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Foreword 
 
Work Package 3 (WP 3) is the first technical stage of the project CEVIS “Comparative 
Evaluations of Innovative Solutions in European Fisheries Management”. The aim of WP3 is 
to evaluate innovative approaches for European fisheries management such as participatory 
governance, right-based management, decision rules and effort control. The first stage of WP 
3 consisted in reviewing the existing literature on in ovations to management focusing on 
four locations in the world where innovations to management have been introduced, as are: 
Canada, Alaska, Iceland and New Zealand. The second stage was the study trip which was 
planned at a WP meeting held in Bergen. The WP3 consists of 8 researchers from a variety of 
social and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary composition of the team has allowed for a 
better understanding of the driving forces and outcmes in each case. 
 
The most important source of information in all cases has been the interviews carried out 
where stakeholders as diverse as fishers, conservationists, scientists and managers have 
illustrated well what has happened in each case. Int rviewees have expressed their views and 
relate the story from their variety of academic andprofessional perspectives identifying which 
decisions and circumstances have been good and which have been deleterious to their 
fisheries systems. The first part of each report consists of a review of the case including 
historical background and rationale of each regime inc ption and a qualitative evaluation of 
the innovation performance. A second part of each report consists of a synthesis of the best 
practices that our team has drawn from the visits and interviews. To help the reader navigate 
through this deliverable a guide through the chapters is provided at the end of the 
introduction. 
 
Our outsider’s view helps in being objective when trying to understand the mechanisms that 
have led these systems either to success or failure. We sincerely thank all the people that have 
welcomed us to their regions, allowing us to be in real touch with each case. We believe this 
deliverable will contribute to the knowledge required to implement management innovations 
in the near future. 
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Introduction 
 
The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a new thinking in fisheries management 
which seeks to counteract and/or prevent the deleterious outcomes of traditional fisheries 
management based on TACs and command and control (C & C) management. A variety of 
systems being referred to as innovations to management that include participation of 
stakeholders, right based management, harvest control rules (HCR) and effort based 
management, have been implemented all over the world and are continually evolving. The 
objective of CEVIS’s WP3 is to gather information ofisheries management regimes in four 
developed regions where innovations have been impleented in order to begin the process of 
evaluating their suitability for the EU fisheries management system. These regions are 
Alaska, Canada, Iceland and New Zealand. 
 
The Cambridge Dictionary (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/) defines innovation as “the use 
of a new idea or method”. In the world of fisheries, innovations have been mainly introduced 
during the last three decades. Some of them arose as a tool to expand country influence on 
recently incorporated Exclusive Economic Zones during the late 1970s, others emerged as 
contingency measures to stock collapses, others arose as a result of conflicts between fishery 
sectors and others emerged in search of efficiency (e.g. overcapacity reduction). Innovations 
seen in the following chapters see the introduction and modification of institutional structures 
to allow participation and the development of a sense of ownership as fundamental in 
achieving the intended objectives of management. Stakeholder’s participation is usually led 
by protection of individual and collective interests and assets, resource protection and 
government understanding that participation is a key factor to build transparency and 
legitimacy of the management processes. 
 
The design of management innovation shall take into account a variety of factors such as 
resources being managed, fishing technology, fishing communities, geographical location, the 
value of fisheries as a source of food and income for a given region, the state of scientific 
expertise and management capabilities and resources. It is extremely complex to address all 
these issues within a management system and it may require the use of complementary 
mechanisms such as cost recovery or industry led resea ch. The introduction of new concepts 
and tendencies in fisheries management, such as the precautionary approach and ecosystem 
based management may modify the original design for a given innovation. It seems that 
bringing together scientists and stakeholders allows learning from errors and to accept and 
deal with concepts that were exclusive to scientists in he past such as uncertainty. 
 
The shape that each management innovation takes seems to be mostly determined by internal 
forces while it usually entails external components. In this regards, the innovative 
management of shared resources managed between two or m re countries would not be the 
same as the management of a resource exploited by a single country. New Zealand is a good 
example of an approach to management that has evolved without much external influence and 
a process of constant adjusting to the changing nature of its management system led by an in-
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depth market based regime. Iceland is somehow similar as it has growth without much 
influence since it is not part of the European Union and has not embraced the Common 
Fisheries Policy. 
 
Innovative measures to counteract resource declines have, in several cases, meant the exit of 
some agents and the entry of new participants. Trade offs among the different management 
objectives shall be counterbalanced when introducing a  innovation. A pure market based 
solution, for example, may cast aside overcapacity and introduce efficiency in the system but 
it may harm the wellbeing of the communities while not being able to assure sustainability of 
stocks, which depends on many factors other than market. Participation assures legitimacy but 
turns the process of management into a very long, costly and complicated process. It is 
difficult that all stakeholders may have the same degree of representation since participation 
could demand important technical and economic resources. Effort management constrains 
effectively harvest activities but it could be undermined by input substitution. Innovations rest 
on the pillars of an effective system of MCS, wide participation and legal mechanisms that 
empowers the decision maker to take decisions for the sake of sustainability. 
 
Since perfect innovation does not exist, many innovati ns will lack the adequate design to 
counteract negative outcomes. A combination of innovati ns taking the best of each system 
may probably have the scope to simultaneously deal with several issues.  Flexibility to change 
may be another of the aspects that may help the syst m to work. Alaska and Canada are two 
cases where a combination of innovations have emerged to deal with the complexity of 
managing fisheries shared by old fishing communities and exploited by a variety of 
technologies. 
 
Fisheries management, as any other human activity dealing with economic interest and the 
protection of resources, very much depends on the economic context, the market, people’s 
and communities’ new expectations and the changes in resources due to environmental 
factors. This system in constant change may require ick, and some times, tough decisions.  
 
The objective of the following chapters is to analyze each case and to draw useful conclusions 
to EU fisheries. Reviewing the reasons for the introduction and the forces that have shaped 
each system and its current performance will help us to draw lessons to European fisheries 
managers. We aim at going further from what literature can tell us in each case. Our aim is to 
mirror the voices of the diverse actors allowing them to tell their story, conveying the reasons 
behind each introduction and its current performance and outcomes. In each case we analyze 
the performance and evaluate the outcomes. In each chapter we draw best practices for the 
introduction of innovations to management.  
 
Structure of the deliverable 
 
Chapter 1 discusses findings on two innovations in Alaskan fishery management. The first of 
these innovations is the Overfishing Level (OFL) tier system, which is a decision rule that is 
part of the TAC setting process and applies to all fish stocks. The second innovation is the 
viii 
system of industry cooperatives that jointly harvest Pollock in the Bering Sea (BS) region. 
This chapter describes the two innovative management systems and assesses them against 
their biological robustness, economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness of management and 
stakeholder acceptance.  The chapter concludes with a best practice section. 
 
Chapter 2 reports on the visit to the province of Nva Scotia in Canada. It discusses the recent 
history and outcomes of rights-based management in Nova Scotia, with a particular focus on 
the inshore mobile gear fishery. It also focuses on different innovations under the general 
category of participatory governance. This chapter d scribes the local fisheries co-
management initiatives called Community Management Boards (CMB) and the combination 
of innovations such as the CMBs’ transferable rights-based system. It also reviews on the 
advances the Canadians have been making in particiption in scientific and decisional aspects. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the case implications for Europe. This includes 
some hypotheses about what kinds of things might work ell in particular circumstances and 
a best practice section.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the Icelandic ITQ system. It reviews the history of the innovation and 
assesses and evaluates the outcomes of the system in terms of the major goals of fisheries 
management such as biological robustness, cost-effectiveness, economic efficiency and social 
robustness. Complementary innovation to management is also discussed such as Harvest 
Control Rules for cod and temporarily closed areas. This concludes with best practice 
guidelines conveying ideas on what is recommendable when introducing an ITQ management 
system. 
 
Chapter 4 describes and analyses the New Zealand quota management system. It describes the 
history of the innovation and the reasons for the introduction of the market based solution. 
The chapter reviews the backbone of the innovation bei g the MCS system and the quality of 
the property rights. Then it looks into the complementary innovations of the QMS inter alia 
participation, the cost recovery system and the deemed value instrument. Finally, it reviews 
the outcomes from the system with regards of industry development, indigenous people and 
communities and resources sustainability. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
case implications for Europe. This includes some hypotheses about what aspects of the 
innovation might work well in particular circumstances and it draws best practice guidelines.  
 
Chapter 5 distills best practices from the precedent chapters aiming at drawing more general 
recommendations from the four study trips. It synthesizes the best practices regarding the 
following objectives of management: economic efficiency, biological robustness, social 
robustness and cost effectiveness of management. 
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Methodology 
 
Four teams of two people, each of them comprised of a natural scientist and a social scientist, 
carried out case studies of areas of the world where innovations of the kind that CEVIS is 
examining have been implemented. These areas were Alaska in USA, Maritime Canada, 
Iceland and New Zealand.  
 
The aim of the case studies was to have a more practical and operational focus on 
implementation; monitoring and enforcement issues associated with management innovations 
than can be found in usual discussions of management innovations in the fisheries literature. 
Moreover, the study trips were designed to identify da -to-day issues in the management of 
fisheries and contingency measures that are being undertaken to counteract threats to resource 
wellbeing such as non-compliant behaviour.  
 
The first stage of the WP was a desk study including review of the technical literature and 
web pages. This first approach allowed us to become acquainted with the case and to identify 
main sources of information that led us to key peopl  and institutions. Prior to the study trips, 
the WP team held a meeting where the team discussed preliminary issues on the nature of the 
cases, scheduled the trips and discussed a draft ques ionnaire that was designed to guide the 
interviews (see Appendix). This questionnaire was not designed to be strictly followed but to 
serve as a basis for the interviews in the field.      
 
The second stage was the study trip that allowed us to get in closer touch with the case and its 
actors, while seeking the sources of success or failure during the QMS implementation. The 
interviews covered the history and development of the innovations, the changes in costs and 
benefits for fisheries management operations associated with the innovation, what indicators 
are used to monitor and improve outcomes, and what is seen as the best practices in 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing the innovations and resulting management measures. 
Moreover, participants in the interviews were asked to identify potential threats and future 
trends in the evolution of the fishery. 
 
In all 84 interviews were conducted with people from a variety of academic disciplines and 
belonging to a wide professional spectrum, including managers, researchers from the realm of 
natural and social sciences, fishermen, industry representatives and conservationists. 
Interviews comprised a wide geographical distribution covering Juneau, Anchorage and 
Seattle in Canada; South West Nova Scotia in USA; Reykjavik in Iceland; and Wellington, 
Auckland and Nelson in New Zealand. Interviews were carried out between November 2006 
and March 2007. 
 
The outcome of this research is this deliverable in which we attempt to mirror the voices of 
the actors conveying the reasons behind each introducti n and its current performance and 
outcomes, and to evaluate the reasons for success or failure from our outsider’s perspective.  
In addition, we draw best practices for the introduction of innovations to management for the 
European Union and elsewhere. Many historical facts given by the interviewees have been 
framed and backed by the comprehensive literature reviews carried out in the early stage of 
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the WP and subsequent revision of literature provided by the interviewees. Finally, each team 
has had a free hand in elaborating their case study reports.
1 
Chapter 1 
 
Fisheries management innovations in Alaska: 
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1 Introduction 
 
This report discusses findings on two regime-level innovations in Alaskan fishery 
management gained through expert/stakeholder intervews1 and the study of secondary 
literature. The first of those innovations is the Overfishing Level (OFL) tier system, a decision 
rule that is part of the TAC setting process and applies to all managed fish stocks in Alaska.2 
The second is the system of industry cooperatives that jointly harvest Pollock in the Bering 
Sea (BS) region. Analytically, the Pollock cooperatives are a mixture between a rights-based 
approach (quotas are allocated to industry sectors which may form cooperatives) and a form 
of participatory management (within these cooperatives, micro-management is carried out by 
the fishery participants themselves). 
 
The two innovations have been selected for study because of their uniqueness and the fact that 
relatively little is yet known about their combined biological, economic, and social effects. 
Furthermore, especially the tier system, which is ba ed on the precautionary approach may be 
an interesting model for EU fisheries and may be integrated into the upcoming Work 
Packages of the CEVIS project. 
 
In this paper, we will describe the two innovative management systems and assess them 
against their biological robustness, economic effici n y, cost-effectiveness of management 
and stakeholder acceptance. While the tier system is an innovation that has some potential to 
make fisheries more biologically robust (without having significant economic and social 
effects), the cooperative model scores high with rega d to economic efficiency but is socially 
rather contentious; it also has impacts with regard to biological robustness and cost 
effectiveness of management but these are less significant. 
 
2 Background 
 
The Eastern Bering Sea contains a huge continental shelf and makes it one of the most 
productive marine ecosystems in the world. Until the middle of the 20th century, fishing off 
the Alaska coast was dominated by the domestic Alaska fi hermen. The principal interest of 
these fishermen was salmon and crab and to a certain xtent halibut. The groundfish species, 
like cod and pollock, were not targeted until the early post-war years, the late 40s and the 50s, 
when the foreign fishing fleets arrived. This was when the national policy in Europe and 
Japan was to revitalize the industry. Trawlers were built, capable of crossing great distances, 
and fleets sent to the Bering Sea, an area the US seemed to focus little on. The foreign trawl 
                                                
1 Altogether, 22 respondents from the fishing industry, fisheries management, civil society, and academia were interviewed which were 
based in Juneau, Anchorage and Seattle. The interviews were carried out in January 2007. 
2 This includes a number of groundfish species (walleye pollock, Pacific cod, sablefish, yellowfin sole, Greenland turbot, arrowtooth 
flounder, rock sole, flathead sole, Alaska plaice, “other flatfish”, Pacific ocean perch, northern rockfish, shortraker and rougheye rockfish, 
“other rockfish”, Atka mackerel, squid, shallow and deep water flatfish, rex sole, flathead sole, arrowto th flounder, Pacific ocean perch, 
shortraker/rougheye rockfish, northern rockfish,“other slope” rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, demersal shelf rockfish, thornyhead rockfish, 
Atka mackerel, and skates) and some non-groundfish species: crab, scallop, halibut, and salmon (cf. NPFMC Management Plans for 2005). 
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fleet first targeted yellowfin sole in the Bering Sea and maximized their catches around 1960. 
In the Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska, themain target of the trawlers was Pacific 
Ocean perch and the longliners sablefish and rockfish. By the end of the 1960s, the foreign 
trawl fleets shifted to walleye pollock as catches of Pacific Ocean perch and yellowfin sole 
decreased (NPFMC, 2006a). The total catches of pollock in the Bering Sea (The Eastern 
Bering Sea, Asian waters and international waters; the Donut hole) peaked in 1986 with 
almost 7 million metric tons.  The catches in the Eastern Bering Sea (now U.S. waters) has 
been rather stable at 1.3 tons since 1970 (Ianelli, 2006). Total catches in the Eastern Bering 
Sea has been almost 2 million tons the last 20 years (See Appendix) (NPFMC, 2006b) and 
around 200 000 tons in Gulf of Alaska in the same period (NPFMC, 2006c). 
 
Fig. 1. Alaska’s geographical setting 
 
In institutional terms, evolution of Alaskan fishery and the Alaskan fishery management 
systems was significantly affected by Alaskan statehood in 1959 – with the Alaska 
constitution codifying open access to state water fisheries3. The Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act from 1976 (renamed MSA in 1996), was the beginning of 
several major aspects of fisheries management in Alaskan waters. The purpose of the Act was 
to extend the nation’s ocean boundaries out to 200 nautical miles and develop a management 
system that allows decisions to be made at the regional level, with the affected public having a 
say in those decisions (NPFMC, 2006a). The Act contained the concept of Allowable 
Biological Catch, ABC, which meant the beginning of quota regulations. By the (unilateral) 
establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone through the US in 1977, the EEZ extended 
from three to 200 nautical miles off the coast. This almost corresponds with the area of the 
                                                
3 Article 8, Section 15, of the Constitution reads: ‘No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the 
natural waters of the State.’ This was amended later to provide for the possibility of Limited Entry Programmes. 
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productive continental shelf in the Eastern Bering Sea. As a consequence of the EEZ, 
management of the commercial fisheries off Alaska falls under a mix of state and federal 
management jurisdictions. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC, or 
‘Council’) has authority for the majority of groundfish fisheries in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone off Alaska, i.e. between 3 and 200 nautical mies off the shore. This includes 
management of pollock, cod, flatfish, mackerel, sablefish, and rockfish species in the Gulf of 
Alaska (GOA) and Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI). The NPFMC is one of nine such 
co-management bodies in the US in which industry and public administration, advised by 
scientists and NGOs, jointly manage federal water fisheries. Its primary management tool is 
Fisheries Management Plans (FMP).4 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA Fisheries)5 has the competence for monitoring and enforcing fisheries management at 
national level. With the Alaska Board of Fisheries and the Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game (ADF&G), analogous structures exist for Alaskan inshore waters. 
 
The foreign dominance in the fisheries off Alaskan is held to be a significant precondition for 
the establishment of a rather precautionary overall management system 
(Eagle/Newkirk/Thompson 2003: 16). This includes the Tier system, which is a set of harvest 
control rules for maximum acceptable biological catch (max ABC) and which will be studied 
in Chapter 3. It furthermore encompasses a strict by atch regulation (also following the Tier 
system), a cap on total catches6 of all species in defined ecosystem and an early observer 
programme.7 At this time it was basically the foreign fishermen that were regulated and 
monitored, so that there was little resistance in the regional political processes.  
In recent years, with overcapitalisation, ever shorter fishing seasons and the respective 
adverse effect on both the harvesting and processing sectors, including with the loss of boats 
and life at sea, rights-based management (locally dubbed ‘rationalisation’) has been 
introduced to limit access to and reduce capacity in a number of fisheries (Queirolo/Benjamin 
2005, Madsen/Fina/Oliver 2006). Legally partitioning the Bering Sea pollock TAC among a 
limited set of participants which are granted usufructuary rights is one instance in this chain of 
rationalization programmes; the cooperatives which emerged in this context will be studied in 
Chapter 4. 
3 Harvest control rules and TAC setting 
The Tier system is a set of harvest control rules and is the basis for setting the TAC for all 
                                                
4 The Council has established five Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) for GOA Groundfish, BSAI Groundfish, Crab, Scallop and SE 
Salmon troll. Since their establishment, the Council only regularly amends the management plans. Approval and implementation of these 
FMPs is carried out through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA Fisheries), a divis on of the United States 
Department of Commerce, which is responsible for the management, conservation and protection of living marine resources within the U.S. 
EEZ. The Management Plans stipulate that all groundfish is managed in accordance with the Tier system. 
5 formerly National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS 
6 This ‘Optimum Yield’ (OY) amounts to 1.4 - 2 Mio metric tons for BSAI groundfish, and to 116 to 800 thousand metric tons for GOA 
groundfish (National Standard Guidelines; National St ndard 1 – Optimum Yield; cf. also Witherell 1997, DiCosimo 2001). 
7 The industry had to, and still has to, pay for the direct costs of putting observers on the boats. NOAA certifies the observers. The 
requirements depend on the size of the vessel, the fis ry etc. The base coverage levels are as follows: Any vessel that is more than 120 feet 
long has to take one observer full time, (which means 2 or 3 observers per trip), and this concerns the w ole groundfish fisheries. Vessels 
from 60-125 feet require observers 30% of the fishing days while smaller boats have no requirements. Some of the processing plants have 
observer requirements depending on the quantities of fi h they process in a month. The observers on the AFA-fleet (the pollock vessels) and 
some other fisheries have to take samples of every haul. Compliance is not considered an issue at the 100% coverage vessels while there may 
be some problems at the 30%. The observers also play an important role in the bycatch regulations and prohibited species regulation. They 
collect data on everything in the hauls: fish, mammals, birds, bottom habitat and lost nets. 
5 
groundfish stocks managed by the North Pacific Fisher es Management Council. The bycatch, 
endangered and non-commercial species are also assigned to a tier. The TAC is set each year 
for all stocks. The Tier system is defined in the Management Plan for the BSAI and for GOA, 
and is thus the council’s interpretation and operation lization of the fisheries management 
strategy stated in the MSA. This strategy is based on several concepts: optimum yield (OY), 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), overfishing and rebuilding of stocks. MSA, National 
Standard 1, states that “Conservation and management asures shall prevent overfishing 
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the OY from each fishery for the United States fishing 
industry.” The MSA defines overfishing to signify “a rate or level of fishing mortality that 
jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce thmaximum sustainable yield on a 
continuing basis.” OY is defined as the amount of fish which 
 
- “Will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food 
production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems.” 
- “Is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum s stainable yield from the fishery, as 
reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor.” 
- “In the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with 
producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fisery.” 
 
The Maximum Sustainable Yield is defined as “the largest long-term average catch or yield 
that can be taken from a stock or stock complex under prevailing ecological and 
environmental conditions.” In this context, a “MSY control rule” is defined as “a harvest 
strategy which, if implemented, would be expected to result in a long-term average catch 
approximating MSY.”  
 
The total allowable catch (TAC) for each groundfish stock in BSAI and GoA is based on 
three principles 
 
- The Tier system, which provides a quantity of the maxi um allowable biological catch 
(max ABC) for each groundfish stock, 
- The groundfish cap, which sets an upper limit for the total TACs for all stocks in a certain 
ecosystem,  
- OY (optimum yield), which may stay at or reduce theTAC from ABC by economic, 
social or ecological factors. 
The Tier system defines the overfishing level (OFL) and the maximum acceptable biological 
catch (max ABC), which sets the upper limit for theABC, which again sets the upper limit for 
the TAC. ABC and OFL are based on estimates of current stock status (if they can be 
provided) and on harvest rates corresponding to the MSY concept. The rule contains a 
strategy for rebuilding stocks to MSY levels when they are estimated below the MSY biomass 
level. 
 
The FMPs have set constraints for the total catches of groundfish, one cap for GoA and one 
for BSAI. The underlying idea of the cap is that there is a long-term maximum sustainable 
yield of groundfish for each ecosystem, and which will vary according to the productivity of 
the system. The range of MSY was estimated by an early version of EcoSim (an ecosystem 
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production model). The range for BSAI groundfish was estimated at 1.8 to 2.4 million metric 
tons (NPFMC, 2006). For precautionary reasons, the OY was set at 85% of the TAC range or 
1.4 – 2.0 million metric tons. The OY for GOA groundfish is set to 116 to 800 thousand 
metric tons (Witherell 1997, DiCosimo 2001). In accordance with the FMPs the sum of total 
groundfish catches must always fall at or below the optimum yield. In practice, the cap for the 
GoA has not been reached and only the upper limit of the range for the BSAI OY range has 
been used. The cap of 2 million metric tons for the BSAI was introduced in 1982 and was 
decided by law in 2005, legislated as an amendment. 
 
Max ABC is a preliminary quantity for ABC, which agin is the upper limit for the TAC. 
Max ABC is a result of the Tier system where the Tir is agreed in advance. The assessment 
author might recommend an ABC below the maximum value due to ecosystem considerations 
(e.g. low zooplankton abundance), uncertain data (e.g. incomplete survey coverage) or 
switching to other assessment models. It is not possible to recommend an ABC above the 
maximum level.  The Plan Team decides the ABC. The AC can be further reduced by other 
factors, like when the ABCs for all stocks amount to a higher level than the total Cap, of 
economic reasons or when the ABC is not expected to be taken because of bycatch problems 
and the strict bycatch regulations. 
 
3.1 The annual TAC cycle 
 
TAC setting is organized in a regular annual cycle. Scientists from the NOAA Fisheries and 
the ADF&G collect and update data on catch, age and size composition, as well as biomass, 
on a yearly basis for the Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) report (as required 
by the Guidelines for Fishery Management Plans). The SAFE reports summarize the best 
available scientific information concerning the past, present, and future condition of the 
stocks, marine ecosystems, and fisheries under federal management. The agencies’ stock 
assessment scientists analyze the data and calculate estimates of population parameters, 
biomass, and age structure. They use stock assessment models to integrate the information, 
except when the data is not sufficient to construct s ch a model. The assessments determine 
the ABC and OFL. 
 
The BSAI and GOA Plan Teams meet each September to discuss methodological issues and 
preliminary stock assessments. In October, the Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC), the 
Advisory Panel (AP) and the NPFMC convene. The SSC focuses on assessment 
methodology, while the AP recommends and the NPFMC sets preliminary TACs based on 
extrapolations from the previous year. By November, the individual chapters of the SAFE 
reports have been prepared by the assessment scientists, and another group of scientists has 
completed the section on Ecosystem Considerations (EC). This is made official and there is a 
public hearing. The Plan Teams meet again in November to review the SAFE reports and 
make ABC recommendations. In December, the SSC reviews and evaluates the SAFE reports, 
the Plan Team recommendations and comments from the public, and has the final say in terms 
of the ABC recommendations. The AP recommends TAC values, which are traditionally 
lower than the ABC values recommended by the SSC. The NPFMC then sets final values of 
ABC and TAC, subject to confirmation by NOAA Fisheries (NOAA Fisheries 2004 c: 11). 
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Neither the authors of the SAFE report, the Plan Team nor the SSC recommends TAC. 
 
3.2 The evolution of harvest control rules 
 
The fisheries were virtually unregulated through 1965 and thereafter only minimally regulated 
until the mid-1970s (NPFMC, 2006). During this period, the foreign fleet dominated and the 
catches were only limited by closed areas and gear restrictions. The first catch limits on some 
species were set in bilateral agreements in 1973. The initial question of that time was how to 
manage a stock that is clearly declining as the management of a group of rockfish allowed 
catches that seemed to lead to stock decline. 
 
The first goal of the early management was to get estimates of fish stock biomass and harvest 
rates for management purposes. This was the beginnin  of the scientific surveys, and. the 
early assessments were basically using survey data to get point estimates. The first 
management strategy was based on fractions; say a ctch of 15% of the biomass estimate.   
The tier system was developed through 2 sets of amend nts of the FMPs. While the concept 
of ABC already existed, the definition of overfishing came in as an amendment in 1976.  A 
two-parameter (two-part) harvest control rule was adopted for the Alaska groundfish in 1990, 
which was modified to a three-parameter form in 1996. In 1998, the U.S. Government issued 
a set of National guidelines (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998), which assigned a 
fundamental role to the further development of the harvest control rules (Thompson, 1999). 
These control rules are the basis for the Tier system, first established in 1994-5 by 
Amendment number 44, and supplanted by Amendment 56 (1998). The last is still valid and 
relatively similar to today. It contained the concepts of overfishing levels, maximum 
sustainable yield and acceptable biological catch. The Agency thus required the scientists to 
determine whether the stocks were overfished. The natio al guidelines include requirement 
specifications for the precautionary approach: 1) target harvest rates are less than limit harvest 
rates, 2) harvest rates at low stock sizes are less than harvest rates at high stock sizes and 3) 
the buffer between limit and target harvest rates widens as uncertainty regarding a stock’s size 
or productive capacity increases (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998). The Tier system 
fulfils these requirements, except that the size of the buffer not necessarily increases with 
uncertainty (Thompson, 1999; confirmed on interviews). 
The scientists develop the harvest control rule, NOAA Fisheries evaluates the tier system to 
see whether it complies with the national guidelines and scientists assess the stocks on a 
regular basis and determine whether the stocks are overfished. As assessment models were 
more and more used globally, the scientists in charge of assessing the stocks in Alaskan 
waters and the Bering Sea started doing assessments by virtual population analysis (VPA). 
However, they found the VPA too data demanding and developed their own models that were 
less data demanding and more statistically based. 
The harvest rate (FMSY) and biomass levels (BMSY) that determine the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield, are based on stock-recruitment rela ionship At that time the amount of data 
was considered not to be sufficient to estimate this relationship for quite many of the Alaska 
stocks, so they had to come up with proxies for FMSY and BMSY. They ended with F40%, which 
is the harvest rate associated with an equilibrium level of spawning per recruit equal to 40% 
of the equilibrium level in the absence of any fishing (NPFMC, 2006b).  
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This means that the F-value will be lower for species with lower egg production. The 
scientists decided on B35% for Bmsy. The accepted biological catch (ABC) is set b low this 
(see appendix). The scientist respondents regard the MSY-proxies as a bit ad hoc, but yet 
robust. 
 
3.3 Description of the Tier system 
 
The Tier system is a 6-tier set of harvest control rules that applies to all the Alaskan 
groundfish stocks (Appendix). The bycatch, endangered and non-commercial species are also 
assigned to a tier. 
The amount and quality of data on a particular stock, decides which of the tiers goes with the 
stock. Tier 1 is assigned to those species with the highest level of data and biological 
information (a stock-recruitment relationship), while Tier 6 to those with very low data and 
biological information. Each tier contains a formula or set of formulae defining ABC and 
OFL. ABC and OFL are based on calculations of MSY, but only Tier 1 follows the theoretical 
MSY concept. Proxies for MSY are used in Tiers 2 – 4. Tiers 1 to 3 basically require age-
structured models, and each of these Tiers consists of a 3-part rule, reflecting the state of the 
stock. One part applies when the biomass estimate is higher than Bmsy, the other two when it 
is lower, implying no catch when the stock is below a critical level (defined as 5% of the 
BMSY level). The intention is thus to keep the biomass level above an MSY level, or, if 
necessary, to rebuild the stock to this level. Tiers 4 to 6 are a one-part rule. The requirement 
for Tier 5 is a minimum of biological information and for Tier 6 that there is a reliable catch 
history for a certain period. Tier 6 is thus construc ed in such a way that if there is no data, it 
is not possible to develop fisheries on new species. B cause of the substantial observation 
program and scientific survey information, however, it has been possible to provide enough 
data to categorize non-harvested species as Tier 5. The FMP lists all the targeted species, so 
for a fishery to develop, there has to be an amendmt. 
Of the stocks in the BSAI area, only BSAI pollock is in Tier 1, 12 stocks are in 3, 8 stocks in 
5 and 2 stocks in Tier 6 (NPFMC, 2006b). Of the 13 stocks considered enough information to 
have a 3-step rule, 10 are assessed to be above the BMSY level, while 3 stocks are assessed to 
be below, but considered above the critical level. Of the 18 stocks that are assigned to a tier in 
GoA, 10 stocks are at 3, 3 at 4, 4 at 5 and one stock is at level 6. 8 of 10 stocks are assessed to 
be above the BMSY level. In the BSAI area, tier 2 and 4 is presently not used, and 1 and 2 is 
not used in the GoA. According to our respondents Tier 2 has never been used and Tier 4 has 
not been common. Some of the stocks are likely to be shared between the two areas. 
 
Stocks can move from one tier to another. Most often it is upwards, but occasionally 
downwards.  A stock may go down a tier if the survey coverage was not sufficient or if there 
is some decrease in the quality of the data input to the stock assessment. Reasons for going up 
are improvements in the data quality or stock assessm nt model. Although the Tier system is 
constructed to take uncertainty into account by defining a buffer (between OFL and ABC), the 
buffer does not increase with increasing uncertainty. In practice the harvest rate decreases 
with increasing tier but not necessarily. 
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3.4 Assessment 
3.4.1 The Tier system and the resource situation 
 
Assessing the impact of the Tier system on the resources is impossible without taking into 
account compliance, the observer program, fisheries regulations besides the TAC and the role 
of the NPFMC. All parties, including the environmental organizations, express that 
compliance is not an issue. Full compliance and the observer program together result in a 
situation where the control of what is caught by the Alaska fisheries is extremely high 
compared to the case in European waters. So, the status of targeted, bycatch, endangered and 
non-commercial species hinges also on the success of the observer program. In addition the 
catch, including the bycatch regulations, have been very strict so that the TACs have been 
followed more or less. The TAC regulations have also been restricted by ecosystem 
considerations. The total Cap for total groundfish catches has restricted, especially the 
pollock, TACs, prey fish (e.g. mackerel and capelin) is not targeted in federal waters of 
ecosystem considerations and relatively vast areas are closed to fishing. In contrast to many 
other U.S. regional councils, the NPFMC follows theprinciple that the TAC should never 
exceed the max ABC level set by the scientists. 
 
Compared to other fisheries around the world, the tier system provides precautious 
management. Stock abundances are historically high for several stocks. Most groundfish 
stocks are considered to be above the BMSY level and few below. The fishing mortality rate 
is very low compared to European stocks. The FMSY level is lower than 0.4 for all stocks in 
the BSAI and GoA, but for most stocks it is lower than 0.1. The history of harvest rates 
indicate that the stocks have been harvested at about these levels the last 10 –20 years. 
 
A general comparison with the European situation, the Tier system provides cautious harvest 
rates, is more cautious with long-lived species, is generally more cautious the less data there is 
and prevents new fisheries to develop before there is a certain minimum amount of data. 
However our respondents have pointed to some aspects that may indicate that there may be 
possible ways of improving the Tier system. 
 
Starting with the more technical aspects, the scientist respondents pointed at some weaknesses 
with the Tier system: the difference between ABC and OFL is not prescribed on uncertainty 
and it is not necessarily more precautious down the tiers, tier 2 has never been used and the 
results from switching tier level has been somewhat unpredictable. They suggested that the 
Tier system should change to a rule that enables to take uncertainty into account in a general 
way, maybe exchanged with one single rule, and that more stability in TAC levels should be 
built into the rule. Other parties did not address such extensional changes, but tier 6 was 
criticised for its arbitrariness and that it in principle allowed a stock decline, and the 
environmental organizations argued that the assessment uncertainty wasn’t properly taken 
into account. This is also expressed through a concern that the Council did not always follow 
the scientists’ recommendations on reducing the ABC of ecosystem or uncertainty reasons. 
 
A common complaint from the environmental organizations was the huge quantity of fish 
removed from the ecosystems of the Eastern Bering Sea. Although they considered the 
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ecosystem in a healthy state at the moment, they argued that the fisheries in the federal waters 
is relatively young, that the present abundance is sheer luck and that eventually the stocks will 
decline and become depleted, just like history has developed elsewhere. Especially they point 
to the extreme catch level of the BS pollock stock. They argue that this level, because of its 
size, must have a considerable impact on the ecosystem. 
 
Several issues have been addressed by the respondents which they denote as weaknesses with 
the Tier system, but are more likely to be complementary issues. There are related to spatial 
management, ecosystem function of a particular stock and that the total Cap should consist of 
a range, depending on the productivity of the ecosystem and not set at a single value. 
 
The Alaskan natives have been worried about local dep etions of stocks. There were claims 
that they have to go further and further away from the coast to get fish and that because of the 
big, federal, fishing vessel fishing within the 3 mile zone. Spatial management has been an 
issue at the Council because of worries about local dep etions. Managing the stock on spatial 
grounds may probably solve this problem without changing the Tier system.  Other reasons 
for spatial management that have been voiced by the gre ns are protection of nursery areas, 
spawning grounds and bottom habitat. 
 
The fisheries in the BSAI and GoA are not minimum fish size regulated and 
environmentalists argued that small fish should be more protected. 
 
Again, these last issues are possible to solve without changing the Tier system, but is of 
course highly relevant in the more general resource management context. 
 
3.4.2 Trust in science and resource management 
 
In general all parties seem to have confidence in the Tier system and how it is used. Fisheries 
cannot develop without a minimum of data, bycatch regulations have to follow the Tier 
system, harvest rates seem sustainable and management is takes ecosystem considerations 
into account. The industry respondents, the managers and the scientists themselves all confirm 
that the industry seems to have trust in science and especially in the Tier system. . The pollock 
fishery in particular, prides itself on respecting the max ABC, supporting sustainable fisheries 
and contributing to an ecosystem friendly management.  The explanatory factors for this trust 
may be diverse. Early experience had demonstrated that the main salmon stock in Alaska was 
recovered from depletion with science advice and the depletion of fish stocks on the U.S. east 
coast was a warning. The precautionary management from its start was welcomed as it was 
regarded as a means to diminish the foreign fleet, regarding the ABCs, the strict bycatch 
regulations and the total Caps. The bycatch regulations have again been a reason for accepting 
lower TACs and the total Cap because the industry has seen that the TAC would have been 
impossible to take anyway. The productivity of the ecosystems, especially the Eastern Bering 
Sea, has provided abundant stocks so that the market oriented fisheries, which dominates the 
federal waters of Alaska, has found it suitable to restrict the quotas. The remaining actors after 
the foreign fleets had left and after the several rationalization programs have made good 
profits on fishing. The Tier system is transparent in hat the principles of all the tiers are 
11 
stated, and combined with the participatory nature of the Council, the interested parties have 
their say in deciding the TAC and how it is allocate.   Non-industry respondents claim that the 
industry has never lobbied to get a higher TAC than the ABC. On the contrary, when the 
scientists changed model for pacific cod, and it showed twice as much as the old one, the 
industry recommended to follow the old one. They were satisfied with their share. 
 
Although there are several examples where the industry goes for a lower TAC than the 
recommended ABC by the scientists, the industry does challenge the scientific reasons for 
lowering the ABC below the max ABC. The industry perceives these reasons as subjective as 
they are not included in the assessment model calculations. Since the scientists agree that 
science is respected, this may mean that they consider the max ABC as precautionary enough 
in itself. 
 
The critical voices to the tier system are basically from the environmental organizations. Their 
concerns are the harvest rate levels, uncertainty considerations, local depletions and the lack 
of ecosystem considerations. They criticize the fact that the scientists’ recommendations for 
lowering the ABC can be overruled by the industry through the Plan Team and suggest that 
science recommendations should not be negotiable. While the managers, the industry and the 
scientists seemed content with the management system and enjoyed mutual trust, the 
environmental organizations were far more critical. Apart that values and attitudes may be the 
main reasons for this difference, the fact that the environmental organizations have never had 
a representative at the council may also play a role. The other three parties may have 
developed a general common understanding through cooperation in the Council, while the 
greens have tried to influence the decisions mostly through testimonies. The scientists think 
the environmentalists exaggerate their criticism of the management, while the greens question 
the scientists’ credibility by referring to industry funded research. This does not mean that the 
environmental organizations are powerless actors. It i  quite the contrary. They have won two 
significant court cases against the Council. One was on violating the Federal Endangered 
Species Act by jeopardizing the continued existence of ndangered species, and the other on 
violating the National Federal Policy Act. These led to the protection of Stellar Sea Lion and 
its prey and impact assessments of the groundfish feries. This power of the 
environmentalists may have contributed to change the a titude of the industry and the Council 
towards a more environmental friendly policy. 
 
4 Bering Sea Pollock cooperatives: Economic efficiency at the cost of 
social acceptance? 
 
In the following, we will describe and assess against the CEVIS criteria the system of industry 
cooperatives that evolved in the Bering Sea pollock fisheries in the US (EEZ) waters off 
Alaska. The cooperatives represent a specific form f rights based management, where the 
fishing industry negotiates in a self-governance approach among themselves quota shares 
after access to the fishery had been limited to a defined (and quite low) number of 
participants. Within the North Pacific/ Alaskan fisheries management, the pollock 
cooperatives represent one example within a string of rights based management systems 
(‘rationalisation’ programmes) that have been introduced over the past 15 years. 
12 
 
Walleye pollock is a semi-pelagic schooling fish widely distributed in the North Pacific. The 
Alaska pollock fishery accounts for over 20% of theotal US landings (Felthoven 2002: 184) 
and is the largest single segment of Alaskan fishing industry with 1,48 Mio metric tons of 
harvested fish in 2005 and a real ex-vessel value exc eding $ 350 Mio (Hiatt 2006: 13, 17). 
The low-priced Walleye pollock – in 2005 it achieved ca. $0.13 per pound at the market (ibid: 
7) – had become popular with the decline of whitefish populations such as cod that resulted in 
the search for substitutes.8 While there are four major Pollock stocks – the Gulf of Alaska 
(GoA), Eastern Bering Sea (BS), the Aleutian Islands (AI) and the Central Bering Sea/ 
Bogoslof Island pollock –, cooperatives were only itroduced in the BSAI region. Since the 
AI region has been closed to fishing due to the declin  in the Stellar Sea Lion population, the 
cooperative fleet is currently only active in the BS. The fishery is highly industrial, dominated 
by a number of large factory trawlers with a crew of ca. 100 and a length of 80-100m and 
smaller catcher vessels9. These vessels are typically owned by non-Alaskan residents and 
operated from Washington State. The dominant gear type is midwater trawling and harvesting 
takes place in an ‘A’ season in spring (roe) and a ‘B’ season in summer/autumn. Pollock 
products include the higher value products roe and frozen blocks as well as surimi, mince, and 
fish meal. As regards international markets, competitors to the Alaskan Pollock industry are 
the Russian pollock industry which has suffered from declining stocks in the past years and, 
in a wider sense, other international whitefish industries including aquaculture. 
 
4.1 Evolution and characteristics 
 
The pollock cooperatives emerged as a result of ongoing conflicts (‘Pollock Wars’ according 
to one interviewee) between the inshore and offshore Pollock sectors. The inshore sector 
consists of Catcher Vessels (CVs) that deliver to sh re-side processing plants, while the 
offshore sector includes Catcher/Processor Vessels (C/Ps) (i.e. large ‘factory trawlers’) on the 
one hand and the Mothership sector (MS) on the other. Motherships do not themselves 
harvest fish but process the Pollock a fleet of CVs delivers to them. These three sectors of the 
Pollock industry have developed differing interests and these are crucial to understand the 
evolution of the coop system. 
 
Historically, with the Pollock fishery being largely foreign, efforts were politically supported 
to first form joint ventures between US and foreign companies and then fully Americanise the 
industry (Wilen/ Richardson 2003). At the same time, there was an interest by the State of 
Alaska to settle processing plants at the Alaskan coast in order to improve community 
infrastructures, to create employment and generate rev nues through the taxing of landings. 
Mainly Japanese investors were approached to build up processing/ surimi factories. These 
plants were also in the interest of CVs which could now deliver to the shore processors and 
not only to MS or C/Ps. 
 
In problem underlying the Inshore-Offshore conflict was the huge capacity of the C/Ps which 
                                                
8 Among others, McDonald’s and Unilever as large customers started to source Alaska Pollock as an alterntive to cod. 
9 4-6 crew members, 30-60 m long. 
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threatened to deprive the smaller CVs of harvesting opportunities. These were less efficient 
since they needed to land fish to shore-based plants between trips. Allying with the processors 
and supported by significant players such as Alaskan Senator Stevens, the CV sector in the 
late 1980s started to fight in the (Alaska-dominated) Council for a separate share of the 
resource to be set aside for them. In 1993, the first Inshore-Offshore deal was struck which 
resulted in a quota allocation of 35% for the inshore sector (i.e. CVs) and 65% for the 
offshore sector (both C/Ps and MS). In the subsequent y ars, the inshore quota was raised 
continually, to the massive discontent of the offshore sector. 
 
To make up for their losses, the C/Ps envisaged the creation of harvesting cooperatives which 
had been successfully introduced among C/Ps in the S ate of Washington Pacific Whiting 
fishery in 1997. The institutional innovation of cooperatives allowed circumventing the US 
moratorium on introducing new Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems in the mid-
1990s.10 However, beforehand legal concerns with regard to US anti-trust law11 needed to be 
overcome, which declares agreements among competitors all cating resource outputs to be 
per se illegal. While the ‘Fishermen’s Cooperative Marketing Act’ in principal extends an 
anti-trust exemption to collective harvesting arrangements, legal cases had suggested that 
coop members needed to have a low level of vertical integration (Sullivan 2000: 2-3). 
Catcher/processors, however, are vertically integrat d to a high extent. Forming of the 
‘Whiting Conservation Cooperative’ – the participants of which also operated C/Ps in the 
Bering Sea Pollock fishery – became possible on the basis of a Business Review Letter by the 
Department of Justice which accepted the argumentatio  that a harvesting cooperative would 
be pro-competitive.12 After this precedent, which had triggered substantial efficiency gains in 
the whiting industry (ibid: 5-6), creating a cooperative for Bering Sea Pollock 
catcher/processors analogous to the pacific whiting coop seemed legally possible. However, 
technically it required that the offshore sector was formally divided into a catcher/processor 
sector and a mothership sector. This split was demanded by the representatives of the C/P 
sector in the third Inshore-Offshore negotiations i 1998. After lengthy deliberations, 
however, the Council rejected the claim (NPFMC 1998). 
 
The C/Ps then turned to Congress. In Washington D.C. at the time, a draft bill (the American 
Fisheries Act,13 or “AFA”) was being negotiated. It originally aimed at increasing the US 
ownership requirement for US fishing vessels and at revoking the fishery eligibility of certain 
C/Ps that Senator Stevens believed had entered the BS Pollock fishery in violation of the 
Commercial Fishing Vessel Anti-Reflagging Act14 of 1987 (Sullivan 2000: 6).15 The 
                                                
10 The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 stipulated a four-year moratorium. This was triggered by distribut onal and fairness concerns 
resulting from experiences with ITQ programmes such as for the Sablefish and Halibut fisheries off Alask . 
11 The basic US antitrust law is the Sherman Act. 
12 The argument was that while coop participants had an imminent interest to fully harvest their TAC allocation and not to curb market 
supply, the arrangement would increase efficiency and productivity. It would hence benefit consumers as more products would be produced 
at a lower unit cost from the same amount of fish (Sullivan 2000: 5). 
13 Division C, Title II of U.S. Public Law 105-277 
14 Pub.L. 100-239 
15 A number of vessels had been built or rebuilt in Norwegian shipyards (which were subsidised by Norwegian oil revenues to maintain 
their world leadership); in order to qualify as US vessels, however, the boats needed at least to contain specific components (such as the keel) 
from the US. 
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withdrawal would in effect have made possible a further increase of the inshore sector 
allocation at the cost of the offshore sector. Since the vessels to be withdrawn were 
Washington-based, Washington Senator Gorton opposed th  draft bill. By mid-1998 
negotiations were at an impasse. In this constellation, he lobbyists of the catcher/processor 
sector managed to convince Congress that their sugge tions could solve the problem. As a 
result, the draft was substantially redesigned. 
 
The AFA as it was passed in 1998 facilitates the creation of cooperatives in the Bering Sea 
Pollock fishery by establishing a separate and permanent allocation of Pollock for both the 
C/P, mothership16 and CV sectors. It also determines the eligibility criteria for vessels to 
participate based on a catch history (1995-1997), and ctually lists the eligible vessels. In 
addition, the AFA provides for a buy-out of nine C/Ps, thus achieving the capacity reduction 
desired by Senator Stevens. While not providing for a legal framework governing the coop 
formation in the case of the C/Ps, the AFA does lay down criteria for the formation of 
cooperatives among the inshore catcher vessels,17 the owners of whom had in the meantime 
become interested in the idea of coops as well. Key to the complicated regulation of inshore 
coops is that these cooperatives are plant-specific. They form on an annual basis around an 
affiliated shoreside processor to which they agree to deliver at least 90% of their pollock catch 
allocation. The contentious tying of vessels to a specific processor ‘is intended to promote 
win-win rationalization in both the overcapitalized harvesting and processing sectors’ 
(Matulich/ Sever/ Inaba 2001: 13). The AFA also established ‘sideboards’ (i.e. catch limits) 
on the participation by AFA-vessels in the non-pollock BSAI groundfish fisheries and GOA 
groundfish fisheries.18 These shall prevent the ‘spillover’ of capacity into other fisheries to 
protect the interests of fishermen and processors who have not directly benefited from the 
AFA; the C/P’s sideboards are defined in the AFA on the basis of historical catches. Finally, 
AFA subjects the cooperatives to annual reporting requirements (see PCC/HSCC 2006).19 
 
After the AFA had been passed, the cooperatives formed and participants contractually 
allocated percentage shares of the total allocation, based on their historical catch levels. 
Today, the system of cooperatives looks as follows: There are ten coops, one (active one) in 
the C/P sector,20 two in the mothership sector and seven in the inshore (CV) sector. Each of 
the latter is associated with a shore plant. The coops are entitled to the Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) of BSAI Pollock after certain shares have been subtracted from it. These include a 
10% allocation of the TAC to the Alaskan Community Development Quota (CDQ) 
programme plus allowances for the incidental catch of Pollock by vessels harvesting other 
groundfish species.21 From the remainder of the TAC, the catcher vessels receive 50%, the 
                                                
16 Note that most of the catcher vessels that deliver to the three motherships are qualified for fishing i  the inshore sector of the BSAI 
pollock fishery. 
17 AFA, Section 210. 
18 AFA, Section 211. 
19 Cf. Section 210(a)(1)(B) of the AFA.  
20 Formally, an additional co-op exists in the offshore-sector, the “High Seas Catcher Cooperative” (HSCC) exists, the shares of which have 
however been leased to the second (and active) cooperative. 
21 AFA, Section 206. 
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catcher/processors 40%22 and the motherships 10%. Company-specific allocatins allow the 
firms to freely choose which and how many vessels to operate and to coordinate their efforts. 
While the C/P coops started cooperative fishing in 1999, the mothership and inshore coops 
did so only in 2000. No new entries are possible except when a company purchases an AFA 
vessel or its coop share. 
 
Catcher Vessels
50% of I/O Allocation
7 cooperatives
90 [?] catcher vessels
CDQ Allocation
Allowance for incidential catch of Pollock
Catcher/Processors
40% of I/O Allocation
2 coops (1 of them active)
8 members, 16 vessels Total TAC
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20 CVs
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O
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Fig. 2. The system of BSAI Pollock cooperatives (2007). Source: own. 
 
How exactly do the cooperatives work? Basically, the cooperatives fulfil three functions: a. 
allocation of quota shares and of sideboards, b. bycatch reduction, as well as c. the respective 
monitoring and enforcement. Of these, the foremost function is to allocate within each sector, 
and respectively within each cooperative, the allotted quota share of Pollock. This happens on 
a contractual basis, in the form of a Membership Agreement. In practice, the cooperative 
system is similar to an ITQ system. However, beyond deciding on the allocation of harvesting 
privileges coop members also decide on the system for trading, selling or enforcing them. 
Both leasing and selling fishing privileges among members of the cooperative are allowed. 
The leasing and sale of harvesting privileges to an utside party are allowed only if the buyer 
agrees to abide by the rules set forth in the cooperativ ’s contract. The buyer must also 
harvest and process the quota with one of the vessels already permitted or a replacement 
vessel that meets specific criteria (NOAA Fisheries 2004b: F8-11). The cooperatives’ 
Membership Agreements provide for contractual remedies to enforce sanctions should a 
member exceed the quota allocated to them. In addition to harvest shares, within the inshore 
and mothership cooperatives, sideboards (see explanation above) need to be allocated.23 
Membership Agreements govern these issues within each coop, and in addition an 
“Intercooperative Agreement” was developed to govern the allocation between the CV and 
MS coops. Like harvesting shares, sideboard restrictions can be traded among cooperative 
participants and between the different cooperatives.24 In practice, coop managers handle the 
trades of both harvesting shares and sideboard limits w thin each coop. An inter-coop 
manager handles the trades between the coops. Most trades take place at the end of the fishing 
                                                
22 In 2007/08, the share of the seven C/V coops in this TAC allocation ranges from 2.9% to 31.8% (NOAA Fisheries 2007).  
23 The sideboards for the C/P cooperative have been allocated in the AFA. 
24 With the exception of the C/P cooperative, cf. Footn te 23. 
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season when it comes to pool and ‘clean up’ the remaining tons of TAC. 
 
A second function which was not originally foreseen has been developed in 2001. The 
cooperatives concluded a further Agreement25 which contains a ‘rolling hot-spot’ programme 
to avoid salmon bycatch.26 Salmon bycatch is a crucial issue not only because of the 
economic importance of salmon to Alaskan communities, but also because Salmon bycatch 
counts against the Salmon TAC so that the Pollock fishery may be closed down when the 
Salmon TAC is exhausted. In the rolling hotspot programme, areas with the highest bycatch 
rates are identified as ‘Savings Closures’ two times a week and are closed to fishing based on 
each coops’ bycatch performance. Each coop is also as igned to one of three tiers on a weekly 
basis: those with low bycatch rates don’t have to respond to closures, those with medium 
bycatch rates are restricted by the closures for four of the days, and those with high rates are 
restricted all seven days (Fahn 2005: 24). About 85 percent of the AFA Pollock harvest is 
observed by NMFS through observers, and this data, sh red among all the coops, forms the 
basis for the bycatch reduction system.27 Vessels that experience an incident of high salmon 
bycatch are required to provide a fleet wide notification of the ‘hot spot’, disseminated by 
satellite communication to the participating vessel. This and weekly bycatch reports help 
captains avoid areas of potentially high bycatch. A similar system (the “Calamari Triangle”) 
was devised when bycatch of squid (a non-managed spcies) reached alarming levels in 2006. 
 
The third function of the coops is monitoring and enforcement of the above mentioned 
functions. This is done by a third party, the private company “Sea State Inc”. On the basis of 
catch data reported to NOAA Fisheries, Regional Office data and direct communication with 
the boats, Sea State verifies on a company-by-company b sis that the coop’s pollock catches 
don’t exceed their allocations. Contractual remedies are foreseen when a company overfishes 
the allotted quota share. Sea State is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the 
Salmon Bycatch Agreement. Among others, a weekly ranking of the twenty boats with the 
worst bycatch record (‘Dirty 20’ lists) helps to determine whether there is a systemic problem 
or just unlucky accidents. Enforcement measures include a 50-percent-of-catch penalty for a 
first closure area violation and a 100-percent penalty for a second one (ibid; Holland/Ginter 
2001: 40). The private monitoring system constitutes a kind of in-season micro-management 
with the aim to maximise the harvest by avoiding closures driven by by-catch. 
 
We will briefly add some more details on the coops’ operation for the economically most 
important and politically most high-profile of the cooperatives, i.e. the Catcher/Processor 
cooperative “Pollock Conservation Cooperative” (PCC). The PCC is the only coop active in 
the C/P sector, although formally a second cooperativ  (the “High Seas Catcher Cooperative”, 
HSCC) exists, too. The HSCC consists of catcher vessels only, which had traditionally 
delivered their harvest to the C/Ps. Once the AFA was in effect, the members of the HSCC 
started to lease out and in the meantime have now sold out their shares to the PCC. The PCC 
                                                
25 The “Salmon Bycatch Management Agreement” of 2001, renewed in 2006. 
26 It is mostly Chinook Salmon and Chum Salmon that are c ught as by-catch by pollock boats. 
27 While beforehand, the bycatch rates were already available at NOAA Fisheries, since most of the vessels had observers on board, no 
mechanism existed to merge this information in realtime and make it available to the vessels. One reason for this was that the information 
was confidential – making the data public would have revealed the locations of individual vessels. Hence, an agreement between Sea State, 
NOAA Fisheries and the participating companies allows Sea State to retrieve observer data and calculate bycatch rates per ton. 
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formed in a two months negotiation late 1998. In 2006, the percentage share for the eight PCC 
companies ranged from 5.0% to 43.7% (PCC/HSSC 2007: 1 ). Theoretically, an annual 
meeting should take place at the beginning of each year to establish a “Harvesting Plan” 
which, however, turned out not to be necessary in the past years. The members meet monthly 
back-to-back with meetings of their trade associations28 to discuss operational issues, but the 
meetings are said to be very short. 
 
4.2 Assessment  
4.2.1 Biological performance: Support for cautious management as long as the profit 
flows? 
 
To analyse the cooperatives’ impact on the natural resources, we will take into account the 
impact on pollock stock, sideboard and prohibited species. Also there are discussions on 
ecosystem impacts like bottom habitat destruction, Stellar Sea lions, local depletions and fuel 
consumption. We will have a look at what influences these impacts, the coops or other 
management features. 
Table 1. Stock Assessment of Walley Pollock (Nov. 2006)  
 
Source: NPFMC (2006: 10) 
 
The pollock cooperatives catch the major part of the TAC of the EBS pollock stock. The 
pollock cooperatives have no influence on the max ABC, but have their say on the ABC and 
the TAC setting through the council. Table 1 shows that the catch level is pretty close to the 
TAC, and the TAC is considerably lower than the ABC. In addition to pollock the coops catch 
                                                
28 The „At-Sea Processor Association“ (APA). 
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bycatch species divided into sideboards and prohibited species. The pollock fisheries is 
considered a clean fishery as the percentage of bycatch is very small. However, since the 
catch level is so high, the bycatch is considerable in t rms of absolute numbers. 
 
The EBS pollock catch level the last 20 years has been relatively stable at about 1.3 million 
metric tons (Ianelly 2006). This we explain by decisions on low harvest rates, a strict fisheries 
regulation regarding TACs on pollock and sideboards and prohibited species, the BSAI Cap 
and the observation program providing control on what is actually caught. The TACs have 
been quite lower than the ABC, and the coop members have realised that with their bycatch 
levels, especially on salmon, it would be impossible to take their quota before bycatch levels 
would have closed the fishery. The environmental organizations do not expect TAC level to 
maintain as they don’t consider the management sustainable. In any case, the abundance of 
pollock is not likely to be much affected by the coops of these reasons. However, the 
acceptance of these regulations among the coop members may partly be explained by the 
construction of coops. The coops have reduced the fleet capacity, made it more profitable for 
the members, made it possible to plan in longer terms and pollock stock has been abundant. 
Closure of areas (e.g. to protect the Stellar Sea lion) and other environmental issues has 
caused discontent among fishermen, but the pollock fleet could cope with it because of the 
economy in the fleet. The initiating of pollock coops reduced the number of pollock vessels, 
and the remaining AFA vessels are prohibited to fish in other areas to avoid these “mammoth 
vessels” to deplete stocks elsewhere. An indication that the fleet capacity matches the TAC 
levels is that their sideboards has not yet be taken but given to the actors outside the coops. 
Overcapacity is considered a major cause of stock depletion. 
 
The coops have shown to be an incentive to innovative solutions, which again affect the 
resource situation. The most important issue was how to deal with salmon bycatch. After the 
coops had been established, the bycatch and discards (prohibited species must be discarded) 
has declined considerably. The information in connection with Sea State is so current that the 
coops claim to never have been further away from the TAC than a ton. A PCC vessel has (by 
self-policing) to shut off the fishing at 10t before their share is taken, in case the last bag 
comes in with a little too much. The coops themselves decide on their own penalties and fines 
in case the members exceed the quota, but there have never been significant violations. This 
means there are no incentives to push the limits of any of the agreements and that the only 
incidents are due to confusion. The coops make the bycatch easier to manage, but its success 
is also connected to the low number of quota share owners. 
 
Cooperation through the coops makes it possible to improve present practice and be prepared 
for future environmental requirements. The Marine Conservation Alliance (MCA), a business 
NGO, organizes several research programs through the tax exempt to solve common problems 
within the coops, including projects to reduce bycatch and development of gears to reduce 
damage on bottom habitat. 
 
Against the backdrop of a stable public pollock management through and improvement with 
regard to the bycatch issue, the at-sea trawlers’ trade association applied for a Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) certification of the GAO and BSAI Pollock fishery. This 
application, after a lengthy assessment process, turned out successful. However, a network of 
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environmental organizations has opposed to this certifi ation because they claim there are 
local depletions in spawning aggregations, because of the Stellar Sea lion issue and damage of 
bottom habitat. The Stellar Sea lions issue is a complex one. There are no strong scientific 
indications that the lack of AI pollock prey is the r ason for the declining Stellar Sea lion 
population. Other explanations have been suggested but not proved. Still the coops did agree 
with a closure of pollock areas to protect the population. The environmental organizations 
think that management should be precautious due to the uncertainty and that greater areas 
should be closed. 
 
The midwater trawls that are used for targeting pollock are estimated to be in contact with the 
bottom floor 44% of the time. In specific periods, the big pollock stay close to the bottom. It 
is however a disagreement whether this has a significa t impact on the bottom habitat. These 
areas do not consist of rocky habitats, so that coral reefs and sponges are not affected. One of 
the scientist respondents thinks that the trawling is not a great problem, but admits that the 
scientific knowledge is not sound. There is a concer  among the conservation groups that e.g. 
the total amount of Sea Pens caught is considerable.29 
 
Although there is a considerable disagreement between the pollock fisheries actors and the 
environmental organizations about the impacts of the pollock fisheries, the NPFMC has made 
the two parties work out and agree on what areas to close for bottom trawling. However, the 
greatest concern of the environmental organizations s what will happen if the EBS pollock 
stock declines significantly. With low pollock abundance, insignificant rights to target other 
stocks and the political power of the coops, will they still embrace an environmentally 
friendly fishery?. 
 
4.2.2 Economic performance: Stability and sectorally differing levels of efficiency 
gains 
 
How has formation of the coops impacted on the Pollock industry’s economic performance? 
We found that passage of the AFA allowed for substantial efficiency gains, both with regard 
to the fleet structure, harvesting operations and processing. So some extent, however, the 
improved performance of the pollock industry, as indicated by ex-vessel and product values, 
was caused by other factors, too. 
 
Since 1998, the year when the AFA was passed, real ex-vessel value of the pollock catch has 
increased compared to the ex-vessel value of other groundfish species (see Fig. 3).30 Though 
the figures include the value of Pollock harvested in the Gulf of Alaska (GOA), which is not 
managed by co-operatives, as well as that of pollock by-catch from other fisheries they are 
strongly indicative of developments pertaining to c-operatively harvested pollock.31 In 
                                                
29 One of our respondents suggested the development of a censor to tell how much of the time the gear has been in contact with the bottom. 
Fishermen who can document less than 20% contact could get a 10% reward an incentive to change practice. 
30 Note that the value added by at-sea processing is not included in the estimates of ex-vessel value as pre ented in Fig. 3 (Hiatt 2006: 43). 
31 In 2005, the estimated pollock catch in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands was eighteen times the catch in the Gulf of Alaska (Hiatt 
2006: 18).  
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accordance with the ex-vessel value, real gross product value of pollock products increased 
markedly (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Real ex-vessel value of the groundfish catch 
in the domestic commercial fisheries off Alaska by 
species, 1984-2005 (base year = 2005).  
Source: Hiatt (2006: 13). Red line marks year of 
introduction of co-ops. 
 
Fig. 4: Real gross product value of the groundfish catch 
off Alaska, 1993-2005 (base year = 2005). Source: Hiatt 
(2006: 15). Red line marks year of introduction of c -
ops. 
 
The increase of ex-vessel value and gross product value resulted to a significant extent from 
the capacity reduction and access limitation that te AFA provided. However, coinciding with 
this institutional driver, market developments at the ime contributed to these developments. 
Firstly, the effects of the Asian currency crisis of 1997 which had hit the surimi market 
waned.32 Secondly, a more general trend of the late nineties was that the number-one 
competitor of the US Pollock industry, i.e. the Russian pollock fishery went into serious 
decline after years of overexploitation. Also, with collapsing cod stocks in the US and North 
Sea and other dwindling stocks, the supply of whitefish on the world market was generally 
low. 
 
Fleet efficiency rose due to the removal of marginal vessels from the fishery. Through the 
AFA-induced buybacks and through a transfer of fishing quota within the cooperatives to the 
most efficient operators, marginal vessels were scrapped or retired. This included small 
vessels and large vessels that were inefficient, either because of high fuel or high maintenance 
costs. During the first year of the Pollock Conservation Cooperative’s operation, for example, 
only 14 of the 20 eligible vessels fished, thus saving the operating costs of these vessels that 
would have fished had the cooperative not formed (Wilen/Richardson 2003: 7). It is expected 
that permanent fleet reductions will be ‘on the order of 30 percent for all three sectors of the 
industry’ (NOAA Fisheries 2002a: 5). Felthoven (200: 196) estimates that for the group of 
C/Ps, introduction of the cooperatives lead to a fall in total fishery effort of around 30% in 
1999, though it slightly rose again in 2000. 
 
Through the guarantee of a fixed harvest for each coop participant and through some 
                                                
32 Waning of the Asian currency crises may explain why real ex-vessel value and real gross product values began to improve in 1998, while 
the coops actually started running only in 1999 (offshore sector) and 2000 (inshore sector). 
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additional influences,33 the race for fish ended and fishing seasons prolonged – from 55 days 
per year for catcher/processors in 1997 (MacGregor 2006) to a historical peak of 140 days in 
2000 (Felhoven 2002: 196). For the first year of cooperative fishing within the PCC, Fig. 5 
shows that the length of the A season was doubled compared to that of 1998. Slowing of the 
fishing operation allowed the use of smaller bags for hauls so that the fish had a higher quality 
(less damage): In 1999, in the PCC, ‘Catches per haul w s 27 percent lower, the number of 
hauls per day dropped by 45 percent’ (Wilen/Richardson 2003: 7). Furthermore, the end of 
the race for fish made it possible to target a more sp cific size range of pollock for fillet or 
surimi processing, to range farther in order to locate higher quality catch, and to better time 
deliveries and serve different markets (NOAA Fisheries 2002a: 5). Finally, the TAC could be 
more fully exploited due to the cooperative ‘mopping up’ of TAC remains: fish could be 
harvested that had traditionally gotten lost through management ‘buffers’ in the closing of 
seasons, which had served to prevent an over-exploitation of the TAC (Sullivan 2000: 6). 
 
With regard to processing operations, too, introduction of the coops increased production 
efficiency. The time and resources freed from the race for fish could be invested in the 
retooling of boats and new on-board production technology.34 As Fig. 6 shows, the product 
recovery rates of Catcher/Processors increased some 50%, from a little less than 20% of 
finished product per ton of harvested fish in 1998 to slightly more than 30% in 2006. Among 
others, fish caught in the A season – the carcasses of which, after having been stripped from 
roe, had been thrown away under the Olympic system – after passage of the AFA were fully 
processed and parts such as backbones, heads, stomachs etc. that had so far been waste were 
now being processed.35 The increased product recovery made possible above all production of 
additional lower-grade surimi or mince products. The utilization rates of the inshore and 
mothership sectors increased likewise, though at smller rates.36  
 
                                                
33 These include e.g. the buyout of nine Catcher/Processor vessels. Also, under cooperatives, ‘processors may chose to operate at different 
times of the year than their competitors for logistical or market reasons. (…) And finally, differences in markets may lead one processing 
operation to operate at different times of the year from its competitors’ (NOAA Fisheries 2002a: 5).
34 For example, while the at-sea processing vessels before AFA had largely produced either surimi or fillets, retooling meant that now the 
boats produce both. 
35 As an industry representative put it: “Back in the Olympic days it was important to just catch as much as you could because otherwise 
somebody else did. And you did not really care what you were making because there was no cost associated with the fish. You just caught it 
as fast as you could and if some of it got wasted it did not matter.“ 
36 NOAA Fisheries (2002a: 6) specify that the inshore sector processors increased their overall utilization rates from 35.8% in 1998 to 
36.6% in 2000, and the mothership sector from 20.7 percent (1998) to 26.6% (2000). 
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Fig. 5. Length of A-season and daily catches of Bering Sea 
Pollock Catcher/Processors in 1998 and 1999. Source: 
Wilen/Richardson (2003). 
 
Fig. 6: Total product recovery and mix in 
Catcher/Processor sector. Source: 
PCC/HSCC (2007: 24). 
 
Disentangling different types of economic gains induced by the AFA, Felthoven (2002: 197) 
summarises that ‘most of the perceived gains of the AFA seem to be related to processing and 
the associated increases in product recovery rates nd product grades [rather than to 
harvesting efficiency]. In fact, it is likely that tradeoffs were made betwen harvesting 
efficiency and the quality of processed products, as evidenced by the observed slowdown of 
operations.’ In accordance with expectations formulated by economic theory, an industry 
representative underscored that the end of the race for fish had shifted the logic from 
‘Maximise your dollar per day’ to ‘Maximise the dollars earned per ton of fish harvested’. 
 
When looking at the development of employment, there have been lay-offs in the BSAI 
Pollock industry linked with the reduced harvest allocation and accompanying buy-out of nine 
vessels in the offshore C/P sector. Industry representatives estimate the number of employees 
lost to amount to 900-990, while cautioning that some of the retired boats would not have 
been able to stay in the market much longer anyway; i.e. some jobs might have been lost 
without the coops, too. This was to do with the generally dire economic performance of the 
sector in the mid to late 1990s, which had resulted the race for fish combined with 
overcapitalisation (MacGregor 2006), apparently also with bad loans, and with the Asian 
currency crises that hit the major surimi markets. 
 
With the longer seasons, annual crew use has increased, too. As regards income, there is no 
detailed data available on how crew income developed as a consequence of the cooperative 
fishing. The fact that renumeration is said to be share based and to depend on the value of 
products (which has increased) may lead us to inferthat crew income was at least stable, if 
not ascending. 
 
Introduction of the coop system in a wider sense contributed to the economic stability of the 
US pollock industry. With the AFA limiting access to he fishery and reducing fishing 
capacity, there had been no bankruptcies any more sinc 1999. At the same time, the secure 
harvesting rights – signalling a safe future of the industry – made access to capital less costly 
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as risk premiums were cut. Looking at the effects on other fisheries, there is some fear and 
anecdotal evidence of investment from the well-performing Pollock companies in vessels and 
licences to harvest in other fisheries, among others in cod fishery. This is ‘Dollar spillover’ 
and may occur independent of the spillover-prevention through sideboard limits. 
 
4.2.3 Cost effectiveness of management: Easing the burden of the public sector 
 
How cost-effective is the system of cooperatives in terms of its management? Which costs are 
borne by public administration, which by the private sector? Distinguishing between costs of 
design, of implementation and operation, we find that t e co-op system has caused very few 
additional costs for fisheries management and has rathe  freed public resources especially 
with regard to the operation phase. Some of these bn fits are inherent in the coop system, 
others stem from the specific design and implementation of the system. Our analysis of 
management costs is qualitative only; a quantitative analysis would be beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
With regards to the design of the cooperatives as amanagement system, public costs were 
low. The idea of a sector allocation and of cooperatives developed among private sector actors 
and was negotiated between major players of the Pollock industry and with a small number of 
political actors in Washington DC (Matulich et al. 2001: 2-3, Sullivan 2000: 6-7).37 The 
subsequent design of the cooperatives and elaboration of their internal rules was subject to 
private negotiations among the coop members. 
 
Costs for implementing the coop system encompass the AFA buy-out, the initial quota 
allocation, and annual public research and management tasks. Apart from the latter, these 
costs are largely born by the pollock industry. Buy-out and scrapping of nine C/P vessels from 
the offshore sector had been a precondition for the AFA deal to make possible separate sector 
allocations and hence cooperatives. The buyout was funded through a combination of $20 
million in Federal appropriations and $75 million in direct loan obligations to the companies 
of the inshore sector:38 with this loan, the inshore CVs bought out the offshore sector C/Ps, as 
a compensation for the increase of their overall TAC allocation. The CVs paid off the loan 
through a delivery fee of 0.6 cent per pound of pollock they harvested. As regards the initial 
quota allocation, negotiations were carried out exclusively among industry participants, which 
thus covered the related transaction costs. The relativ y low number of participants (ca. 100 
companies), divided into 3 sectors in which interests are relatively homogenous, implies that 
these costs were probably lower that the typically high up-front cost of initial allocations in the 
case of ITQs (Sutinen/Soboil 2003). Finally, there remain some implementation costs for the 
public sector. These include the Annual Stock Assessm nts by NOAA Fisheries that feed into 
the TAC setting process within the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council. Since these 
costs accrue for all managed fisheries in the Council’s jurisdiction, they are no additional 
costs caused by the co-op system. Further public imple entation costs are related to the 
                                                
37 These included above all Alaska’s Senator Ted Stevens, then-head of the US Appropriations Committee, and Washington’s Senator Slade 
Gorton. 
38 Cf. Section 207 of the American Fisheries Act. 
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annual application procedure of inshore cooperatives required by the AFA.39 
 
The costs of operation include costs of running the co-ops, of monitoring and sanctioning 
their operations. These costs are mainly private expenditure. Firstly, they include funding of 
observer coverage – the catcher/processors are required to have two observers onboard at all 
times, which annually sample 99% of all hauls. Secondly, the private operation costs include 
subcontracting of Sea State Inc. by the coops. The main cost item is said to be management of 
the harvest, i.e. remaining within the quota, sideboards, and bycatch limits. With 
establishment of the coop self-governance system, public in-season management tasks related 
to BSAI pollock were reduced, hence freeing public resources for other purposes.40  
 
Public enforcement through NOAA Fisheries’ Office for Law Enforcement, the US Coast 
Guard and the Alaska State troopers is ongoing, but the AFA coop system is reported to have 
substantially relieved burdens off enforcement. This is because the day-to-day activities of the 
boats are less important: controls relate to coops rather than to individual companies. As coop 
members can even out landings and bycatch-rates amongst them the potential for violations 
sinks; also, the collective responsibility for violations spurs peer control (Holland/ Ginter 
2001: 40). A law enforcement officer commented: ‘Now it is more of a monitoring type of an 
operation as opposed to harder enforcement.’ 
 
4.2.4 Stakeholder acceptance: Insider vs. outsider attitudes 
 
Is the coop system socially accepted by Alaskan fishery stakeholders? To answer this 
question, we need to differentiate between groups of stakeholders which can be expected to 
have different material interests and possibly ‘ideational’ orientations. While we find that 
members of the Pollock cooperatives themselves are highly supportive of the system, other 
industry stakeholders are somewhat sceptical of the economic and political power which is 
felt or feared to go along with the property rights created through the American Fisheries Act. 
Non-industry stakeholders, above all conservationist organisations, have focussed on 
ecological management and community issues rather than institutional aspects such as rights-
based management, and criticise the pollock fleets’ direct and indirect ecological impact. In 
the following, we will elaborate these positions. 
 
Among the coop members (i.e. AFA vessel owners), satisfaction with the regime is high: ‘We 
are really firm believers in the coop system here’, as a PCC participant told us. Not only did 
the vessel-owners’ political deal set an end to the cumbersome distributional conflicts 
between the inshore and offshore sector, but it increased the industry’s general security of 
expectation. And it boosted its economic performance – if to differing degrees in the three 
sectors (Matulich et al. 2001, NPFMC 2002) – in a wy that overcompensated the offshore 
                                                
39 When the prospective coops have submitted copies of their coop contracts and a list of participating companies at 1st of December, a 
NOAA Fisheries unit checks whether the applied-for c op composition is correct, i.e. in accordance with the previous year’s catch/ delivery 
data. The 1st of December, the fishing year starts. 
40 For example, prior to the coop system NOOA Fisheries would estimate the catch to determine closure of the ishery (NPFMC 2002a: 47). 
The American Fisheries Act, which for catcher/ processors observer presence and flow scales weighing all fish brought onboard, made such 
catch estimates superfluous. 
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sector’s loss of allocation shares vis-à-vis pre-1998. Even Alaskan communities, in the form 
of CDQ Groups, profited from the new wealth of the industry: they leased the historically 
unique share of pollock allocation which they had been allocated and invested in some of the 
AFA companies. Not least, according to a participant ‘the beauty of the coop system is that 
people are managing themselves’. This new extent of self-governance41 – e.g. development of 
cooperatives’ voluntary rolling hotspot system led to an exemption of AFA vessels from 
regulatory salmon bycatch savings areas42 – has increased the sense of ownership of Pollock 
management. Some researchers even describe the fact th t the AFA companies can 
collectively decide on how and when to harvest fisha  a form of community management 
(McCay 2001: 181-182). The positive attitude of thePollock industry towards the coops is 
mirrored first and foremost in the functioning of the system43 and in the high level of 
compliance with both coop and public provisions.44 As regards the coop’s Membership 
Agreements, no operator is reported to have gone beyond their allocated catch levels. 
Likewise, there were no substantive violations of the intercooperative agreement, and 
infringements of the bycatch programme are said to have been minor and ‘confusion-based’.45 
This positive storyline was confirmed by public law enforcement records which, as was 
mentioned above, gave evidence of declining infringements (NMFS 2006). Acceptance of the 
coop system by its participants is finally reflected in a low level of conflicts within or between 
the coops – a factor that is certainly fostered by the small number of operators. Interestingly, 
it is at the crew level of the pollock industry that the overall enthusiasm with the coop system 
is to some extent qualified, among others on ‘cultura ’ grounds: a number of crew members 
were reported to miss the old Olympic days in which fis ing was the embodiment of the 
‘American dream’, with experienced captains taking credit for tracking down maximum 
amounts of fish in the shortest possible time. Also, it was felt to be disadvantageous that 
seasons were longer with more trips. 
 
Louder criticism is being voiced by non-pollock industry stakeholders. Without being able to 
base this on a broader number of fishermen interviews, key informants related a scepticism of 
non-pollock fishermen operating off Alaska vis-à-vis the new wealth of what was nicknamed 
the ‘big pollock guys’, created through the AFA’s secure property rights to a vast and 
profitable resource. Many suspect that AFA vessel-owners could use their revenues to invest 
and compete in other fisheries. At the time when the AFA was being devised, a more acute 
feeling of disfranchisement prevailed among a number of (medium sized) mixed species 
‘Head & Gut’ trawlers that had also harvested minor amounts of pollock, and especially 
among two companies with somewhat bigger pollock catch histories. However, these being 
still small compared to those of the larger pollock- nly C/Ps, the vessels were not made 
eligible in the American Fisheries Act deal and hence could not participate in the fixed 
                                                
41 Note that the fishery had been co-managed already before the AFA, through the North Pacific Fisheries Council. 
42 Cf. Amendment 84a to the Fishery Management Plan for Gr undfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area, October 
2005. 
43 Even in the inshore sector with its more precarious balance between harvesters and processors the system has worked out so far, with the 
successful forming of coops each year. The latter is not a matter of course, due to an AFA requirement (Section 210) that cooperatives may 
form only if an annual contract is signed by the owners of 80% or more of the qualified catcher vessels that delivered the majority of their 
pollock for processing to the particular processor in the prior year. 
44 Though there are probably other factors that is likely to have contributed to this positive record, such as the comparative ‘simplicity’ of 
the pollock fishery as a single species fishery and o e that is relatively clean with regard to bycatch. 
45 Such confusion may be caused by frequent changes of areas that are closed (ca. twice a week) and the respective timelines. 
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allocation system: ‘The line is always drawn somewhre’, as a PCC member summed up. It 
was drawn right above the level of the two boats, in a backroom decision process which the 
non-eligible companies contest still today. 
 
More generally, the Pollock cooperatives’ new wealth is felt or feared to go along with 
increased political power, both within the institutional structure of the North Pacific 
Management Council and in Congress. While the Council is formally the prime institution for 
Alaska fisheries management decisions, by addressing Congress the Pollock industry had 
gone ‘forum shopping’ to assert their interest in another forum. This precedent has since been 
repeated by other industry groups – a move which is felt to gradually undermine the Council’s 
authority and devalue its co-management approach. Also, less well-off fishing industries feel 
compelled to equally invest into lobbying activities in Washington D.C. Tight relations 
between the pollock industry and senior US Senator S evens (R-AK), his son (former State 
senator and former Alaska Fisheries Marketing Board Chairman Ben Stevens), and one of his 
former office aids have in the meantime sparked rumo rs of political corruption and 
conflicting interest, resulting in a number of FBI investigations.46  
 
When it comes to non-industry stakeholders, we willfocus on environmental organisations. 
Typically, these groups have not strongly commented on the American Fisheries Act, being ‘a 
lot more engaged in how much fish should be taken, and how and where it should be taken, 
than by whom it should be taken’.47 In this vein, they have not taken any action against the 
cooperatives as such, though a range of aspects of poll ck management have been protested 
against, including through legal challenges.48 With the expansion of rights-based management 
in the fisheries off Alaska, there was however some discussion of cooperatives and ITQs 
among the NGOs. A split exists between those that reject exclusive rights to a common pool 
resource versus those that consider rationalisation at least as a means to reduce fishing 
capacity. Opponents of rationalisation, however, argue that the latter is typically linked to the 
consolidation of fleets by a few corporations, which again tends to promote a short-term profit 
orientation that is at odds with eco-system and community concerns. With regard to the 
pollock industry in a wider perspective, a number of marine conservation NGOs oppose large-
scale industrial fishing for which the Bering Sea pollock fleet stands as a stark example 
(Stump/Hocevar/Baumann/Marz 2006: 36-39). They criticise harvest levels as unsustainable 
considering declines in pollock abundance in several stocks, depletion in outlying population 
centres, poor recruitment levels in recent year classes and draw attention to the resulting effects on 
the food web (ibid). They also point to bycatch-levels which in absolute terms are striking 
(AMCC 2004); and to the not insignificant bottom-impact that even mid-water trawlers have. 
In 1998, to get across their message, Greenpeace used non-violent action to prevent the 
trawler fleet from leaving Seattle for Alaska. Furthermore, some organisations are concerned 
that the substantial research funds which the pollock industry donates might indirectly affect 
fisheries management, among others by neglecting resea ch on species without commercial 
                                                
46 Cf. Maurer (2005, 2006), Metcalfe (2006), Wolfe (2007). 
47 Interview with representative of environmental NGO working on Alaska fisheries. 
48 Most notably, this concerned the protection of Stellar sea lions (Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheres Service, April 1998 - March 
2003, cf. McBeath 2004) and the adequacy of Essential Fishing Habitat provisions and Environmental Assessments in fishery management 
plan amendments (American Oceans Campaign et. al. v. Daley et al.). On grounds of ecological concerns, a  NGO network had also 
launched an objection procedure in the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification process of the BSAI (and GOA) pollock fisheries. 
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significance. More generally, the NGOs are worried about conflicts of interest in the co-
management structure of the Council49 and demand a better representation of non-fishing 
public interests and native Alaskan communities in its voting positions (cf. 
Eagle/Newkirk/Thompson 2003). 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
We analysed two rather different innovative management regimes implemented in Alaska – 
the tier system as a harvest control rule, and the Pollock cooperatives as a mixture between a 
rights based management and self-governance system.  
The study of the tier system revealed that its strengths lie in the fact that harvest rates are 
relatively precautionary, that the system is transprent and is used for bycatch regulations, 
too. The tier system is based on the fundamental assumption that it is impossible to develop 
fisheries without data. Its weaknesses are that so far, the system is not linked to ecosystem 
considerations; tier 5 may not be precautionary; and that the proxies for Fmsy are contested. 
 
The case study of cooperatives in the Bering Sea pollock fishery showed that in terms of 
biological robustness of the regime has its merits, though to a large extent the relatively 
favourable condition of the BSAI pollock stocks is caused by cautious measures of public 
fisheries management – the absolute TAC cap, counting of by-catch against the by-catch 
species’ TACs, an extensive observer programme, to name a few. The most significant value-
added in biological terms of the coops hence lies in their self-managed by-catch reduction 
programme. Whether the industry will in future be as supportive of precautionary 
management as they presently claim to be, might depend on the then abundance of the stocks 
and the related profit margins in the fishery. In terms of economic performance, the stable 
allocations and quota share system of the cooperativ s have undoubtedly created efficiency 
gains, mostly but not exclusively with regard to prcessing, which result from the slower pace 
of fishing. The gains seem to be distributed slighty unequally among the three sectors 
(catcher/processor, motherships, inshore catcher vessels). In terms of management costs, 
introduction of the coop system has shifted some of the previously public costs of pollock 
management to the private sector, without actually causing too much added costs altogether. 
Some of these effects have been caused by a specific design of the AFA and the coops, rather 
than by introduction of cooperative harvesting per s . The overall benefits in terms of 
efficiency and public management costs and the highacceptance of the coop system by the 
coop members themselves are somewhat counterbalanced by a certain distrust, partly even 
sense of disenfranchisement, of industry and non-industry stakeholders that are not coop 
participants. The experience of the Pollock cooperative system seems to reflect some of the 
experience made with ITQs both in Alaska and elsewhere: social acceptance might be most 
difficult to accommodate. 
 
                                                
49 For example, Section 302 (j) of the Magnuson-Stevens-Act exempts voting members of fisheries management councils from specific 
conflict-of-interest provisions. 
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6 Best practices guidelines 
6.1 Participation 
 
Fisheries management should involve stakeholders in addressing management issues and in 
evaluating management decisions. Although this may be time consuming, involvement can 
improve the communication between the different parties, which again can improve 
acceptance of the different views. Involvement may improve the quality of the management 
decisions as more aspects are brought to the table. Involvement will trigger negotiations, 
which can result in innovative solutions. From the interviews carried out in connection with 
the Alaska fisheries, there seemed to be a mutual tr st between the industry, managers and the 
scientists within the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council. The environmental 
organisations had less trust in the council and the o r parties, but they were not represented 
in the council.  
  
6.2 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
 
In a fishery, the surveillance and enforcement should be adequate to avoid cheating. This will 
provide fairness to fair players, and the marine resources will be better managed. In addition, 
fishing vessels in IFQ systems should have good observer coverage on board. This avoids 
cheating and provides fairness to fair players. This makes it easier to manage bycatch 
problems and other potential ecosystem considerations (damage of bottom habitat, undersized 
fish etc). Sustainability labelling will be easier and the fish may get a higher value on the 
market. 
 
6.3 Harvest control rules 
Legal decisions on HCR 
 
The management objectives concerning the biological resources and the basic ideas of a HCR 
should be decided by law in order to avoid negotiati n on the TAC thus ensuring sustainable 
fisheries. There will always be room for negotiations (ecosystem concerns, data, models etc.), 
but there should be drawn some kind of border for what can be negotiated. 
 
It is also advisable to decide on HCR for non-harvested species and criteria for developing a 
new fishery. It allows for precaution when developing a new fishery to avoid a depletion of 
the stock. 
 
Ecosystem based caps 
 
A cap for total catches should be set in a defined ecosystem. This creates a buffer against 
uncertainty if the cap is set at a level so that the sum of single stock sustainable harvesting hits 
the cap once in a while. If there is a cap for total prey species and for total predator species it 
takes one ecosystem consideration into account: enough prey for predators. 
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By catch quotas 
 
Total bycatch quotas for each species should be set, and the fisheries taking Bycatch should 
be stopped when this quota is taken. (This requires observers on the fishing vessels to avoid 
cheating). Bycatch is a problem in many fisheries. This is an incentive to learn to deal with 
the problem. In the European fisheries, it is difficult to tell whether the fishermen are able to 
avoid bycatch species or not, and there is no strong incentive to solve the Bycatch problem. 
 
6.4 When rationalizing a fishery (dividing quota rights) 
Identification of sectors 
 
Collect information on characteristics of the fisheries to be rationalized. Different fisheries 
need different solutions. The Alaska fisheries have several rationalization programs that are 
very different 
 
Setting of objectives 
 
Consider socio-political objectives, establish community rights etc. In order to take care of 
social aspects to strengthen the community economy, social welfare, etc. 
 
Initial allocation of rights 
 
Start with the simplest fishery to collect experienc s before the difficult ones. Simple fisheries 
are those where the same gear type is used, the same species caught, similar vessels used and 
similar interests held. 
 
Subjects to allocation 
 
Give rights not only to vessel owners, but also to the captains and the crew. This allocation 
increases legitimacy and acceptance to the process. Consequently, power is not concentrated 
on a few hands or a few geographical locations. This practice depends on available data. In 
Alaska there was a problem with collecting data on h w much the crew (other than the 
captains) had worked on a fishing vessel. 
 
Openness of the process 
 
There should be an open process when the criteria for different rights are decided. The aim is 
to increase the legitimacy and acceptance of the process.  The rationalization of the pollock 
fishery in Alaska was based on the amount of pollock caught in a certain year. One of the 
involved parts felt this very unfair and claimed that they weren’t allowed their say. 
 
Micromanagement 
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Create incentives so that the participants in the fisheries will take over some of the micro-
management of the fishery. This allows saving administration costs for the government. The 
industry may be forced to cooperate and come up with innovative solutions to solve common 
problems. The pollock coops hired Sea State, which manages the bycatch of the fleet by 
closures of areas. This is more efficient that what t e management administration was able to 
do. 
 
Fleet changes 
 
Make sure that the resulting fleet after a rationalization can afford to solve problems that 
eventually will come up, like lower stock levels and ecosystem concerns that will affect the 
way the fleet is operating. There is a lot of capitl in the pollock coops, so that they have been 
able to adjust to changes. Otherwise, the fleet may suffer economically, or ecosystem 
concerns may not be resolved. 
 
Buy-out programmes 
 
Make sure there is an adequate buy-out program, either supported by the remaining fleet or by 
the government. This increases acceptability of the program and gives compensation to those 
who have to leave the fisheries. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Methodology of the Case Study 
This case study is part of the Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Solutions in European 
Fisheries Management (CEVIS) Project. The last decas have witnessed the rise of 
innovative fisheries management systems which have be n proposed as alternatives for 
traditional command & control regimes. These include a wide range of alternatives such as 
participatory governance, rights based approaches, effort controls and various kinds of 
decision rule systems. The purpose of the CEVIS project was to evaluate these alternative 
approaches for their usefulness in European fisheries management. We made visits to four 
places outside of Europe, that A) have fisheries similar to Europe’s, B) have implemented 
innovations that contain various degrees of participatory governance,  rights-based, effort-
control and decision-rule based systems. These placs were Alaska, Maritime Canada, Iceland 
and New Zealand.  
 
This chapter reports on our visit to the province of N va Scotia in Canada. We focussed our 
inquiries mainly on the management of the inshore ground fish fishery but also included other 
fisheries in our discussions about how the Canadians were structuring their fisheries science 
institutions. This area attracted us because of several kinds of innovations, the main one being 
the different ways they combine a rights-based management system built on individual quotas 
will participatory governance. We began our investigation with a literature review on fisheries 
management in Nova Scotia and then followed up in February of 2007 with a two week study 
tour during which we interviewed 20 people: five fisheries scientists, five fishers, five 
managers and five “others”. The latter category included two conservationists, an academic 
expert in Nova Scotia fisheries, a council member in a fishing village, and a woman who 
heads a society working to bring together scientists and fishers.  
 
A literature review and a study tour do not create experts in Nova Scotian fisheries. Our job 
was to learn about what was happening in Nova Scotia while keeping our own problems here 
in Europe in mind. We were looking for experiences and lessons we could take back with us, 
and new ideas that might create an “Ah Ha!” experience helping us to look at management 
issues in a new way. The following report consists of four main sections. We begin with some 
brief background material on groundfish management in Nova Scotia. Section 2 discusses the 
recent history and outcomes of rights-based management, with a particular focus on the 
inshore mobile gear fishery. Sections 3 and 4 focus on two different innovations under the 
general category of participatory governance. Section 3 looks at the local fisheries co-
management initiatives called Community Management Boards (CMB). Here we discuss in 
particular a combination of innovations that we found very interesting: one of the CMBs has 
created, in effect, its own transferable rights-based ystem. Section 4 looks at some of the 
advances the Canadians have been making in particiption in the scientific and decisional 
aspects of fisheries management.  
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of what we learned for Europe. This 
includes some hypotheses about what kinds of things might work well in particular 
circumstances and some “best practices”, meaning ideas we found in Canada that we feel 
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might be particularly useful in Europe.  
 
2 Background to the Case Study Innovations 
2.1 Changes from Round Fish to Invertebrate Fisheries  
 
The state of fisheries in Atlantic Canada is still very much a result of the collapse of the 
Northern Cod stock and the depletion of most other groundfish stocks in the late eighties and 
early nineties. In the early 1980's, Canadian catches of Atlantic groundfish peaked at 775,000 
tonnes, gradually declining to 688,000 tonnes by 1988. This decline then continued rapidly, 
dropping to 418,000 tonnes in 1992, and to 250,000 tonnes in 1993. The 10 principal cod and 
flatfish stocks went from 500,000 tonnes in 1988 to less than 100,000 tonnes in 1993 
(http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/commercial/landings/sum_e.htm). This 
means a decline in catch of 90 percent in five years. Following the collapse and a subsequent 
moratorium imposed on commercial fishing for cod in 1992, industry restructuring and social 
dislocation in coastal communities across the Atlantic coast led to approximately 40 000 
persons out of work (Harris, 1995, cited in Potts, 2003).  
 
Extensive literature exists about the causes of the collapse, evidencing human errors rather 
than environmental causes. Sinclair et al. (1999) acknowledged that “failure to meet the 
objectives was due to deficiencies in the groundfish management system as a whole, rather 
than to problems with any particular component”. Overfishing and juvenile discarding are 
considered as the main factors (Hutchings and Myers, 1994; Myers et al., 1997), but errors in 
stock assessment assumptions and over optimistic fore asts leading to unsustainable TACs 
have also been advocated as a major reason of the collapse (Walters and Maguire, 1996, 
Shelton and Lilly, 2000).  
 
Post-moratorium analyses have also underlined the role of over optimistic scientific advice in 
management. Rice et al. (2003) stated that the observed changes in productivity made the 
projections of recovery time severely overly optimistic, which consequences are more 
grievous and lasting than the costs of being overly pessimistic, because re-opening criteria 
were based on erroneous assumptions on productivity. A slight improvement was observed in 
the late nineties, leading to partial reopening of the fisheries. As a consequence, the recovery 
process reversed and main Atlantic stocks were closed again in all areas between Labrador 
and Gulf of St Lawrence.  
More than a decade after the collapse and the moratorium, most groundfish stocks have failed 
to recover at predicted rates, and are still at very low biomass levels, for the whole Canada 
Atlantic. Shelton et al (2006) indicate that recent productivity in ground fish is much lower 
than before, due to increased natural mortality, decreased body growth, and in a few cases, 
reduced recruitment rates. Continued fishing in directed and bycatch fisheries is also an 
important factor, and fishing mortality is further delaying recovery.  
 
Although the collapse was not as severe in the Scotia-Fundy area, and thus no moratorium is 
currently in force, groundfish stocks in areas 4W and 4X are still in poor state with low 
productivity. Most of the groundfish fishery is found in areas 4X and 5 between Halifax, 
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Nova Scotia and the Canada-U.S. boundary and in the Bay of Fundy. This means that it is 
shared between the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, with the Nova Scotia fleet 
being much the larger of the two.  There were 900 active groundfish licences in 2003, over 
700 of these were fixed gear vessels. Approximately 55,000t of groundfish were landed in 
2003 with a value of about $90 million (DFO 2004a). 
 
Invertebrate fisheries, on the other hand, have becom  increasingly important. Frank et al. 
(2005) argue that the Scotia Shelf ecosystem has experi nced a “trophic cascade” driven by 
what they describe as the “virtual elimination” (2005: 1621) of the structural influence of 
commercial fish species on the ecosystem. One result was a marked increase in the abundance 
of small pelagic fish and benthic macroinvertebrates. According to the Nova Scotian 
government the landed value of invertebrate fisheries in 2004 was $ 596 million or 80% of the 
overall landed value from all species. The major species include lobster, snow crab, shrimp 
and scallops http://www.gov.ns.ca/fish/marine/sectors/invert.shtml. The value of fish landed 
in Nova Scotia reached $701 million in 1987 and then d clined to $482 million in 1997, 
however landed values in 1997 were double what theyw re in 1970. The reason for this is 
increased landings of high value invertebrate species (Charles et al. 2001).   
 
One main characteristic for these stocks is that the traditional VPA-based methods used for 
fish cannot be applied to the stock assessment of such pecies, both because the age 
determination is almost impossible and because the time-series are not long enough to apply 
the methods. As a consequence, more ad-hoc methods are used, mostly on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
2.1.1 Institutional Changes in Canadian and Nova Scotian Fisheries Management.  
 
In addition to, and to some degree in response to, the ecological changes major changes took 
place in the early 1990s in the way that Nova Scotian f sheries are managed. These changes 
are interrelated and driven by a complex mixture of management ideology, the changes in the 
fishery, and bureaucratic imperatives. 
 
One major change was an accelerated shift to quota management through individual quotas 
based on historical participation in the fishery. Individual quotas (IQs) and, indeed, individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) had existed in Canada for some time.  More than half of Atlantic 
Canada’s fisheries have some sort of fishing right or privilege within a quota system. The Bay 
of Fundy herring seine fishery had IQs boat quotas in 1976 and became an ITQ system in 
1983. The offshore ground fishery got Enterprise Allocations, essentially ITQs, in 1982 
(Apostle et al. 2002).  Our discussion here focuses on two fleets, both of which are based on 
an individual quota system but structured very differently.  The inshore (< 65’) mobile ground 
fish fishery currently managed under an ITQ system. The inshore (< 45’) fixed gear fishery, 
which uses long lines, gillnets and hand lines, is managed through community quotas based 
on the aggregations of individual quotas. The change was a very difficult one, involving open 
public protests and demonstrations as well as considerable private anguish.  
 
A second major institutional change in Nova Scotia fisheries management was severe 
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cutbacks in the budget of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). In the period 
leading up to 1999, DFO’s budget was cut by a third an  they lost a quarter of their staff. The 
scientific resources have been shifted to include other areas besides fisheries but industry 
initiatives have been filling the gap (Land and Stephenson 2000). Sinclair et al. (1999) argue 
that the shift toward co-management was strongly related to a shift in government philosophy 
towards user fees and cost cutting. Management costs were broadly transferred from 
government to industry including monitoring and surveillance functions, day-to-day 
management of the quota system as well as small things such as DFO no longer paying 
stakeholders’ travel and per diem for meetings. 
 
The third major change, which followed directly from the introduction of the individual quota 
approach was the development of an effective monitori g system. The heart of the system is a 
privatized “hail in hail out” monitoring system for fish landings. The IQ Committee, which 
was charged with the developing the IQ system as described in detail below, and the 
Groundfish Advisory Committee cooperated with DFO in setting up the monitoring system 
(Apostle et al. 2002).   DFO started to put together a commercial catch monitoring system in 
the fall of 1990. Their key objective was to develop a system such that one could not move 
fish from the wharf until it had been weighed and recorded, an important point of this being 
that the truckers were responsible for the contents of their vehicles. In June of 1992 they 
created a user-pay system based on a percentage of the landings. DFO was still paying a share 
of this because non-ITQ species were involved. The monitoring system moved to a fee-for-
service approach in 1993 because it faced a financial cr sis as a result of quota cutbacks 
(Apostle et al. 2002).  In the fall of 1992 quota cutbacks created financial pressures on the 
system and some people, especially in eastern Nova Scotia, did not pay their share. In 1996 a 
new company took over and instituted an “arms-length rule” meaning that the fishing industry 
now had nothing to do with running the monitoring system (Apostle et al. 2002).  
 
In the current system independent companies collect th  data based on a contract they make 
with the individual fisher. This is a requirement for the fishing license. This kind of system is 
now ubiquitous across Atlantic Canada. Thirty five companies take care of all the data 
collection, including an electronic log book system. The role of DFO is policing the system to 
ensure full compliance but not to be involved directly. There is also a required observer 
program for larger boats, who must contract with the observers directly. Finally there are 
obligations for satellite tracking with the industry bearing the costs for installation and 
transmission. Comments by some of our respondents indicated that the fact that the 
government is not actually carrying out the monitoring, it was being done by “normal people” 
hired from the fishing communities by the private sector seemed to increase the legitimacy of 
the system.  
 
A fourth change is the evolution of the legal framework for fisheries management that 
occurred for the whole of Canada. Canada's original Fisheries Act was passed in 1868 and it 
still gives the government the basic power to make regulations for “the proper management 
and control of seacoast and inland fisheries" (Haward et al. 2005 p17). In response to the cod 
crisis, the 1996 Oceans Act gave DFO the role of integrating the activities of marine agencies 
operating at the federal, provincial, territorial and local levels. The Oceans Act is "an 
extraordinary piece of legislation” (Haward et al. 2005 p17) that commits Canada to 
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integrated, ecosystem-based precautionary management. The Oceans Act expands the role of 
DFO to integrate all ocean use activities and users rather than simply fisheries only.  
Emerging pressures from the international community, including FAO Code of Conduct, have 
lead DFO to develop Objectives-based Fishery Management (OBFM) which provides a broad 
operational framework for addressing ecosystem and precautionary considerations.  A key 
part of this has been the development of Integrated Fishery Management Plans (IFMP) as 
operational tools for achieving consistency in management processes since 1995 (Auditor 
General 1999, cited in Potts, 2003). These are regulatory instruments that set the basis for 
licensing and regulatory requirements. Finally, theSpecies at Risk Act came into force in 
2003 and has increased the focus on bycatch species. It has evolved into a very restrictive 
law-driven constraint on fisheries management. 
 
Finally, the last major institutional change in the background of this case study is a general 
move towards a more participatory approach to fisher es management, albeit a participatory 
approach firmly under the control of DFO. Both of the fleets we examine closely below have 
their own industry advisory committee. The community management boards, examined at 
length below, are perhaps the most ambitious example of a participatory approach to 
management.  
Another aspect of this is the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC). This is a 
stakeholder body with diverse stakeholder membership that considers a wide range of issues. 
The main focus, however, is on conservation. The FRCC is charged with preparing formal 
recommendations to the Minister. This body has been through a considerable evolution since 
its formation. It has become a more open and participatory as indicated by both the number 
and kinds of spokespeople and it has become a forum for the open discussion of scientific 
issues (Sinclair et al. 1999). The FRCC and its role in science are discussed below in Section 
4.4.2.  
 
The history of the introduction of rights-based management through the IQ Committee, which 
later became the ITQ Committee, is a good example of the problems and possibilities in this 
more participatory ethos. The Committee was selected by DFO but only after a survey 
indicated that fishers, and especially the processors, wanted this approach rather than 
selection through communities. Sixty percent voted for this approach and DFO agreed to this 
scheme while expressing reluctance. The system is not a co-operative management scheme 
but was based on DFO wanting to make a clearer distinction between conservation and 
allocation and this was a means of transferring some allocation decisions (Apostle et al. 
2002). The IQ Committee process worked well internally. It was a fairly homogeneous group, 
especially in comparison to the old Groundfish Advisory meetings where offshore, mobile 
and fixed gear reps could not get along. There was also some external hostility (death threats) 
that the authors believe helped increase the internal legitimacy The ITQ Committee also has 
real roots in the community and this has limited the ideological assertion of property rights 
(Apostle et al. 2002).  
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3 The Right-based System 
3.1 A Brief History of the innovation 
 
When the decision was made to introduce an ITQ system, he inshore mobile fleet had the 
biggest capacity problem in the Scotia-Fundy region. It was four times the size required to 
harvest its quota at the target fishing mortality rate (F0.1) (Liew 2001). Stock decline in the 
late 80s led to early closures especially in 1989 and these closures were the immediate 
catalyst for the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans’ action to get an Order-in-Council to create 
IQs. This decision set aside for later the issue of transferability and the issue of initial 
allocations (Apostle et al. 2002).  
 
Quota allocation began in February 1990 with a Working Group of representatives from the 
catching sector and the ground fish industry associati ns, provincial governments, and DFO. 
The Working Group was charged with identifying the stocks to include, the operational 
guidelines including that sharing and appeal system, and monitoring. The Working Group met 
with fishing communities in the summer of 1990 to explain the programme and hear the 
views of licence holders. Later in the fall these metings began to also include discussions of 
transferability options, limits on quota accumulation and the overall duration of the 
programme. The programme began on 1 January 1991 (Liew 2001).  
 
Further modifications were carried out by an IQ Management Committee, which was created 
in late 1991, and later became the ITQ Management Committee. They quickly made some 
major changes such as making the IQ system permanent d allow permanent transfer, thus 
creating a true ITQ system. They also expanded the system to include Georges Bank cod and 
haddock. Working with DFO they designed the self-financed dockside monitoring system 
described in the previous section (Apostle et al. 2002). During the summer of 1992 the DFO 
adopted these recommended changes and also recognized the decision-making authority of 
the IQ Committee (Apostle et al. 2002). 
 
Vessel owners were given the option of joining the ITQ system, fishing under a competitive 
quota reserved for fixed gears, or joining a "generalist" category that would also fish under a 
competitive quota. Of the 455 eligible vessels 325 chose to remain in the ITQ system.  The 
325 dropped to 213 in three years and estimates at the turn of the century were in the range of 
100 give or take 20 (Apostle et al. 2002).  
 
McCay et al. (1996) compare the ITQ systems in Canad  for groundfish and in the USA for 
surf clams and ocean quahogs. The SCOQ system was delaye  for years because of struggles 
between independent and vertically integrated firms. The IQ committee in Nova Scotia came 
to a decision on how to set up the system and make allocations in less than a year. The use of 
history in SCOQ was a source of delay because of accus tions of cheating by the larger firms. 
There was less concentration in Nova Scotia. The issue of stratification was important but so 
were differences in process, in Canada it was controlled by one agency that did not have to 
convince any co-management type body similar to the US Regional Management Council 
(Apostle et al. 2002).  
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In 1993 the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC) was created. It was the first 
formal role for the industry in advising the minister. Soon after its creation the FRCC 
recommended a mid-year quota cutback. This raised th  issue of the durability of fishing 
rights in a new way as ITQ holders were faced with these cutbacks. Fears emerged in respect 
to both the legitimacy and the stability of the system. If they could not have a guarantee that 
the quota would not be cut in the middle of the year then it was really no different from a 
competitive fishery - there would be a race to fish up the quota before the cutbacks were 
announced (Apostle et al. 2002). 
 
In 1994 serious consideration was given by the ITQ Committee for allowing quota to be 
pooled by up to 20 licenses which would allow this group to further rationalize their fishing. 
This would substantially benefit processors and larger quota holders, but would be open to, 
and benefit, smaller holders as well. DFO was supportive because the paperwork in handling 
transfers would be reduced as it would be an internal matter for the pools. Lawyers at the 
Justice Department, however, pointed out that it might not be possible to enforce an 
individual stopping fishing after the pool quota was exhausted and they also felt it would be 
difficult to enforce penalties against a pool that overran its quota. The ITQ Committee then 
dropped the idea (Apostle et al. 2002). 
 
After this point the structure of the ITQ system for the inshore mobile fleet itself seems to 
have stabilized and the main issues are treated as settled. This does not mean that there are no 
serious controversies in the fishery.  Perhaps the key current issue is that of “trust 
agreements” discussed below. These agreements raise serious challenges to the fleet 
separation policy that severely restricts the transfer of quota between the main fleets as well as 
to the policy of requiring fishers to be owner operato s.  
 
3.2 Structure of the individual access rights 
3.2.1  Core Fishers 
 
Since 1976, the overall fishing for all species has been limited through a licensing system.  On 
the order of 2400 fixed gear licences exist, for example, of which about 385 are actually 
fishing. To acquire a license you have to be a full time fisher but the definition of full time 
fisher varies.  The ownership of fishing quota, fishing licenses and the basic access rights are 
technically separate issues in the Nova Scotia inshore (< 65’) fleet because being a “core 
fisher” and a license are not the same thing. The statu  of the core fisher was created in 1996 
and included 700 individuals identified in the mid nineties as being, as one manager put it in 
an interview, a “bona fide professional fisher”. The official definition (DFO 1996) reads: “A 
Core Enterprise means a fishing unit composed of a fisher (head of enterprise), registered 
vessel(s) and the licences he holds, and which has been designated as such in 1996 under 
approved criteria”.  The criteria are that the fisher must: “(a) be the head of an enterprise; (b) 
hold key licences (or, for some Scotia-Fundy fisher, a vessel-based licence); (c) have an 
attachment to the fishery; and (d) be dependent on the fishery”. Our DFO respondent  told us 
that what they were “really deciding was who was really dependent on the industry and who 
was dabbling at it”. The core designation is not necessarily the same thing as a full-time 
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fisher but the fishers who were prevented from becoming core were the ones who DFO 
judged were not active enough. Non-core fishers were allowed to keep the licenses they had, 
but when they die the license dies with them. Any certified professional fisher can become 
core by buying in an existing core. However, if a fisher transfers between national regions he 
cannot take it with him, he gets rid of what he hasere and enters their fishery according to 
their rules. 
 
3.2.2 Fleets and Quota Allocation 
 
In Nova Scotia ground fish are allocated to individual fleets as shown in Table 1. There is an 
attempt to make these “sharing arrangements” as stable s possible. The Groundfish 
Management Plan shown in the table covered two years, the subsequent one covered five. 
However, shifts or swaps of quota between fleets have t ke place but they are considered 
extraordinary actions.   
Table 1. Nova Scotia Groundfish Fleets and their Allocations – 2000 
 Gear Fleet Management 
System 
Active 
licences 
Cod 
Allocation in 
Percentage 
Haddock 
Allocation in 
Percentage 
Pollock 
Allocation  in 
Percentage 
  < 45" Community 883* 55 25 28 
45" - 65" ITQ 20 5 4 1 
 
Fixed 
   > 65"  ITQ 11 1 1 0 
     < 65" ITQ 131 32 56 23 Mobile 
       65"+ EA (ITQ) 35 7 13 49 
Figures are taken from the Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Integrated Management Plan 2000-2002 (DFO 2000). 
*Includes 47 active licenses in New Brunswick  
 
The management “systems” in fact are built around these quota allocations. Each fleet has a 
system for administering their quota (Table 2). Consultative bodies such as the Fixed Gear 
Committee with representatives from each of the Community Management Boards and the 
ITQ Committee that represents the inshore mobile fle t exist for each of the fleets. Cross-
sectoral consultative bodies also exist, such as the RAPs that address scientific issues (see 
Section 4.2.3). 
 
3.2.3 Historical Participation and its Problems 
 
We began our interviews using fairly open-ended questions to try to get a sense of what our 
respondents thought was important before we started sking about what we were thinking was 
important. It was quite striking that the dominant subject in the early part of nearly all of our 
interviews was the problems in the early 1990s with the introduction of the IQ system and 
especially the distribution of the initial IQs. While economic theory might suggest that the 
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best way to allocate IQs, at least from the point of view of society’s overall economic welfare, 
would be to auction them to the highest bidder, politica  reality has dictated that nearly every 
such distribution tries, in some fashion, to reproduce the pre-IQ status quo distribution of the 
resource. The main technique for this is to base th distribution on the “historical 
participation” of individual fishers in the fishery in question.  
 
As is often the case, in Nova Scotia the argument quickly became what “history” one was 
going to base the allocation on. IQ systems are almost always introduced in fisheries that have 
been under other kinds of management systems for a long time and these other management 
systems have partly determined who was going to have the largest and smallest fishing 
“histories”. In the Nova Scotia case is was the prevailing record keeping system in particular 
that turned out to be critical. Before 1986 DFO hadkept very sparse records of catches in the 
inshore fleet. So most suggestions about when “history” should begin started at that point. 
After that there was any number of ways that history could be defined. It could be an average 
percentage over certain years, but which years?  Groups formed around the years that would 
give them the best allocations.  A Shelburne fisher explained how his group wanted a 
“straight forward 1986-1993 and nothing else.” But another group was formed to lobby for 
1989-1993 years. 
 
Different gear types had kept different kinds of records. In the 1980s there had actually not 
been very much control, especially in relation to the smaller boats using fixed gears. Hand 
lines were particularly hard hit by a lack of records. One respondent explained that many 
people had been more interested in getting unemployent benefits than in recording fish 
landings. They would ask their friends to put their fish in the friend’s name so they could get 
unemployment. “They were cheating the system and cutting their own throats at the same 
time”. Whole areas were disadvantaged for technical reasons. A man from the port of Digby 
explained that in his area fish for salt processing was not counted, nor was the fish that they 
had been selling to the mobile gear fleet. 
 
In the end DFO and the IQ committee managed to get the allocations made in a year through 
an intense round of meetings and consultation. A number of accommodations were made, and 
formulas were developed for estimating under recorded catches and distributing them as fairly 
as they could be. It was a painful experience that still seems to play the role of foundational 
myth for the current Nova Scotia fisheries management system. Apostle et al. (2002) offer a 
quote from one fisher describing what these meetings were like that seems an apt summary: 
Fishers “were looking at the generated numbers and realizing they were going to end up with 
60 tonnes of fish, and realizing they were finished. It was a really tense, tough, emotional time 
and we did that for a year”. 
 
In the end, however, each fisher had their historical allocation assigned and this allocation 
became the basis for the new management system. For the mobile fleet and the > 45’ fixed 
gear fleet it became the basis for the individual ITQs. For the < 45’ fixed gear fleet the 
individual allocations were pooled and on that basis the community quotas were identified 
that would be managed by the Community Management Boards. 
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3.3 Impacts of the Rights-based System 
3.3.1 Enabling the Transition to a More Sustainable Fishery 
 
A central point that one manager in particular wished to make to us was that people tend to 
conflate everything together. The individual quotas sy tem, the hail-in hail-out monitoring 
system, the cutbacks in the overall magnitude of the quota driven by the ecological situation, 
and the transferability of the ITQs are lumped togeher and called “the ITQ system”.  His 
argument was that the huge drops in numbers of active boats, processing plants and the 
geographical concentration of fishing activity (see S ction 2.3.2) were all going to happen 
anyway if you combined massive quota cuts with effectiv  enforcement. People involved in 
the fixed gear fishery were seeing large numbers of fish plants being closed down and 
blaming the ITQ system for this, when in reality it was the quota going down and a number of 
those plants had been kept alive by black landings and were no longer viable because of the 
new enforcement system.  He pointed out that the same thing, at least as far as operational 
concentration even if not nearly as much geographicl concentration happened under 
community management boards where no ITQs were in play. What the ITQ did was 
determine the process by which fishing and processing capacity was reduced, not the 
reduction itself.  
 
Another of our respondents, a commercial fishing representative, supports this view. He 
believes that the main reason there was a good deal of re uctant support at the time was that 
people believed it was the only way to avoid chaos nd mass bankruptcies. While he is 
basically critical of the ITQ system he admits that there “are a hundred stories” of fishers 
consolidate appropriately with money changing hands and people not losing their houses. He 
suggests that as a mechanism to reduced capacity the ITQ is a good mechanism because it 
allows fair trading and real value to transfer. A manager suggested to us that the central 
question that ITQs pose for fishers is what they really want to do with their business. They 
can decide to have the groundfish be a supplement to what they are doing with lobster or 
harpooning or do they want to fish for groundfish full time. The sentiment was echoed by 
many of our respondents, both fishers and managers and both strong supporters of the ITQ 
idea and those who had many reservations about it. In the late 1980s and early 1990s fishing 
capacity in Nova Scotia had to be reduced and the ITQ system was the fairest and least 
painful system for accomplishing that goal.   
 
The process is not over. The smaller and less effici nt operations continue to be marginalized. 
The price of fishing has gone up. Global competition is intense. More and more of the costs of 
management have been placed on the industry. DFO is requiring increased monitoring and 
observer coverage. Other government agencies are putting pressure on fishers for 
“professionalization” meaning more training and required certifications, greater investments 
in safety precautions, workmen's compensation, and insurance. Meanwhile the groundfish 
resource is still very small by historical standards.  
3.3.2 Geographical and Organizational Concentration 
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The creation of the Nova Scotia ITQ system case was he vily influenced by the fact that the 
communities involved were very dependent on fishing (McCay et al. 1996).  This led to the 
requirements that ITQ holders be bona fide fishers and a rule that no one could own more than 
two percent of the total quota (Apostle et al. 2002). However, Apostle et al. (2002) conclude 
that concentration  of ownership has increased since 1990 in spite of the provisions to avoid 
this. They base this conclusion on interview data with cross-references of estimates as non-
confidential records are not a good indicator because of problems identifying true ownership 
because of the many routes available for getting around ownership limits. Their interview data 
identified 19 groups of three or more licenses controlled by a single entity. Within a short 
time of after the implementation of the ITQ system, Creed et al. (1994), found vertical 
integration with in the community where they did their field work. Only two or three out of 30 
mobile-gear vessels there were not tied to one of the fish plants. They found people who 
believed that the ITQ system favoured those with capital and fishing rights rather than those 
who work hard at catching fish. 
 
Table 2 summarizes some indicators of concentration. These data should be read keeping in 
mind concentration was very evident in the 1980s. Indeed there is a dip with some measures 
going down in the early 90s then back up again (Apostle et al. 2002).  There has also been a 
very clear geographical concentration with a big drop in the cod landed in eastern and central 
Nova Scotia. These areas accounted for 33% of the cod landings in 1991 but only 4% in 1997 
(Apostle et al. 2002). Some of this difference, however, can be attributed to changes in stock 
distribution.  
 
Table 2. Percentage of Landings Going to.. 
  1990  1997 
The top 12 fishing vessels  13  28 
The top 10 fishing ports  57  73 
The top 11 fish buyers  39  60 
Abstracted from Apostle et al. 2002 pages 61-63 
 
In their ethnographic investigation of the impacts of ITQs on the Scotia-Fundy mobile gear 
groundfish sector Creed et al. (1994) found significant differences in perceptions of social 
power and access to resources between ITQ holders and non-holders. One of the social 
impacts they found through ethnographic studies wasth t people in communities with 
significant quota became gatekeepers to the fishery. This changed relationships in ways no 
one liked, even the gatekeepers themselves. (Apostle et al 2002).  
 
Two other policies that are in place to limit organizational and geographical concentration in 
Nova Scotia fisheries are the Owner-Operator Policy and the Fleet Separation Policy. Both 
policies are aimed at separating processing and harvesting (DFO 2004b). Under the owner-
operator provision, licence holders who are restricted to using vessels less than 65 feet in 
length are required to fish their licences personally. There exist some grandfather provisions 
for  fishers who had previously designated an operator for one or more of their vessels and 
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substitute operators are also allowed when circumstance prevent a fisher from fishing 
personally. One of the key Canadian policies in respect to the inshore (< 65’) fleet is the 1979 
“fleet separation policy” The policy restricted corp ations from holding any new fishing 
licences for inshore vessels, while it did allow for corporations, including processors, to 
maintain licenses held before that time. The fleet separation policy was in place before the 
ITQ system was introduced. 
 
In 2003 DFO produced a “discussion document” (DFO 2004b) based on interactions with 
stakeholders on the subject of fisheries policies in Atlantic Canada.  These discussions 
uncovered industry views regarding the owner-operator nd fleet separation policies that were 
highly polarized. The problem from the perspective of the inshore fishers was "trust 
agreements" which they saw as undermining the fleets paration policy. Trust agreements are 
a legal agreement which allow a license holder to enter into an agreement with a third party 
which allows them to control the use of the license. These consultations found wide concerns 
that the trust agreements were eroding the two policies. There were also proposals to make the 
owner-operator and fleet separation policies more flexible without limiting the use of trust 
agreements which provoked widespread opposition.  The document argues that DFO might 
have the power to prevent the separation of the license and the benefit if they do so “for 
fisheries management reasons” and DFO should have to demonstrate this linkage.  The 
consultations have found opposition to the trust agreements is very strong. Many people 
believe that DFO should pursue a regulatory solution t  reducing or eliminating trust 
agreements and this debate is still ongoing. 
 
3.3.3 Retirement and Recruitment 
 
The entry and exit of fishers into the fishery is an important area of concern among our 
respondents in respect to the ITQ system, as well as the Community Management Boards 
discussed below. Several respondents emphasized that ITQs facilitated the retirement of 
fishers by providing them with an asset they could sell when leaving the business. This, in 
fact, was one of the major ideological fault lines in debates over the system.  One respondent 
who was deeply involved in the Community Management boards considered a desire to leave 
the fishery to be perhaps the main determinate of pe ple’s attitudes towards ITQs. This 
respondent observed that people who are planning to keep on fishing are generally opposed to 
the ITQs system because their increased costs throug  taking on debt to buy quota would be 
greater than their benefits. But those wish to leave fishing say yes because it provides a 
mechanism for doing this.  Another respondent said that he thought it was more common to 
sell a license in order to buy a license in another fishery than to sell a license in order to retire.  
 
Respondents pointed out, however, that the market for small licenses is currently weak. 
Transfers in the inshore fishery have traditionally tended to take place between a father and 
his son or other relative. “But if you look at the papers there are licenses for sale 
everywhere”.  A young man can become a fisher after two years in terms of being able to 
qualify as a “professional fisher” to buy a license. Then have to buy a license and it may not 
be possible to use the license to secure a loan from a bank. The ITQS have not usually been 
recognized as assets for the purpose of loan collateral but very recently court cases have 
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suggested that the licenses, i.e., the access right itself is an asset in the legal sense.  While 
ITQs have been argued to be a block to a young person getting into the fishery because of the 
cost of quota, but in Nova Scotia licenses for non-ITQ species (e.g. lobster or crab) are just as 
expensive. With costs of entry as high as they are nd the status of these assets being so 
unclear, for many young fishers only real choice they ave it to go to the processing plants for 
a loan.  This then ties the new fisher to that plant and is one source of the “trust agreements” 
discussed in the previous section.  Finally, many Nova Scotia young people are choosing to 
going out west drawn by the oil boom in Alberta. This as implications for both finding future 
boat owners and finding adequate crew now. 
 
The transfer of licenses on leaving the fishery is an issue with wide resonance. The 
government is easing the very significant capital gains taxes if a license is transferred from a 
parent to a child. This was the subject of a large debate in the last election. The resulting 
legislation allows a tax exemption of 500,000 CAD on all licence transfers and an additional 
500,000 CAD if the transfer is to an immediate family member.  This is one area that has been 
a particular challenge for the Community Management Boards, with several respondents 
saying that retirement is perhaps the most contentious disagreement they fact. People with 
good catch histories go into a community group, but when the time comes that they want to 
sell their license to retire the group asserts control of the license of the quota attached to it. 
 
3.3.4 Crew 
 
The ITQs have changed some of the shares systems used through which crew members are 
paid. Owners of larger firms have placed the cost of ITQ on "the top of the lay" in other 
words the cost of the quota is considered a cost of fishing and deducted from the crews share 
of the catch and not only from the share of the ITQ owners (McCay et al. 1996).  A 
respondent from the industry  explained that while some inventors in quota are still very 
concerned with communities and the quality of life others are focussed only on maximizing 
profit and return to crew members is less today than it was 20 years ago. “Once people started 
buying the quotas they had another debt and the less reputable ones would shovel that cost on 
to the crew members”. 
 
Other factors are at work as well. Changes in skillrequirements are one. One respondent who 
works in the industry told us that even in the 70s a generous portion went to the crew because 
they took a risk, they had to be skilled and they had to manage the trip. But now fishing has 
become safer and electronic equipment is reducing the level of skill required. Another fisher 
explained “there are four of us in our boat. I used to carry seven. This is because of the lower 
number of fish we have to catch. I used to fish 7-8 days hard, but now I can't so I only take 
four. The way they are paid is being changed because you have no fish to catch and you have 
to buy fish before you come then it has to be paid for”. 
 
Recruiting crew has become very difficult. The smaller firms employing kin have often 
chosen not to decrease the crew share. The crews in Canada are having to work longer hours 
and are very unhappy; in some cases they are not getting an increase in pay (McCay et al. 
1996).   A manager working with the informal ITQ system in Shelburne (see Section 2.6 
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below) told us “last summer I think the guys started realizing it was a lot harder to find crew. 
If they didn't like who they had they used to shift faster… It is particularly hard to get the 
older more experienced people. I don't think there are a lot of young people who want to go 
fishing. It is cold hard work. “A respondent in the mobile fleet told us that because the crew 
share has decreased it is not so easy to find crew for groundfish now. An important factor here 
is that there is that the lobster fishery is paying relatively well.  His community has responded 
directly to this problem because “there are still good young people in [his community]”.  
“The community is built on hard workers  ... who stayed together and saved money, they 
adapted to the changes”. The community has bought some ITQs as a community a  there are, 
in fact, more vessels and larger vessels than before the change.  This quota they are buying is 
from the other villages in the area that are not so organized, another aspect of the geographical 
concentration discussed above. 
 
3.3.5 Markets, Quality and Price  
 
One claim that was made during the introduction of the ITQ system is that it would improve 
fish quality because fishers could fish more slowly and time their fishing in relation to the 
market. Some evidence exists of increases in quality. The prices gotten by the inshore mobile 
sector of cod and haddock, but not pollock, have converged with those of the fixed gear fleet 
that traditionally got better prices because of higher quality (Apostle et al. 2002). 
 
Among our respondents, however, even those who are very supportive of the ITQ system 
expressed some disappointment that the improvement in quality and price has not been as 
great as they would like. A fisher with a large boat and some processing interests explained 
that the market is not that well organised in Nova Scotia. Fish buyers in New York and New 
England are the main driver and this has kept Canadi  prices low.  He argues that Nova 
Scotia is hurt by the lack of vertically integration created by the fleet separation and owner-
operator policy. This weakens the ability of Canadian firms to resist the influence of the 
American market and set their own prices. Currently fish from the inshore mobile fleet is sold 
with little processing, mainly fresh and whole. The large trawlers are able to process the fish 
onboard. For the inshore fleet the ITQs gave stabili y and security for the investment.  The 
prices went a little up but not so much. The market structure is such that the reward for quality 
is not really worth the investment. 
 
Another respondent from the commercial sector agreed that product quality and prices has not 
improved as much as expected. He argued, however, that the market was constrained by the 
small number of large companies in the off-shore industry who had blocked attempts to set up 
port-based auction markets in Canada. “So a lot of what we do here is controlled by auction 
markets in the US in Portland and New York where we truck in unprocessed fish”. So while 
there is some variability in fish quality in the market but the price response has not been 
enough to generate much change”. A third respondent said that the ITQ system did not really 
help the skippers planning their fisheries and stop the race for the fish  because in reality, the 
owner decides when to go out when the prices are good, whatever the weather. 
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3.3.6 Fishing Behaviour and Conservation 
 
Evidence for a link between ITQS and stewardship is not readily evident and what is there 
gives mixed signals (Apostle et al. 2002). People ar becoming more concerned with 
enforcement, as protection of their investments. They did decide to adopt a square mesh net. 
Creed et al. (1994) also heard reports of increased compliance, even claims that illegal 
landings had almost disappeared. However, some observer data suggests that discarding, 
dumping and high grading have increased in the ITQ fleet (Apostle et al. 2002).  
 
Apostle et al. (2002) analyzed violation statistics. The found that ITQ system seems to have 
had a strong downward impact on both the number violations and the severity of the offences. 
They report that the inshore mobile fleet recorded 331 violations between 1986 and 1990 
before the ITQ system and 74 violations between 1991 and 1995. They also did a random 
sample of 30 cases, 20 from the first period and 10 from the second, to get an idea of the 
kinds of cases being brought. They found a marked difference with the violations in the 
earlier period being considerably more serious in addition to being more frequent (Apostle et 
al. 2002). 
 
ITQ have raised a couple of questions about their direct implications for conservation. An 
ITQ is probably perfect in a single-species context, argued one respondent from the fishing 
industry, but bycatch is the Achilles heel of the ITQ system. In a multi-species context such as 
Nova Scotia, bycatch makes an ITQ system a “nightmare” from a business perspective. A 
Nova Scotia fisher can be dealing with up to six quota species as well as other species with 
bycatch restrictions. A fisher has a basket of holdings of quota and catches more of one 
species and less of another. The economic theory would assume the market would operate and 
you would buy or sell this quota. But quite quickly it becomes apparent that it is easier to 
discard the fish you have caught than it is to buy q ota to cover it. While there are certainly 
people on shore who had the quota needed to cover the incidental catch, they will be asking 
three and four time its market value because they know that the fisher will not be able to catch 
the target species without some quota for the bycatch. This same observation was confirmed 
by other respondents from the industry.  
 
ITQs also have an impact on conservation because they lock in a particular management 
system, including a particular definition of the stock that attaches to the ITQ. One industry 
member, with the agreement of a scientist, explained how they are caught in a situation now 
where they are finding that what they thought was one stock is really two stocks with a high 
degree of mixing. The managers at DFO “tear their hair when we say this as they have 
already been subdividing and subdividing”. It is a downside of an ITQ system that it locks 
ecological realities into hard institutional boxes. The science is saying that we should split 4X 
cod, 4X haddock and pollock. But right now fishers own a quota of 4X cod and there is not 
good way to determine if that quota they own is all e stern or all western or should somehow 
be divided. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
54 
The benefit of the ITQ system is that it provided a mechanism for removing capacity from the 
fishery that reduced the inevitable disruption in fishers’ lives by providing a transparent 
system for the reallocation of value.  The ITQs smoothed the process by which fishing and 
processing capacity was reduced, but were not the main engine of the reduction itself. The 
main engines were much smaller quotas and the introduction of effective enforcement. Most 
of the unfairness that was experienced stemmed from the initial allocation of individual quota 
based on the reconstructed historical participation rather than the system developed for 
trading those individual quotas.  
 
The ITQ system in Nova Scotia has had the same negativ  impacts that have emerged in other 
areas where such a system has been implemented. It has intensified the organizational and 
geographical concentration of the industry that would likely have accompanied capacity 
reduction however it was carried out. It has shifted more of the burden of reducing excess 
capacity to crew members than is perhaps fair. Attemp s to reduce these negative impacts 
through the design of the system and closely related policies have not been very effective and 
remain controversial. The impacts of the system on conservation are both unclear and mixed, 
but from a legal and institutional perspective it has reduced potentials for adaptive 
management by locking ecological realities that evolve either naturally or as a result of 
greater scientific understanding – for example the definitions of particular fish stocks - into 
hard institutional boxes.  
 
The most interesting aspects of rights-based management in Nova Scotia have emerged in its 
interplay with the reforms toward greater participation that have taken place, especially in the 
form of the Community Management Boards. It is to this subject that we now turn.  
 
4 The Community Management Boards 
4.1 A brief history of the innovation 
 
The Community Management Boards (CMB) were formed for the management of small 
vessel fixed gear fleet. The Board’s were formed in the wake of organized protests focussed 
on resistance to the introduction of ITQs. Charles et al. (2005) suggest that this happened 
because the fixed gear fishers did not like what they saw happening in the inshore mobile 
fishery after ITQs were introduced.  
 
Many of these fishers were also lobster fishers. Charles et al. (2005) describe the lobster 
fishery as a "relatively stable core" of multi-gear inshore fishery. In Nova Scotia inshore 
fisheries the lobster fishery is strongly place-based and there is a long history of local 
management going back at least to the 19th century (Haward et al. 2005). The fishers were 
used to using effort control for lobster and so there was a lot or resistance when DFO 
introduced quotas for groundfish in the late 1980s. The fishers wanted trip limits because they 
saw them as more equitable because larger boats can tart fishing earlier in the year and this 
gives them what was perceived as an unfair advantage under a competitive quota approach. In 
1994 when DFO decided not to enforce the trip limits there was conflict and the outcome was 
the establishment of 18 management units, basically ounties, each having a quota. This in 
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turn led to the creation of the Sambro pilot management board and the subsequent allocation 
of the entire fixed gear quota for cod, haddock and pollock into community quotas (Charles et 
al. 2005).  
 
The Sambro community, as describe by Loucks (1998), was on the cusp between two quota 
areas and was competing hard for an area where they had had very high historical 
participation. They took their complaints to DFO and, once they established this high 
historical participation, began to negotiate what to do about it. They requested an experiment 
with a "community quota" allocation. This was approved in the spring of 1995. They ensured 
the plan would be enforced in a democratic way by designing a Fishing Conservation Harvest 
Plan that was adopted by fishers through a formal contractual agreement. The contract shifted 
much of the management responsibility from DFO to the Association.  
 
The fishers understood that they had to demonstrate full compliance if the co-management 
approach was going to work. This was the first community quota in Atlantic Canada and the 
first time a group of fishers in Scotia Fundy signed a contract committing themselves to a 
specific harvesting regime. It required that they hire, for one percent of the catch, one of the 
independent monitoring companies that were involved in the “hail in hail out” system 
originally set up to monitor the ITQ fleets. DFO would also do random monitoring and if 
violations were detected the contract would be cancelled.  
 
One of our respondents was a manager who was involved in these activities from the DFO 
side. He explained that DFO had become very frustrated trying to develop a single 
management plan for everyone. They were continually running into problems such as 
different lobster seasons, differences in tides, one area not wanting to start fishing for pollock 
until June because they were still fishing for lobster but in danger of losing their quota to 
other areas if they waited.  DFO started to address thi  by basing management on gear types. 
They created a gill net group, a long line group and  hand line group. They had the fishers 
choose which group they would belong to and then we used our data to divide the quota. The 
system worked more or less well for different groups depending on the fishing history 
information and other factors.  But overall it was not a very satisfactory system.  
 
Then came the Sambro experiment. It was requested by the community but agreed to readily 
by DFO because of dissatisfactions with the gear group approach. During the first year the 
other groups ran through their quota while Sambro kept right on going through the year. The 
shift of responsibility to the group, Loucks (1998) argues, resulted in high community 
cohesion. The Sambro community purposely under fished t eir quota by five percent.  
 
The success of this system led to DFO formalizing "community quota regions" throughout 
Nova Scotia in 1996. After the successful first year, as our manager respondent described the 
events, in fall of 1995, the rest of the groups got together had their own meeting and invited 
people from DFO. Two hundred people came and said they wanted to try community 
management. It was not that easy to arrange. There w a lot of different opinions and the 
county-based groups put fishers together who did not agree. At one point DFO arranged for 
independent arbitration. Yarmouth and Shelburne, for example, wanted to be one big group; 
this was not allowed because DFO wanted to avoid mixing the slower fishers from Yarmouth 
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in with the high liners from Shelburne. They did not want “piggy backers”. Once the 
communities finished their negotiations DFO met with them and a final decision was made.  
 
The most contentious area was Shelburne County which is by far the most important area for 
fixed gear, nearly half of the fixed gear fishing takes place there. Sinclair et al. (1999) 
describe the complexity of the Shelburne County fishery, with more than 800 fixed-gear < 45’ 
licences. They suggest that the fishers were basically forced to organize.  Shelburne County 
could not come to an agreement and in the end DFO had t e divide them into two 
management boards, Shelburne A and Shelburne B. This arrangement continues to this day. 
 
DFO is very satisfied with the division of responsibilities. “The boards do a whole bunch of 
things we did before, we have downloaded responsibilities. We had very little support before 
in trying to manage fisheries, now they can do their own thing” explained the manager who 
had been involved in the process. The boards have the responsibility for defining entitlements 
on how to harvest the assigned allocation (Peacock and Hansen 2000). The communities have 
taken a number of approaches, which range from a competitive fishery (by gear type) within 
an overall community-quota on a per species basis, to an industry-developed and delivered 
ITQ initiative. 
 
Enforcement is carried out under the CMBs based on the Conservation Harvesting Plans that 
are the basis of their contracts with DFO. Within communities and/or quota groups it is up to 
the participants to develop allocation rules and this process has been extremely divisive in 
some communities, and it is creating tensions among fishers and groups as quota becomes 
associated with fewer individuals. Some licence-holders see themselves being squeezed out of 
the fishery. Under an overall competitive quota for the fixed-gear licence holders, all fishers 
could fish until the global quota was reached. Under community quotas, some groups and/or 
individuals are being closed down quickly while others are distributing their quota throughout 
the whole year.  
 
For most of the CMBs the shifting of fishers between boards is not an issue. It is only possible 
between the two Shelburne A and B without moving to a different county as they are the only 
ones who have two boards in one county. Shifting never happens within a year. Once a 
community quota was created, if people want to move between boards the board must 
approve this decision. They negotiate these things. The boards decide if you are taking any 
quota with them, so what they take is usually limited, so the new boards are reluctant to take 
them as they come with no or little quota. 
 
The management boards are all operate differently which was part of the idea of local control. 
Charles et al. (2005:8) identify the following characteristics are shared by all or most 
management boards: 
 
1. The boards were established and are run by fish harvesting organizations, and 
strive for inclusive decision-making processes.  
2. The boards sub-allocate the community quota among different gear types and 
devise rules for all licence-holders in the form of a community management plan.  
3. The management plans are enforced through contractual arrangement between the 
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board, the licence-holders, and the catch monitoring companies.  
4. Management plans are consistent with basic conservation requirements set out by 
DFO and each licence holder must follow the conditions of licence as determined by 
the government.  
5. Management boards have infractions committees to judge alleged violations of 
management plans and impose penalties. 
6. Seasonal adjustments are made to management plans and in a number of cases 
these adjustments include the sale or trade of unused quota between different 
management boards.  
7. Individual licence holders can still choose to fish under a generic management plan 
devised by DFO for the whole Scotia-Fundy region instead of under a community 
management plan devised for local conditions”. 
 
The Community Management Boards are organized around previously existing fishermen’s 
associations and are influenced by other place-based networks. Shelburne A for example is 
made up of three previously existing groups and Shelburne B is made up of five. These 
groups often reflect the three gear groups of long li es, hand lines and gill nets. The “Fixed 
Gear Committee” represents all of the boards in meetings with DFO. Each board has three 
representatives on this committee, one for each gear group, and a CMB is required to present 
a unified position to the meeting when an issue is decided. Bull (1998) reports that the Fundy 
Fixed Gear Council, a CMB, has been an initial success because it comprises well defined 
geographical area, a relatively unified membership and good working links between the three 
fishers' organizations involved. The Council is organized into three committees by types of 
gear, an infractions Committee was set up with representatives of the three organizations and 
a chair but these all rotated secretly so nobody knew who was going to be up to serve. 
 
The significance of the fishing history was a commitment to a particular place not just to an 
amount of fish that was legally entitled to (Loucks 1998 p57).  Haward et al. (2005) argue that 
the key to Canada's community based approach lies in its reliance on a specific coastal 
community or logical component of the coastal zone. They also point out that the 
implementation of community quotas has increased the management role of the already 
existing regionally-based fishermen's associations.  
 
Davis and Bailey (1996), on the contrary, argue that consideration of how small-boat fishers 
are rooted in the community is missing. The approach to co-management taken here had 
entrenched the elite. One of our respondents from the fishing industry, kind of an elite 
himself, argued that is his experience the government only wants to deal with the bigger local 
players, they want to deal with one person and have that one person deal with the rest of  the 
industry. 
 
4.2 The CMBs and the Costs of Management 
 
No quantified information exists on the implications of the Community Management Boards 
for the costs of management. Even if such data did exist the comparison would be between the 
current system and a counterfactual alternative. Nor is there any data on who is paying what 
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costs, but it is very clear that the overall system r lieves DFO of a number of tasks they had 
previously. We believe it is a reasonable hypothesis that many costs are more cheaply born by 
community groups than by others.  
 
In comparing the costs of management between the CMBs and the ITQ system a DFO 
manager said that they have some significant costs dealing with quota transfers within in the 
mobile fleet. This activity is not necessary for DFO to do on the CMB side because they 
manage the fisheries internally according to their arvesting plan. Only when quota is shifted 
between CMBs must DFO must keep track of the exchange. There is not a "humungous 
amount" of this, but enough so that DFO has two or three p ople involved in keeping these 
records. Even the CMB that uses individual quotas (Shelburne B) does so internally and this 
creates no costs for DFO. DFO does have responsibilities for making sure that the harvesting 
plans are honoured. Most of the information needed for this is developed by the privatized 
hail-in hail-out monitoring system which also involes little or no costs to DFO When asked 
if he is sure that DFO’s costs for the CMB system are less than that for the ITQ system his 
response was "I'm sure it is because it is a lot less paper work”.  
 
Sinclair et al. (1999), however, are concerned about overall costs. They believe that the 
strategic decision to use community quotas as an organizational tool to transfer responsibility 
to the small vessel fixed-gear sector has changed the annual planning process as organizations 
have evolved, in a somewhat forced fashion, from the bottom up (Sinclair et al. 1999). They 
further argue that the overall costs of management have risen with the introduction of a more 
complex institutional structure. The division of responsibilities includes the government 
licensing and registering vessels, limiting gears, and describing the area to be fished or 
controlled. Much of this work is carried out through the DFO-administered licence systems 
and DFO enforcement activities (Peacock and Hansen 2000). 
 
4.3 The CMBs, Sanctions and Compliance  
 
Once a fisher has finished his quota for one species he must stop fishing for groundfish and 
the same is true for the group quotas in the CMB. This is a major incentive for group 
organization. As one fisher explained “some fellow would just go to Georges and catch all the 
cod they could catch and shut everything down for everyone. We do not want radicals 
shutting everything down”. When a group fishes more than its quota this must be corrected, 
this usually means having to find (buy or trade) quota from somewhere else. 
 
The groups develop strict enforcement mechanisms so that they do not have to stop fishing.  
In respect to penalties the fishers are tough. In CMBs the penalties, which are normally 
reductions in quota or time at sea, are harsher than those the government would impose, there 
is no appeal and the enforcement is quite effective (Peacock and Hansen 2000). People who 
commit infractions can be put right out of the group. They go into Group X because no one 
else will take them. This is not common; one respondent from Shelburne B said that he could 
remember it happening with “only three or four boats with any significance.” 
 
Group X is the quota of people who are not affiliated with a CMB. Because DFO created 
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Group X the boards are not forced to accept all fisher . The most serious sanction available to 
the Community Management Board is to exclude a fisher so that he must move his IQ into 
Group X. Group X has almost no management services, t is fished competitively and when 
the Group X quota is exhausted then the entire group is shut down. This completely 
unmanaged quota does not last very long and so there is a strong incentive for a fisher to 
remain within the Board system. As one fisher described it to us “To belong to no group is 
not good, nobody wants to touch you, and people do not want you fishing on their boat”. 
 
When a boat goes over its assigned catch or otherwis  breaks a CMB rule they are taken 
before an infractions committee. One respondent explained how this worked in his CMB.  
The membership of the infractions committee is different every time it meets and is kept more 
or less secret. More or less in this context means that it is officially secret but people know 
who represented their group and the representatives, of course, know who was there. The 
infractions committee reviews an anonymous file. They begin with warnings for small 
infractions but sanctions can be serious. The largest sanction has been five years with no 
contract, which means that the person is forced into Group X. There is an appeals system in 
that the fisher has a right to take the matter to the Board itself. When they do this they loose 
their anonymity. His Board has allowed alternatives sanctions, such as a fine instead of lost 
fishing. Each CMB organizes itself in its own way. 
 
4.4 The Case of Shelburne B 
 
We focused a good deal of our short stay in Nova Scotia on the Shelburne B CMB because it 
is an interesting example of combining a community approach with a rights-based system. 
This CMB has chosen to use an internal transferable quota system to solve their allocation 
problems. This suggests itself as a way to gain the benefits of both community management 
and ITQs. Community involvement may aid in helping to avoid the quota busting, high 
grading, and misreporting that are the common problems associated with quota-based 
fisheries management. Copes and Charles (2004) question the compatibility of the two 
approaches, however, arguing that community management requires a planned approach and 
that ITQs cannot contribute to this as markets make decisions in ways that automatically 
exclude community interests. 
 
The Shelburne B set up, according to two respondents ac ive in its management, gives 
everyone have some access even if it is only a small sh re because of their fishing history. 
The members of the community are able to fish in that community and even people with very 
little history, and hence small IQs, can collect enough for a summer’s work. Another 
respondent described the benefits of the system this way: “you go the time of the year you 
want, if you want to go, you go, and you set the fish aside if you want to go swordfishing. 
When you want to go you can go, that is how the IQ will make things work for an individual if 
you are small like we are”. 
 
The community basis of the system is strongly supported.  Our respondents explained that the 
reason their group has been (mainly) against adopting a full-scale ITQ is because it would 
harm the smaller communities in the county. They believ  that fish would move to the larger 
60 
ITQ gear and would never come back to their area. The fish will not be landed here or worked 
on in Shelburne. Another respondent from Shelburne B believes that equity is what fishers 
really want out of a management system, and it was the inequality under the quota system, a 
perception rooted in the struggles over “history”, that caused so much resistance.  In 
community management you get local enforcement. If he were to go down a dock with, for 
example, undersized lobster, he would be confronted by fishers with various ways of 
expressing their anger over an infringement that they see as affecting them personally, “but if 
you cheat on a quota you are just cheating the governm nt”. 
 
While these internal sales are not usually permanent, in Shelburne B fishers can still sell out 
their licenses and retire. If a fisher decides to stop fishing he can get a reasonable price from 
the community.  These prices, however, are not nearly as high as he would get if their were a 
official ITQ system.  One fisher explained “If I want to retire I can sell my license and then 
they [the buyer] would become a part of the group [the CMB]”.  
 
The swapping system in Shelburne B is entirely internal to the CMB and DFO has nothing to 
do with it. This is in contrast to the official ITQ system in which DFO bears the costs of 
recording when quota changes hand. A DFO respondent said “We could not care less what 
they do as individuals”.   
 
The Shelburne situation, including the formation of Shelburne B and the internal ITQ system, 
has seen a lot of conflict. One fisher said that he se  fishers divided into two ideological 
camps. On the one side are those who want to chase fish wherever they are. They see the 
others as lazy, and on the other side are those who want to wait for the fish to come closer so 
they don't steam as far. They say the others are gre dy and wasteful. These two attitudes are 
expressed in their disagreements about management and w s, in the opinion of several 
respondents, an underlying reason for the division of Shelburne into Shelburne A, the lazy 
group, and Shelburne B, the greedy and wasteful group. While this conflict was very intense 
ten years ago the groups have settled and seem now to coexist. “We are not enemies”. Over 
the years there has been some movement between the groups. Most of the movement is 
toward the B side. Some changed simply because they thought the group was working better, 
but more of the shift was people selling licenses. The B group, being the more business 
oriented, were simply the more likely to be the purchasers. 
 
A substantial group within Shelburne B would like to move to a full ITQ system. The process 
that DFO has set up for making such a decision is a demanding one and it does not look like 
this group has the support to prevail in the near future. The true ITQ groups are also a bit 
resentful of the Shelburne B system as they have the benefits of ITQs without their costs. 
These costs being the allocation fee and the more extensive dockside monitoring the DFO 
requires of the ITQ fleets. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
The Community Management Boards have developed an international reputation as an 
experiment in fisheries co-management. All of the respondents we interviewed were very 
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supportive, some even quite proud, of the CMB system. Even industry respondents who were 
not entirely satisfied, such as those that would like a more traditional ITQ approach, 
considered the CMBs to be as good a deal as they can expect to get at this time. The CMBs 
seem to have worked particularly well from the persctive of DFO. They have greatly 
reduced taxpayer costs while giving them effective local institutions for working with the 
fishing industry.  
 
We found the Shelburne B experiment to be particularly interesting. On the one hand the ITQ 
impact that leadership in coastal communities fear the most, the loss of a local fisheries base 
through industry concentration, has not happened. On the other hand, the CMBs that have not 
allowed the transfer of IQ among members have had problems dealing in a fair way with exits 
from the fishery. They have also no doubt paid a considerable cost in economic efficiency in 
comparison to a formal ITQ system, as is evidenced by the lower price that Shelburne quota 
gets in comparison with the mobile gear quota. On the other hand the Shelburne CMB takes 
on management costs that are bourn by the Canadian taxpayer in the mobile gear ITQ.  
 
The CMBs are only one of the institutional platforms for fishers’ participation in fisheries 
management in Nova Scotia. They have developed into a  important resource that contributes 
to the success of other initiatives, such as the individual quotas and the monitoring system. 
Science is another area in which participatory approaches, facilitated by both the CMBs and 
other institutions, have been beneficial in Nova Scotia. This is the subject for Section 4. 
 
5 Participatory Approaches to Science and Management decision 
5.1 History of Innovation 
5.1.1 Increased Industry Participation in Science 
 
The collapse of groundfish stocks and the perceived role of science in it through over 
optimistic assessment have sharpened the mistrust of the industry to the traditional ways of 
providing scientific advice to management, and they ave demanded the chance to participate 
in the scientific process. Furthermore, the development of new fisheries almost from zero, 
with emerging data-poor target species, has weakened the established model-based scientific 
system, because of the needs of new methods for scientific advice. This has created incentives 
for industry participation, as the scientific knowledge on biology and abundance for these new 
species could not been based on historical scientific data, and thus could be more open to 
industry’s empirical knowledge. Finally, the drastic cuts in DFO budget (see Section 1.2.2) 
have also reduced the possibilities of scientific surveys and analyses. As a consequence, a 
major trend in Atlantic Canada over the last fifteen years has been towards an increasing 
participation of industry in the whole scientific advice, and a real educational process of the 
industry into stock assessment and research. 
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5.2 Participation in Stock Assessment Processes 
5.2.1 Groundfish Stocks 
 
In spite of some flaws in the traditional VPA-based assessment methods revealed by the 
groundfish stock collapse, these methods are still used for stock assessment and scientific 
advice to management for most fish stocks. Some altern ive indicator-based approaches were 
tried back in time (see Section 4.5) but have not replaced the existing system. All groundfish 
stocks are handled in the same way. It has meant that industry participation has been 
subordinate to that existing scientific system, and has been conditioned to its format and 
requirement. Potential input from industry should be quantitative and scientifically validated 
evidence that could fit into the modelling, and potential criticisms from the industry to the 
scientific hypotheses first required in-depth understanding of the scientific methodology. As 
such, the participation of industry is formal and controlled.  
 
An initiative jointly created by the industry and DFO scientists was the so-called “sentinel 
fishery”, a survey mostly designed for maintaining formation flow during fishery closures, 
primarily in Atlantic Canada and Gulf of St Lawrenc. Sentinel fisheries have succeeded not 
only in providing crucial information for stock assessments, as a supplement to research 
vessel surveys, but also in becoming well-established and accepted among fishers, playing an 
instrumental role in creating a more co-operative atmosphere between scientists and fishers. 
(Charles, 1998). 
 
Some other initiatives were launched in the nineties by the industry alone, in order to provide 
alternative surveys that would supplement the scientific surveys used in assessment. A main 
one is the so-called “ITQ survey” performed by the rawler fleet >45’ entitled ITQ in 4X area. 
DFO used to have a regular trawl survey, but which could not sample along the shore in 
shallow waters because of the size of the research vessel. The industry proposed to cover that 
area and started a systematic survey with scientifically validated protocols in 1996. The costs 
are fully born by the industry, through some unallocated quotas which are used for science 
instead of being redistributed to each quota owner. The survey has been added to the scientific 
survey and is used into stock assessment. “This is a success story, with willingness and 
commitment from both parts. The industry makes good and objective job, and the science 
branch has been willing to modify their methods” said a fisherman engaged in that survey. 
Similarly, an industry halibut survey has been in force in ten years. It was initially proposed 
by scientists but was designed in collaboration betwe n the scientists and the industry. The 
results of that survey have been quite consistent with scientific findings, giving fishermen 
confidence in assessment results. 
 
However, including industry-based surveys in the asses ment is not always straightforward, if 
the results differ significantly from scientific findings. A longline fleet also launched a survey, 
as their perception of stock abundance was the opposite as observed with trawl-based surveys 
(“we see cod and few haddock, they see haddock and fewer cod”) said a longline fisherman. 
The industry survey lasted six years, but was never included in the assessment. 
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5.2.2 Invertebrate Stocks 
 
The situation is quite different for invertebrate stocks, as usual assessment tools cannot be 
used. Every single invertebrate species is so unique there has to be a new technique. This has 
lead to a system with DFO scientists almost full time dedicated to one particular stock over 
several years. This is changing now, as not all persons leaving are replaced, but this has been 
the case since invertebrates became major target specie . Assessment methods vary from 
stock to stock, depending on data available and scientist’s background, but also on industry 
demands and funds. A number of scientific studies ar  p id by the industry, as a source of 
knowledge for their own goals.  
 
The specificity of invertebrate species is also found in the industry exploiting them. Except 
for lobster, which is mostly targeted seasonally by a large number of fishermen with other 
activities year round, most invertebrate stocks have smaller spatial distribution and mobility, 
and are targeted by a limited number of specialised fishermen forming a rather homogeneous 
and cohesive group. As a result, the full-time involvement of a DFO scientist on a stock 
exploited by a limited number of stakeholders often l ad to close collaboration and high 
commitment between the scientist and the industry. These long-lasting relationships 
strengthen the trust and credibility of science andease the data collection process.  
 
However, this system leads to two types of issues. Fir t, the scientists may get too accustomed 
to their routine work, and do not have the chance to compare with methods used on other 
similar species. This leads to some inconsistencies between stocks, which may not be so 
problematic (“we are sort of disjointed and inconsistent according to some, but it is not 
inconsistency it is specificity to a situation” advocated a DFO scientist), but still raises some 
issues regarding science quality and equity. DFO works now towards higher scientific 
communication across scientists assessing invertebrate stocks, with support from statisticians 
and modelling experts. “We are seeing more of this cross stuff, partly because Canada is so 
big and we need consistency, and industry is complaining that one area is being treated 
differently from other ones” explained a DFO Science Branch manager. 
 
The second issue relates to scientific independence and integrity. The high level of 
embedment with industry creates the risk that industry put pressure to obtain the scientific 
evidence they want. There have been some good examples, where industry trusted their 
scientist and followed their recommendation of decreasing catches. These were cases where a 
real relationship of trust existed “I said they should cut back, and (…) they said OK. They said 
you were with us when we went up and this was, importantly, based on my history with this 
group of people” said a DFO scientist. But this is not true for all cases, and there are 
suspicions on scientific manipulation, also acknowledged by the professionals. “Some places 
it just does not make sense and we see manipulation” said a groundfish industry 
representative. Some industry pay parts of the salary of the scientist involved, and may even 
be involved in their selection. In such cases, peer scientists do not suggest obvious scientific 
manipulation, but rather claim over secrecy, lack of transparency and absence of peer-review 
of scientific results. 
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5.2.3 Participation in the Regional Advisory Process (RAP) 
 
As most stocks in Scotia-Fundy area are under sole Canadian jurisdiction, their assessment is 
under the responsibility of DFO and not NAFO, and is conducted within RAP meetings. 
These meetings have been opened to industry and NGOparticipants as a way to improve 
collaboration between industry and science after th groundfish collapse. And indeed, this has 
facilitated the dialogue with the industry and the improvement and acceptance of scientific 
results. The industry feel involved, and feel that they have to (“If you don’t ask question they 
will say whatever they want” said a fixed gear representative). When they do not agree with 
scientific findings, they try to come with samples for supporting their hypotheses. The 
industry is involved in helping to write the evaluation report, and industry’s comments and 
concerns are written down (“We have to go in with them. They are fair and willing to listen, it 
does not mean they will change the report, but I don’t feel slighted” said another fixed gear 
representative). Some communities are also organising local science meetings with DFO 
scientists prior to the RAP, in order to collect information from fishermen who do not attend 
the RAP. These open meetings also help the industry to understand the difficulty and 
complexity of stock assessment, and that uncertainties are inevitable. But it is clear that some 
mistrust is still there, although less radical than before. Some particular issues occurs with 
fixed gear industry, as most of the science is based on surveys using mobile gears, which do 
not accurately catch species such as cusk, pollack, ha e and halibut, leading to high 
uncertainties  in assessment. 
 
The major issue of such open science meetings is the risk of distortion because of political 
issues. The industry may put pressure on the meetings o get the results they want, looking at 
detailed wording instead of reviewing science and methods. The quality of interaction with 
industry depends on the level of the stock. “At one part they were invited to the assessment 
meeting, they started bringing lawyers and it became a very political discussion” said a DFO 
Science Branch manager. “They are going to change and go back to an invitation only 
meeting, reenforcing that participation is about bringing scientific inputs. It got to the point 
where people did not want to chair the meeting as they were afraid of being sued.” 
 
5.2.4 Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the scientific process has dramatically changed over the last fifteen years. A 
real effort has been made toward transparency and openness for effective governance. The 
Science Branch has been willing to improve dialogue and communication with the industry, 
to include their comments and concerns into assessment reports, to include some relevant 
surveys under certain frames. On the other side, the industry has been willing to participate at 
own costs, and has gone through a real educational process to be able to be proficient in 
collaboration with scientists, as the perception of reality and time frames differ strongly 
between both worlds “We were told that we had to do 5 years. 5 years is long time for a 
fisherman to think ahead, we mostly think one week ah ad.” said a former longline fisherman.  
 
Regular meetings between scientists and industry have created some particular situations of 
long-lasting and personal relationships with high levels of commitment and trust, especially in 
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invertebrate fisheries. But this cannot be generalised, as it appeared clearly that the own 
personality of the scientist is a decisive factor in the establishment of such relationships. The 
industry praises scientists confident with their analyses, and able to explain simply and well 
about issues. 
 
Participation of industry in the stock assessment process has though not always been 
straightforward. A degree of mistrust is still present between both worlds, especially when 
scientific results are based on comprehensive models and with input numbers based on 
extrapolation of sampling data. This has neither solved all uncertainties in stock assessment 
results, bringing sometimes more uncertainty in when industry and scientists perceptions of 
stocks trends go in opposite direction.  
 
In comparison with the previous system which was completely closed to industry 
participation, the open process risks “to go way the other way”, with a too large role accorded 
to the industry. Some uncomfortable situations were observed, with industry putting pressure 
on science meetings outputs for political reasons, especially when the level of scientific 
uncertainty is high. 
 
All actors recognised the progress achieved in including fishermen’s knowledge and point of 
view in the scientific advice, although some scepticism remains “I think it has improved, but 
on a scale 1-10 it has only improved 1, and it should be 10.” said a fisherman. This process 
has improved social robustness, by reducing the feeling of industry of being unheard. It has 
also improved biological robustness, by increasing the feeling of ownership and responsibility 
for the resource and improving the commitment to scientific advice.  
 
5.3 Participation in other Scientific Work – the FSRS 
 
A notable initiative launched in Nova Scotia in the aftermath of the groundfish collapse was 
the creation of the Fishermen and Scientists Research Society (FSRS), a voluntary 
organisation for collaborative research and co-education of fishermen and scientists and the 
first of its kind in the world. The initiative was initially paid by the government, which also 
provides continuous office facilities. But it is now an independent non-profit society, which 
financial support includes industry funds and governmental research grants. FSRS promotes 
science relevant to the long-term sustainability of the fishery. The Society stays away from 
controversial management issues, being prohibited by law to engage in lobbying and other 
management activities. In 2007 it counted 367 active members, mostly fishermen and 
scientists.  
 
The Society provides a frame for collaborative research. Scientists provide guidance in 
developing scientific protocols with fishermen; fishermen have a key role in identifying 
research priorities. Research programs are conducte within self-financed projects dealing 
with specific scientific issues about various species, and the Society promotes continuity in 
the projects for insuring suitable time series of data.  
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The FSRS has played a key role in the educational process of the industry and in the 
restoration of the credibility of science. Fishermen trust data they collect themselves   “If 
fishermen are doing the science, they believe it to be true. How can you argue about 
something you collected.” explained the FSRS manager. FSRS worked towards increased 
understanding of the scientific rationale for data collection protocols and increased 
participation in RAP meetings. It also educated the sci ntists to give timely feedbacks on their 
project results. The main success was about helping communication, discussion and 
dissemination, which helped “humanising” each group in the eyes of the others. 
 
However, in spite of these positive initiatives, some of our industry respondents, although part 
of the educated elite, were little supportive of the FSRS. In particular, its status of non-profit 
organisation creates a constant chase for grants and funds for maintaining its existence, which 
precisely distorts its image of non-profitability. Secondly, most of the initiatives are still 
proposed and piloted by scientists. The FSRS is still perceived by some as a governmental 
body, which did not necessarily supported industry’ own initiatives such as the “ITQ 
survey”.   
 
However, it is clear that in spite of criticisms, the FSRS has existed over fifteen years, 
surviving the massive DFO cuts in research programs. This longevity is the main proof of 
success, as the Society would not have survived without support from the industry.  
 
5.4 Industry Involvement in Management Decisions 
5.4.1 Harvest Control Rules and Management Plans 
 
Traditionally, management decisions about single stocks TACs were taken based on clear 
Harvest Control Rules (HCR) such as F0.1. Shelton (2007) showed that the management 
strategies have however changed over time, including changes in reference points and time-
scales. This is due both to an increasingly complex legal framework for fisheries management 
(see chapter 1.2.2), and to increasing participation of industry in management decisions and 
scientific understanding. TACs are no longer set based solely on forecasts conducted by 
scientists, but are now based on a number of considerat ons, of which stock assessment is a 
major component.  
 
Management decisions for groundfish are taken as part of the Groundfish Management Plan 
established for the period 2002-2007. Annual fishing plans are developed in consultation with 
the fishing industry and are reviewed annually to update quotas and introduce new measures 
considered appropriate by DFO and the fishing industry, as part of this long-term GMP. 
Consultations also occur on an ongoing basis to ensur  successful implementation of the plan. 
TACs have been fairly stable over the recent years, reflecting general commitment towards 
stability and long-term sustainability “as the crucial starting point for improving relationships 
with industry, stakeholders and other resource users" stated fisheries Minister Hearn 
(http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/newsrel/2006/hq-ac07_e.htm).  
Shelton (2007) acknowledged that this leads to increased flexibility in the harvest control 
rules, and weaken the use of the scientific knowledge as decisions are now taken ad-hoc. 
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Indeed, there is a clear reluctance both from the management bodies and from the industry to 
use clear and pre-agreed harvest control rules, as the final management decision is taken from 
consensus and negotiation. Precise control rules would remove this negotiation buffer, as 
HCR does not account for uncertainty. Some situations happened where the industry, the 
scientists and the managers agreed on some control rules before the assessment, but refused 
them after the assessment as they would have meant m jor cutbacks. The final decision 
process is not always fully clear and transparent. “Management has fisheries roundtable 
discussions, but I don’t see that there is an open process for taking science advice and moving 
to decisions, which is why these discussions bleed into our science meetings.” said a DFO 
Science Branch manager.  Existing lack of consensus across various industry groups 
undermines the possibilities for real co-management, and the decision power still resides with 
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. “Co-management was a concept a few years ago, but 
not now” deplored a groundfish industry representative. A DFO manager explained that the 
scientific advice is followed for the most part, but that the management framework has 
become more complex and more restrictive with law-finding acts requiring drastic decisions. 
 
To improve the transparency of the decision process, The Science Branch is currently trying 
to introduce simulation-based Management Strategies Evaluations (MSE) (first initiated by 
IWC 1993) that aim at identifying management strategies robust to various sources of 
uncertainties. These simulations can be used as a tool to support discussions and negotiations 
between stakeholders in a quantitative and transparent manner, as alternative scenarios are 
compared based on a set of plausible hypotheses. First trials were conducted in 2007 on Artic 
surfclams and ocean quahogs with DFO- and non-DFO scientists as well as members of the 
fishing industry, DFO managers, and provincial representatives (Boudreau and O’Boyle, 
2007). Results were used for providing advice for the 2007 and beyond fisheries. This is still 
too new to get real feedback on such a process and the immediate feelings about this approach 
are mixed. “Many questions industry has are with the whole picture, and if you hear some of 
their questions then maybe you hear this idea about stra egies and decision rules.” said the 
DFO Science Branch manager. But “regional management folks were a bit negative, I did not 
know if this was distaste for formalized management or just that they don’t like something 
new, they do like to be flexible in how they use advice”. 
 
5.4.2 The FRCC  
 
A particular initiative of increased participation f the industry in the decision process was the 
creation in 1992 of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (FRCC), funded right after 
the groundfish collapse. The initial mandate (until 2004) of the Council, consisting of industry 
and academics, was to provide advice to the Minister on conservation issues for the 
groundfish resources of Atlantic Canada. FRCC was meant as a consumer, not a producer of 
science. They got DFO peer reviewed science and traditional knowledge, and provided advice 
based on those two during open and documented meetings. It worked as a “depoliticised 
advisory process, providing written public recommendations to the minister, which then 
should be able to justify publicly why if it doesn’t listen to FRCC.” explained a FRCC 
industry member. Since 2004, the FRCC mandate has cnged from annual management 
advice for groundfish to long-term conservation issues including other key species such as 
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snow crab and lobster, and looking at sustainability issues from ecologic, economic, social 
and institutional perspective.   
 
In spite of its laudable mandate, some critics were raised about FRCC, mostly because 
significant conflict of interests problems. “they kept reappointing these people and you kept 
seeing obviously manipulated quota allocation.” said a groundfish industry representative. 
Needs for consensus can create dangerous “ho tage” situations if a party brings conflicts of 
interests in. But it has nevertheless given a real frame for co-management with a legitimate 
mandate to the industry, and keeps being a major institution in the region. 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
 
It is here again clear that some progress have been towards industry participation into the final 
management decisions using agreed scientific advice. Charles (1998) illustrated how the 
opening of the scientific process to industry helped r ducing uncertainty in cod stock status in 
area 4X. However, fifteen years of co-management have also shown some limits, as decision 
will always result from a combination of legal framework and management objectives in one 
hand, and negotiations on the other hand. A transparent nd legitimate decision cannot always 
be reached from consensus, especially when industry groups are numerous and 
heterogeneous.  
 
5.5 Indicators and the EBFM 
 
The initial choice of innovation with regards to science in the original CEVIS project was the 
use alternative tools for providing scientific advice and moving away from the traditional 
model-based and forecast-based methods. Canada is mov ng towards integrated management 
with clear objectives accounting for ecosystem and socio-economic sustainability, and set in 
agreement (“shared stewardship”) with a number of stakeholders. This has naturally led to a 
growing need of identifying reliable and measurable sustainability indicators systems SIS, 
using “pressure-state-response”-type frameworks (OECD, 2001), and Canada has gone a 
decade of development and exploration of these systms.  
 
5.5.1 The Precautionary Approach Framework 
 
Shelton and Rivard (2003) described the history of development of the precautionary 
approach (PA) since the cod collapsed. Over the 10 years following the collapses, Canada has 
been engaged in a process of developing a precaution ry framework that is consistent with the 
1999 United Nation Fisheries Agreement (UNFA). Development of this framework has been 
given high priority since the concerns raised in 2002-2003 that post moratorium TACs had 
been unsustainable and were jeopardising stock recovery. The framework adopts a notion of 
“serious harm” as the definition of a conservation limit reference point. The term 
“precautionary approach” should be used only to refer to situations that can result in harm that 
is serious or difficult to reverse. Activities whic simply reduced yield were economically 
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inefficient, but could not be interpreted as serious harm. Serious harm is defined as the SSB 
below which productivity is impaired. In terms of rec uitment, impaired productivity is 
consistent with the notion of “recruitment overfishing”, i.e. the SSB level consistent with a 
marked decrease in recruitment.  
 
In 2007, the PA framework was routinely implemented in a way similar to ICES procedures, 
on a single-species basis with traffic-light based coloured zones as indicators for management 
advice. 
 
5.5.2 The Traffic Light Approach 
 
The Traffic Light Approach (TLA) was developed in the Maritimes as a method to 
incorporate PA and decision rules in fisheries management, following initiatives from Caddy 
(1998). DFO Maritimes initiated an investigation of the TLA in 1999. It is to be used as part 
of stock assessment, broadening the approach to include non traditional information. The key 
appeal of the TLA is a means of visualisation of indicator data as a series of traffic lights 
categorising indicators in relation to target and limit reference points. The basic TLA includes 
three steps (Halliday et al., 2001) : (i) uses a multiplicity of indicators of system status; (ii) 
classifies the current state of each indicator in relation to reference points using a system of 
green, yellow and red lights; (iii) establishes management rules associated with the number of 
lights of each category. The TLA was initially designed for implementing the PA in data poor 
situations, but was thus adapted to data rich situations. The main interests of the method are 
the ability to include all new sources of information, and a way to propose a visually pleasing 
and transparent process for communication and understanding among users. ”You say “this is 
all the information we have fellows, now you know as much as I do” and we can start talking 
about all the inconsistencies” reported a DFO scientist. 
 
In 2007, the TLA was only part of routine stock assessment for the small eastern Scotian 
Shelf shrimp stock (DFO, 2005), with a summary indicators being a simple average of equally 
weighted indicators: 
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Fig. 1. Example of Traffic Light Analysis (DFO, 2005). 
 
The success of the method for a small stock of shrimp was partly explained by the strong 
relationship of trust between the industry and the sci ntist. As Koeller (2007) explained, “the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) exactly tracks my mental integration of the indicators and 
judgment of how it might affect my patient’s health.  Surprisingly (or not depending on how 
one analyses their motives) the stakeholders have always sought and taken my advice on the 
TAC verbatim, and this has included significant decreases with accompanying economic 
consequences.” In that case, the industry trusted the management strategies proposed by the 
scientist, without arguing of scientific uncertainty for requiring higher quotas.   
 
The traffic light method was applied as a trial basis for some Scotia-Fundy groundfish stocks. 
As such a complete trust in scientific advice as in the shrimp case is not always existing, it 
was felt necessary to formalise the method and the harvest control rules that could be applied 
from it, in a wish to proposing objective and transparent  indicator-based management 
decisions. Main criticisms, also from industry side, alt with the too strong simplification of 
the results, the loss of information and the need for more formal and causal mechanisms, as 
well as the issue of combining disparate lights into summary lights: ”First is happy with red, 
the other is happy with green, if you make yellow as a compromise nobody catches anything” 
said a fixed gear representative. Furthermore, as industry has gone through a major 
educational process with regards to stock assessment in the recent years, simplification for 
communication is no more necessarily a major need. Halliday et al. (2001) conducted a 
thorough analysis of the technical aspects of the method, including the choices of indicators 
and reference points, the summarising (“integration”) a d the establishment of decision rules.  
The trials made to make the method more quantitative through using fuzzy logic lost its 
simplicity without solving the issue of integration, and its use did not proceed beyond the 
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pilot stage (Koeller, 2004). As Koeller (2007) noticed, this final product was essentially a 
compromise between two irreconcilable philosophies, and collapsed under its own 
complexity.  
 
However, its simplistic approach as taken for shrimp suggests that summary statistics may 
track "stock health" more comprehensively and usefully than individual indicators, and might 
be more precautionary than traditional methods (Koeller, 2004). In particular, it accounts for 
some other parameters than traditionally used in assessment, which could be indicative of 
stock status, as for example the r productivity parameters (Hutchings and Myers, 1994). And 
it avoids relating on comprehensive models. ”Fisheries science is not rocket science but it has 
been mistaken for rocket science and we got a lot of rocket scientists on to the problem” said 
the DFO scientist.  Furthermore, it is expected that such a traffic light categorising could 
indeed be applied to any kind of indicators used in PSR-type framework. 
 
In 2007, during our study tour, the method was thoug  gaining a revived interest, and was to 
be tested on two invertebrate stocks of primary importance, the Gulf snow crab and the 
Northern shrimp. To which extend this approach willreceive commitment and support from a 
larger industry group as for the eastern Scotian shrimp cannot be answered now, but it would 
be very informative to follow-up the future development of these cases. 
 
5.5.3 Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) 
 
The renewed interest for indicators is related to the ecosystem approach, to which Canada is 
committed by law. Indeed, Choi et al. (2005) tried to use a similar traffic light approach as a 
descriptive tool for the Scotian shelf, choosing indicators in collaboration with scientific 
experts from the various relevant fields but without trying to combine indicators for potential 
management action. This seemed to work well to track strong dramatic changes, as the 
Scotian shelf has experienced over recent years, but not so much for weak changes. 
 
Many years of discussion about implementation of the ecosystem-approach in fisheries 
management have lead to some progress. Influent scientists are acting towards a pragmatic 
and urgent approach based on current knowledge, rather than on developing comprehensive 
models trying to include all ecosystem processes. Clearer management objectives have been 
defined in the frame of Oceans Act. Productivity, Biodiversity and Habitat are the three main 
Canadian ecosystem objectives. The Management Branch in DFO is formulating one to three 
priorities under these objectives, as well as associated strategies and performance indicators 
(Figure 2). For each type of fishery, the level of importance and knowledge is qualitatively 
assessed (not important, important, unknown), in order to define priorities of action and 
priorities of research. Progress has been made towards collaboration with other branchs and 
other departments, with the purpose of formulating tegrated assessment and advice. 
However, the operationalisation of this is not straightforward, as the traditional assessment 
cannot easily account for such information. And in most cases, assessment and management 
meetings are still attended almost uniquely by traditional Fisheries Management science 
group and industry representatives, with little support from environmentalists and ecosystem 
scientists. 
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Fig. 2. Steps towards EAFM: Management objectives, p rformance indicators, and managed activities. Strategies 
highlighted in blue are those that are considered of high relevance that currently receive attention; Red 
highlighted strategies are of potentially high relevance but with major uncertainties remaining, and would require 
additional attention; White strategies are considere  of low relevance. (source L. Burke, DFO Management 
Branch).  
6 Best practices –What Might be Useful for Europe? 
 
As a concluding chapter, we intend to consider the example of Nova Scotia from the 
perspective of our own management issues in Europe. This case study was particularly 
interesting, because it has gone through many stages h ad of what has happened or could 
happen in Europe. For example, it gives an interesting insight of what could happen if the cod 
stocks were to collapse in eastern Atlantic area as well. Furthermore, a similar “cultural shift” 
towards an integrated and ecosystem-based approach with stakeholders’ participation has also 
emerged in Europe in the most recent years, and interesting lessons might be drawn from the 
Canadian example. Finally, its size, diversity, complexity and history make it a comparable 
scale to the EU, probably more than the other case studies of Iceland, Alaska and New 
Zealand.  
 
We first summarise our main findings in our evaluation of Nova Scotian innovations. Then 
we focus more in-depth on five “best practices”, i.e. five processes which we found were 
particularly interesting and positive, seen from a pr ctical and field-based perspective and 
considering how they have developed over their ten to fifteen years of existence. 
 
6.1 Summary – Evaluation of Nova Scotian Innovations 
 
The purpose of CEVIS was to evaluate innovations with regards to four criteria: Cost of 
management, economic efficiency, biological robustne s and social robustness. The literature 
 Strategies (performance indicator) Managed Activity 
Productivity   GF HF SF L/CF 
Primary Productivity • Control alteration of nutrient concentrations affecting primary 
production at the base of the food chain by algae 
    
Community Productivity • Manage trophic level removals taking into account consumption 
requirements of higher trophic levels 
    
 • Manage total removals taking into account system production capacity     
Population Productivity • Keep fishing mortality  moderate     
 • Allow sufficient spawning biomass to escape exploitation     
 • Promote positive biomass change when biomass is low     
 • Target % size/age/sex of capture to avoid wastage     
 • Limit disturbing activity in spawning areas/seasons     
 • Manage discarded catch for all harvested species     
      
Biodiversity      
Species Diversity • Control incidental mortality for all non-harvested species     
 • Minimize change in distribution of invasive species     
Population Diversity • Distribute population component mortality in relation to component 
biomass 
    
      
Habitat      
 • Manage area disturbed of bottom habitat types     
 • Limit amounts of contaminants, toxins and waste introduced in 
habitat 
    
 • Minimize amount of lost gear     
 • Control noise or light level/frequency      
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review and the study tour helped formulating a number of hypotheses for the evaluation of the 
innovations described in this chapter. These hypotheses were used as the basis of developing 
the CEVIS research work in Europe. Various processes ar  identified within each innovation, 
but not all processes can be evaluated with regards to all four criterias. The findings are 
summarised in the table below (-) means “decrease” while (+) means “increase” : 
 
Table 3. Evaluation of Innovations by CEVIS Objectives 
 
The detailed description and functioning of each process is described in the relevant chapters. 
It is clear that a number of effects intermingle within each innovation, and some processes 
may counteract each other. Generally, we found that both community control (innovation 2) 
and participatory approaches to science (innovation 3) mostly brought positive aspects in. 
However,  some of their effects are still unclear. Especially their practical implementation is 
not always straightforward and painless. Nevertheless, both innovations have clearly helped in 
the sustainability of fisheries activities, both in terms of biological robustness, by increasing 
industry commitment and trust and thus decreasing cheating, and in terms of social robustness 
by maintaining fisheries activities in the local communities and increasing the feeling of 
Innovation Costs of Economic Biological Social 
Process involved Management Efficiency Robustness Robustness
1. Right-based management
facilitating transition to lower capacity - + + +
fishing rights passed within the community +
recruitment of crew and crew wage - -
fishers retirement +
reduction of risk of bankrupcies and dislocation +
licensing separted from quota ownership +
flexibility of system to biological reality -
management of mixed-fisheries issue -
increasing pressure for effective monitoring - +
2. Community control
community responsible for quota allocation -
exclusion of non-cooperating fishers + + +
local stocks exploited by local communities only + +
local support to ecosystem approach +
3. Role and form of science
Industry responsible for monitoring - + - / +
industy involvement in science meetings + +
industry surveys + +
collaborative research + +
industry involvement in management decision +/- +
scientists commitment with industry +
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involvement and ownership of the industry into the scientific and decisional process.  The 
main costs of the participatory approaches are related to their establishment, once functioning 
institutions are in place they clearly become an important asset for implementing further 
innovations.  
 
Our analysis of the ITQ system is more mixed, as the ITQ has brought both positive and 
negative long-term effects. The direct impacts on effici ncy are clear in theory and what 
limited data we have from Nova Scotia (and elsewhere) suggests that ITQs increase efficiency 
the way they are expected to. The ITQ system has also shown other benefits beyond gains in 
efficiency. In Nova Scotia the ITQ system helped reucing the number bankruptcies and other 
forms of dislocation resulting from the required reuction in fishing capacity. A rights-based 
system using individualized rights increases economic efficiency by granting the individual 
fishers the ability to decide as an individual when and how to fish their fish. Transferability 
then increases this gain in efficiency by concentrating the quota in the hands of those who are 
able to take advantage of it. While for political reasons is these people may be referred to as 
“better” or “more efficient” fishers, what this means in the real world is concentration in the 
hands of those who already control other assets tha give them the ability to both buy the 
quota and use it in more flexible ways. Geographical concentration happens for similar 
reasons as well as because of the comparative advant ge given places by ports, markets and 
processing capacity. The gains are real but so is the concentration. It is difficult to see how 
organizational concentration could be separated from increases in economic efficiency and 
attempts to hinder such concentration face myriad problems with both political resistance and 
people finding direct ways to circumvent the regulations in place to reduce concentration.  
Geographical concentration is a similar and related phenomenon that is somewhat easier 
mitigate through policy. Other negative impacts such as placing greater costs on crew 
members and (as one factor among many) increasing the difficulty for new entrants to the 
fishery also seem difficult to avoid.  
 
The impact on costs of management of the rights based pproached seems entirely dependent 
on design, the Shelburne example suggests that they can be nearly costless to the public. ITQs 
have created a complex set of positive and negative impacts with regards to social robustness. 
The positive effects of ITQs with regards to biological robustness are mixed and quite 
unclear. Surely, the ITQs have had positive effects because of the increasing pressure for 
effective monitoring they have implied. But they have not helped with the issues of bycatch 
they might be expected to help with because it is still often easier to discard fish hand buy 
quota to be able to keep it.  
 
The main policy question remains how to balance these gains with their costs. The experience 
in Nova Scotia is that the owner-operator policies and the fleet separation policies are having 
some effect but they are under increasing pressure both politically and through the 
proliferation of trust agreements. For us the most interesting thing we came across was the 
Shelburne B CMB which seems to be pioneering a rights-based approach that balances its 
advantages and disadvantages in a flexible manner with a great deal of local input from the 
fishing community. 
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6.2 The Monitoring System 
 
The arms-length, user pay monitoring system they have designed works very well. The 
system is able to keep very detailed track of the fish that are landed without any cost to the 
taxpayer. The fact that the government is not actually c rrying out the monitoring seems to 
increase its acceptance in the community. The monitori g system also links up very well to 
both the ITQ system and the CMB system. In both cases local fishers and CMB officers are 
very interested in keeping a close, real time eye on landings. 
 
6.3 The Community Management Boards 
 
The CMBs have worked very well from the perspective of DFO. They have greatly reduced 
taxpayer costs while giving them effective local inst tutions for working with the fishing 
industry. As they move toward ecosystem-based fisheries management they will be a valuable 
tool, one DFO manager called them “vital” if they are going to create an effective EBFM. The 
Nova Scotian CMBs have perhaps realized the practical promise of fisheries “co-
management” better than any similar attempt in Western countries. Several aspects of their 
approach seem to contribute to this effectiveness: they are linked to specific, relatively small 
geography; they have available effective sanctions ncluding in extreme cases the ability to 
exclude non-cooperative members; and the use of legal contracts with detailed specifics in the 
form of the Conservation Harvesting Plans. 
 
6.4 The Informal ITQ System 
 
The Shelburne B system combining the limited transferability of IQs with community control 
of fisheries also suggests itself as an experimental model for Europe. The pure ITQ system, 
the CMBs using non-IQ management methods, and the Shelburne B board have all vastly 
reduced fishing capacity because the main driver for this was tight quotas combined with 
effective monitoring and enforcement. The pure ITQ system has had the expected negative 
impacts. It has reduced potentials for adaptive management by locking ecological realities 
into hard institutional boxes. It has led to geographical concentration of the industry. On the 
other hand, the CMBs that have not allowed the maintenance and transfer of IQ have had 
problems dealing in a fair way with exits from the fishery. They have also no doubt paid a 
considerable cost in economic efficiency in comparison with the ITQ system. The Shelburne 
B system, because it places strong limits on transferability, is not going to be able to match 
the pure ITQ system in terms of efficiency. This is clearly reflected in the lower price that 
Shelburne quota gets in comparison with the ITQ system. But it much less expensive for the 
taxpayer, makes a strong contribution to maintaining the economic health of a peripheral 
community, while at the same time dealing effectively with the problem of exit from the 
fishery. 
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6.5 Collaborative research and industry participation in management 
decision 
 
The groundfish collapse has been a traumatic forcing driver, which has though led to positive 
changes in the ways of providing scientific advice and taking management decisions. The 
scientific world has been forced to learn from the errors that lead to misleading advice, and 
has opened its processes to industry participation. Although this collaborative research and 
co-management is far from being straightforward anderror-free, it is clear that increased 
communication and industry involvement has helped restoring the credibility of science. It has 
also helped learning to accept uncertainty as inherent to fisheries science and management, 
and to live with it as a key factor to be accounted for in decisions. Because Europe has not 
experienced such a large scale collapse jeopardising the existence of a whole region, such 
changes in mentalities are slower to come up. The established system for scientific advice is 
fairly rigid, normalised and conservative, and is st ll providing deterministic advice based on 
projections and forecasts. Similarly, management decisions are still taken in a centralised way 
during negotiation between the Commission and fisher es ministers, without stakeholders 
participation. Some progresses have been made in that direction with the creation of the RACs 
(Regional Advisory Councils). But the mandate of these RACs should be extended from the 
consultative bodies they are now to partners engaged in scientific processes and management 
decisions. Furthermore, few initiatives of collaborative research have been already launched 
in the recent years in Europe, dealing with specific industry-based surveys. Such initiatives 
should be encouraged for improved communication andtrust between scientists and 
fishermen. 
 
6.6 Integrated Fisheries Management Plans 
 
Management decisions for groundfish fisheries in Nova Scotia are not taken within short-term 
frames with large variations from year to year. Management is decided within Integrated 
Fisheries Management Plans with emphasis on long-term sustainability, inter-annual stability 
and commitment to the ecosystem approach. Moving in that direction in European fisheries 
would remove the pressure from the marathon negotiation of TACs in December, and would 
insure better stability while relying less on precise assessment. Extensive discussions are 
currently undertaken in the European Commission to go along those lines, and this should be 
supported.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The fisheries sector is tremendously important in Iceland, which is - despite its modest 
population of little more than 300,000 - the twelfth largest seafood-producing nation in the 
world measured in terms of volume of catch and even higher measured in value. From the 
mid-1990s to 2004, fishing and processing representd between 8 and 13 percent of the 
overall Icelandic gross domestic product (GDP). The export of fish products accounts for 
more than 60 percent of the value of exported goods and around three quarters of the export 
value of fish products goes to European Union (EU) member states - the biggest importer of 
Icelandic fish products is the UK (Ministry of Fisheries 2005b). Thus, the state of the 
Icelandic fisheries sector strongly influences the ov rall state of the Icelandic economy. 
 
Fisheries policy in Iceland is, consequently, of national importance to a degree, which is not 
comparable to any of the EU member states where the fis ries sectors in comparison seem 
insignificant – with the possible exceptions of themost fisheries dependent regions: “Due to 
the size, scope and importance of fisheries in Iceland, policy formulation and decision-making 
on marine issues has far-reaching effect on the standard of living” (Ministry of the 
Environment et al. 2004, p. 4). Iceland has never applied for membership of the EU, not least 
due to an unwillingness to accept the fisheries policy of the EU, which has been perceived as 
severely flawed. Sharing the responsibility for managi g Icelandic fish stocks with the EU 
member states has, considering the importance of the sector, therefore not been considered an 
attractive option. The Icelandic emphasis on nationl jurisdiction over fish resources has long 
roots and includes dramatic incidents like the so-called Cod War(s) with the UK.  
 
Demersal fish species (including cod, haddock, saithe, redfish and Greenland halibut), flatfish 
and shellfish constitute almost 80 percent of the value of landings even though around 70 
percent of the total volume of landings is constituted by pelagic species. Cod, which is mainly 
caught in the Icelanders' own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), is the economically most 
important fish (Ministry of Fisheries 2005b). In fact, most of the Icelandic fish are caught in 
Iceland’s own, highly productive waters, but the share caught outside own EEZ has been 
increasing in recent years. In 2002, catches from outside own zone constituted 24.3 percent of 
the total value of landings (Ministry of the Environment et al. 2004).  
The number of persons employed in marine fishing has been gradually declining over the past 
years. Official estimates indicate that the number employed has dropped from approximately 
7000 to under 5000 in the period from 1992 to 2004 (Ministry of Fisheries 2005b).  
 
1.1 Description of the Management System 
 
The Icelandic fisheries management system, of which the cornerstone is the Fisheries 
Management Act nr. 116/2006 (previously nr. 38/1990), is based on a system of individual 
transferable quota shares (ITQ). Iceland extended its EEZ to 200 nautical miles (nm) in 1975 
and the current ITQ system, which has remained in essence the same since the beginning of 
the 1990s, evolved from an initial individual vessel quota (IVQ) system, which took effect for 
the first time in 1984. The development of this system was a reaction to the failure of a 
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system of effort controls, which over the period from the 1950s to the 1970s had been unable 
to prevent overexploitation of Icelandic ground fish stocks.  
 
1.2 Historical Development and Basic Features 
 
As from 1984, the most important Icelandic fisheries have been managed by means of IVQs 
and subsequently ITQs. The IVQs were distributed based on historical catches in the period 
from 1981 to 1983. Initially the IVQ system was only adopted for one year, 1984; however, 
the system was subsequently reinstated for one year (with minor changes in allocations 
between vessel categories) and afterwards extended i  two more - still time limited - periods, 
which resulted in the system running throughout 1990. In connection with the last extension, 
quota transferability was furthermore increased. Alongside, it was after the first year of the 
IVQ system decided to create an alternative, optional system of effort quotas. This system 
persisted more or less unchanged alongside the IVQ system until the next big change 
happened in 1990 with the adoption of the Fisheries Management Act (Gudmundsson et al. 
2004; Ministry of Fisheries 2005a). 
 
The Fisheries Management Act entered into force 1 January 1990 for the fishing year 
1990/9150. The act extended the IVQ system without time limits and made quota shares 
completely divisible and transferable, although with certain restrictions applying – effectively 
converting the IVQ system into one of the purest ITQ systems in the world. The effort 
management system was furthermore abolished for all vessel groups besides the smallest 
vessels of less than 6 gross registered tonnes (GRT), which were offered the possibility to stay 
in an effort management system. Until this option was abolished by the end of 1993, vessels 
between 6 and 10 GRT could likewise choose to fish under a separate ITQ system or a hook 
and line system. Small boats under 6 GRT became part of the ITQ system in 2004, which 
means that all segments are managed under an ITQ system from 1st September 2006 
(Gudmundsson et al. 2004). Special conditions apply hereafter for vessels under 15 tonnes, 
which is now the legally defined limit for being a small vessel. This includes that quota can be 
transferred to the small vessels from vessels larger than 15 GRT, but not the other way 
around. 
 
The ITQ system entails that the Ministry of Fisheries sets a total allowable catch (TAC) for 
individual species after having received advice from the Icelandic Marine Research Institute 
(MRI). The TAC for each species is subsequently divided among those holding rights to catch 
a percentage of the species in question. The Minister  for most species not obliged to follow 
the advice from MRI, although in reality this will most often be the case. Importantly, 
however, a ‘harvest rule’ for cod was introduced in 1996 following a series of years where the 
TAC for cod had been set higher than recommended by MRI. The same years witnessed a 
series of declining recommended catches, TACs and actual catches. In 2000 the catch rule 
was amended to give room for flexibility if following the catch rule strictly results in major 
changes in the TAC from one year to the other (Gudmundsson et al. 2004; Ministry of 
Fisheries 2005b). 
                                                
50 The fishing year is from 1st September until 31st August the next year. 
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As the latest significant amendment some of the resource rent from the fisheries has from 
September 2004 been collected by means of a special tax imposed on quota holders (Ministry 
of Fisheries 2005a). 
 
Table 1 contains an overview of the most important Icelandic fisheries policy-developments 
in the period from 1983 to 2005.  
 
Table 1. Main Icelandic fisheries policy-developments 1983 – 2005 
1975 The Icelandic EEZ is finally extended to 200 nm after a series of 
expansions of the EEZ in the previous decades.  
1984 A system of IVQ quotas is applied from 1984. The system is in 
the following years changed and expanded.  
1985 An alternative, optional system of effort quotas (days-at-sea) is 
introduced alongside the IVQ system. 
1991 The Fisheries Management Act (nr. 38/1990) enters into force: 
Catch quotas without time limitations become divisible and fully 
transferable as from 1 January 1991 - effectively introducing an 
ITQ system. Vessels under 10 GRT (as from 1994 onlyvessels 
under 6 GRT) can operate under alternative management 
schemes. 
1995 A catch rule for the Icelandic cod stock is introduced. The rule 
states that the annual TAC shall be set at 25 percent of the 
fishable biomass.  
2000 The catch rule for cod is amended. Consequently, it becomes 
possible to deviate from the catch rule if the TAC would 
otherwise vary more than 25 percent in either direction from one 
fishing year to the next. 
2004 A resource rent tax in the form of a fishing fee is introduced from 
the fall of 2004. The last segment of boats (under 6 GRT) is 
changed from optional effort management to the ITQ system (last 
boats go into the system in 2006).  
(Gudmundsson et al. 2004; Ministry of Fisheries 2005a) 
 
 
1.3 Research methods 
 
The report is based on two sources of information: 1) Desk studies including review of 
literature and WebPages, and 2) field studies producing qualitative interviews with key 
persons.  
 
The desk studies were conducted both before the field study to get acquainted with the field 
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and after returning from the field to check up on data etc.  
 
19 interviews were conducted with people closely reated to the Icelandic ITQ system. See 
Table 2 for profiles of the interviewees. The intervi ws focused on the four main areas: 
economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness of management, and social and biological robustness, 
but the individual interviews, of course, often favoured one or two of the perspectives 
depending on the person being interviewed. The interviews also covered the context of the 
ITQ system: The history and development of the ITQ system, the changes in costs and 
benefits for fisheries management operations associated with the innovation, what indicators 
they use to monitor and improve on outcomes, and what they see as the best practices in 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing the innovations and resulting management measures 
etc.  
 
Table 2. Profiles of the people interviewed in this re earch 
 Government Industry Research Green Total 
Biologist 2 1 1 1 5 
Economist/Law 4  4 1 9 
Anthropologist/ 
social scientist 
  3  3 
Fisheries 
candidate 
 1   1 
Fisherman   1   1 
Total 6 3 8 2 19 
 
In the following sections, several technical aspects regarding the implementation of the ITQ 
system will be described in more detail as these contribute to the performance of the Icelandic 
management system.  
 
2 Biological robustness 
 
Copes and Pálsson (2000, p. 1) states from the sceptical erspective that “ITQ systems, 
incidentally, cause significant adverse impacts on […] biological conservation”. Specifically 
according to Gundeman (cited in Pálsson 1998, p. 175) the Icelandic ITQ system is 
fundamentally built upon the idea “that the human and natural world can be organised and 
subjected to rational, totalised control”. It is believed, it is argued, that through privats ions 
the ‘rational economic man’ will organise himself so that the resources, upon which he 
depends, will be utilised optimally. Nevertheless, problems associated with unpredictability 
caused by natural fluctuations in resource abundance d to some extent the overexploitation 
caused by the dynamics of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ may not be overcome by the 
implementation of an ITQ system.  
 
However, much of the reviewed literature seems to indicate that the Icelandic ITQ system has 
so far performed rather well in this respect. Some stocks have increased in size, most 
remarkably the haddock, some have maintained their size, e.g. wolffish, and some have 
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declined, most seriously shrimp. It is hard to tellwhat has caused the different results for 
these different species, but it is likely that changes in the oceanic environment have 
contributed to the increase and decline observed (see Table 2 and Figures 1-4). 
 
Table 3. Recent general trends in several important commercial species in Icelandic waters. A 
number of these stocks have shown changes in distribution and/or migration behaviour over 
the last few years. This has been attributed to enviro mental changes, mostly higher ocean 
temperatures, in the waters around Iceland. (Source MRI). 
 
Table 3. Recent general trends in several important commercial species in Icelandic waters. 
Positive Negative 
Haddock  Cod  
Saithe  Halibut  
Ling  Gr. halibut  
Tusk  Shrimp  
Flatfish stocks Scallop  
Monkfish   
Wolffish   
Nephrops (lobster)  
Herring   
Capelin   
Redfish   
 
It is likely that the result would have been much worse over this period of time if there had 
not been an effective management system in place. Th  status of the same stocks around the 
North Atlantic would indicate that the Icelandic Fisheries Management System has done 
better than most others in maintaining fish stocks. The most recent annual report by the 
Marine Research Institute (MRI) recommended a serious reduction in cod TACs for the 
fishing year 2007/2008, but at the same time a considerable increase in haddock TACs. The 
reduction in cod TACs was instigated by the continued poor recruitment of the cod stock and 
the increased risk of collapse of this most important stock in Icelandic waters. The Ministry of 
Fisheries (MoF) headed the advice and cut down the cod quota to 135 thousand tonnes, the 
lowest level ever. It remains to be seen if this action by the MoF is sufficient to ensure the 
continued viability of the cod stock, but at least it is a sign that there is currently a political 
will to work within the boundaries of the fisheries management system in times of crisis. 
 
87 
100
105
30
50
60
70
92
75
30
80
75
57 57
110
90
104
7
75
35
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
/9
1 
*)
19
91
/9
2
19
92
/9
3
19
93
/9
4
19
94
/9
5
19
95
/9
6
19
96
/9
7
19
97
/9
8
19
98
/9
9
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
Fishing year
th
's
 to
nn
es
Haddock
Saithe
Redfish
Offsh. Shrimp
 
Figure 1. The trends of four different important commercial species that have been quite different as reflected in 
annual TACs. Haddock and saithe have been increasing greatly over the last few years, redfish has been stable 
after a sharp decline in the early 1990s and offshore shrimp has declined by almost 90% from the high in 
1997/98. (Source: MRI and Directorate of Fisheries) 
 
The change in the fisheries management regime into the current ITQ system, first reflected in 
the Fisheries Management Act of 1983, was largely a response to the declining recruitment of 
cod in Icelandic waters and the inability of the existing effort limitation management system 
to address the decline. The declining recruitment rsulted in a great decline in the fishable 
biomass of cod and highly diminished catches. The stock (4 years and older) had grown from 
844 thousand tonnes in 1973 to 1,500 thousand tonnes i  1980 (source: various MRI Status 
Reports). In 1983, however, the stock was down below 800 thousand tonnes and drastic 
measures were deemed necessary to arrest this development. Despite great hope for the 
rebuilding of the cod stock and some apparent succes in the 1980s the cod stock was down to 
550 thousand tonnes in 1995. The status of the stock was reflected in catches, which went 
from being 392 thousand tonnes of cod in 1987 to 187 thousand tonnes in 1994/5 (source: 
various MRI Status Reports, see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The trends in two important commercial stocks, cod and herring, as seen in TACs. Cod has been
declining more or less continuously from 1987, while herring has been continuously increasing over the same 
time period. (Source: MRI and Directorate of Fisheries) 
 
2.1 Harvest control rule 
 
The Minister of Fisheries, in response to concerns over the declining status of stocks, formed 
a working group in 1992 that was intended to form recommendations for the long term 
sustainable utilization of fish stocks in Icelandic waters (Anon 1994). The main conclusion of 
that work was the formation of a harvest rule for the cod stock in Icelandic waters. The 
proposal for the harvest rule was that the TAC for c d would be 22% of the average of 
fishable biomass at the beginning of the year and the quota allocation of the previous year 
(Agnarsson et al. 2007). The MRI recommended a harvest rule that would allow a catch of 
22-25% of the average of the fishable stock of the current year and the stock estimate for the 
coming year.  
 
In the end, the MoF decided to enforce a harvest rule that allowed a catch of 25% of the 
fishable stock, but never less than 155 thousand tones (Agnarsson et al. 2007). This was first 
in force the fishing year 1995/6. In the year 2000, it became apparent that the size of the cod 
stock had been overestimated for a number of years. As a result of that the harvest rule was 
changed in such a way that the minimum of 155 thousand tonnes was abandoned, instead a 
buffer of a 30 thousand tonne maximum change in either direction was implemented 
(Agnarsson et al. 2007).  
 
In 2001, the Minister of Fisheries formed a committee o look into the result of the harvest 
rule set in 1995 (Anon 2004). The committee found that despite the discrepancies between the 
recommendations of the working group from 1994 and the final version of the harvest rule 
implemented by the MoF, the harvest rule had had a positive effect on the cod stock (Anon 
1994). The committee proposed that the recommendations of the working group from 1994 
would be implemented, i.e. a harvest rule of 22% of the average of the fishable stock of the 
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current year and the stock estimate for the coming year (Anon 2004). This was not 
implemented by the MoF. The last changes to the harvest ule were made in 2006, the fraction 
still being 25%, but now of the average as proposed by the 2004 committee and the max 
buffer is no longer in effect (Agnarsson et al. 2007). 
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Figure 3. The decline in TACs for Capelin in Icelandic waters. No TAC had been determined for the fishing year 
2007/08 at the beginning of the fishing year explaining the zero for that year. (Source: MRI and Directorate of 
Fisheries) 
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Figure 4. The trends in TACs for three important commercial species in Icelandic waters. Inshore shrimp and 
Scallop have almost disappeared from the fisheries while the Nephrops lobsters is stable and increasing. (Source: 
MRI and Directorate of Fisheries) 
 
2.2 Cod equivalents 
 
All commercial fish species in Icelandic waters that fall under the ITQ system (25 species in 
all) are allocated annually according to so-called co  equivalents (Ice. Thorskigildi) where 
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cod is assigned a value of 1. According to the Fisher es Management Act no. 116/2006 
(originally no. 38/1990) Article 19, cod equivalents are calculated as the proportion of the 
value of individual species to the value of gutted co . The basis of the calculation is statistics 
for the total catch and total value of these species from the Directorate of Fisheries. For 
example, if we assume that the value of one kg of gutted cod is 150 ISK, the value of one kg 
of Redfish is 75 ISK and the value of one kg of lobster tails is 750 ISK, then one tonne of 
Redfish is half a cod equivalent tonne but one tonne of lobster equals five cod equivalent 
tonnes. The cod equivalent index would then be 0.5 for Redfish and 5.0 for lobster. The 
Directorate of Fisheries publishes cod equivalent tables annually (see Table 4). The cod 
equivalents fluctuate considerably between years, e.g. Capelin between 2005/06 and 2006/07 
by +67%, Redfish between the same years by +28% and lobster between 2006/07 and 
2007/08 by -27%. This is mostly due to changes in market prices. 
 
Table 4. Examples of cod equivalent indexes for several important commercial species from 2000/01 to 2007/08 
(source: Directorate of Fisheries http://www.fiskistofa.is/get_page.php?page=161). 
 
2007/08 2006/07 2005/06 2004/05 2003/04 2002/03 2001/02
Cod 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Haddock 0,82 0,81 0,75 0,68 0,94 1,2 1,2
Saith 0,43 0,42 0,37 0,36 0,43 0,48 0,45
Redfish 0,6 0,69 0,54 0,47 0,5 0,54 0,55
Herring 0,1 0,13 0,14 0,09 0,1 0,16 0,06
Capelin 0,09 0,1 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,04
Lobster (tails) 5,05 6,42 6,45 6,52 6,74 7,15 6,95  
 
2.3 Temporary closed areas  
 
The Marine Research Institute (MRI) has for decades had a legal mandate to temporarily 
close off areas for fishing. These closures are generally based on information received from 
fisheries inspectors monitoring catch composition of vessels at sea. (Law nr. 79/1997, article 
10). The main criteria for closure are that the propo tion of undersized (juvenile or immature) 
fish reaches a certain level. The MRI sends out a closure notice to the fleet. Such closures can 
last for up to 14 days. If longer closures are deemed to be necessary the Ministry of Fisheries 
can publish a closure regulation stipulating the details of the closure (e.g. fishing gear, area 
and time). Other seasonal or permanent area closures or protections are also in force as 
stipulated in the Law on Fishing in Icelandic Waters (nr. 79/1997 with later changes). 
 
3 Cost-effectiveness of management 
 
In relation to cost effectiveness, Arnason et al. (2000) compares the costs of fisheries 
management with the value of landings in Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland, which are 
argued to have comparable fisheries. The article employs a narrow definition of fisheries 
management including only the activities carried out in order to counteract the problems, 
which arise from the common property nature of fish stocks (ex. weather forecast services, 
quality control and support for marketing are left ou ).  
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However, notwithstanding the narrow definition, the r search reported in the article 
underlines that fisheries management costs are significant, especially in comparison with 
actual or attainable economic rents from the fishery, which is only a limited part of the value 
of landings. Arnason et al. (2000: 233) states that “ [t]aking it for granted that the purpose of 
fisheries management is to increase the flow of net economic benefits from the fishing activity, 
the costs of operating the fisheries management system itself are obviously among those that 
have to be subtracted to arrive at the net benefits o  fishing.” 
 
Arnason et al. (2000) conclude that Iceland has the lowest relative costs of management 
compared to the value of landings of the three cases. The costs of management on Iceland 
have remained rather stable in the period from 1990 to 1996, and it is concluded that the 
resource rents “in the Icelandic fisheries undoubtedly exceed the current 3% level of 
management expenditure” (Arnason et al., 2000: 242), which means that benefits exceed 
costs. Compared to Iceland’s 3 percent, Norway used between 8 and 13 percent in the period, 
and Newfoundland used between 15 and 25 percent. The main cost categories on Iceland are 
research and control/enforcement. The third category is administration costs in the Ministry of 
Fisheries and the Directorate of Fisheries. 
 
The fact that Iceland is currently implementing a resource tax will naturally affect the ratio 
between public costs of management and public revenues. 
 
4 Economic efficiency 
 
The implementation of the Icelandic ITQ system was justified in several ways. It was argued 
that the system would create predictability and flexibility in comparison with the former TAC 
quota system. With the transferability of quotas, the system would be more flexible and 
capital used more efficiently. What the national economy would loose by giving away the 
resource, economists argued, would be regained throug  resource rents and sector efficiency 
(Eythórsson 2000). 
 
From the perspective of the fishermen it did, of course, make sense to support the ITQ system 
when it was implemented, since they were offered large values for free (Copes and Pálsson 
2000). In addition, there is no doubt that the leading fishing companies have benefited from 
the ITQ system. Many quota holders have through large-scale operations earned much profit 
and been able to expand their activities to internatio l waters. This has, according to those in 
favour of the ITQ, led to increased international competitiveness, further benefiting the 
industry and possibly leading to increased employment in the long run (Eythórsson 2000). 
One of the main anticipated benefits of the ITQ system was a reduction in fleet capacity and 
resulting increasing efficiency in the industry. After almost 20 years of IVQ/ITQ, 
Gudmundsson et al. (2004) provides evidence indicating that the Icelandic trawler fleet is 
becoming increasingly efficient, as the following example from the cod fishery describes. 
“ [I] n 1990 three fishing companies owned 10 vessels meauring a total of 6,850 GRT. The 
three companies held quota of about 20,000 metric tons in cod equivalent values or 5.6% of 
92 
the overall TAC measured in cod equivalent values. By 2004 these three companies had 
merged into one. The new company controlled about 20,000 metric tons of cod equivalent 
value (5% of the overall TAC), but it now used only five vessels to harvest this quota. These 
five vessels measured 3,850 GRT. Three new vessels were bought instead of the eight vessels 
that the company either sold domestically or abroad r scrapped” (Gudmundsson et al. 2004, 
p.12). In the trawler fleet, which catches more than lf of Iceland's demersal catch by volume 
(Ministry of Fisheries 2005b), there seems, consequently, to be an ongoing development 
where fewer vessels are needed to catch the same volume of quotas. The companies are 
increasingly taking advantage of economies of scale - s an adjustment to the incentives in the 
ITQ management system (Gudmundsson et al. 2004). 
 
In a recent article, Arnason (2005) reviews the Icelandic fisheries management system and 
presents the economic benefits, which, he argues, have been provided by the ITQ system. 
Arnason concludes that there has been a significant, voluntary decrease in the number of 
vessels licensed to fish in Icelandic waters. This ha happened in response to the incentives 
provided by the ITQ system. Since harvests have increased rather than decreased in the same 
period this development has lead to “a substantial gain in economic efficiency” (Arnason 
2005, p. 259). Furthermore, the total market value (annual rental value) of the Icelandic 
quotas has increased sharply from a little more than 20 million US$ in 1984 to about 450 
million US$ in 2002. The rental value is an indicator of the net rents, which the fisheries 
generate. This development leads Arnason to conclude: “1. Since 1984, under the ITQ 
fisheries management system, the efficiency of the is ries has increased dramatically. 2. 
Currently, the economic rents generated by the fisher es, as measured by the quota price 
evaluation, constitutes a substantial fraction of the average landed value” (Arnason 2005, p. 
259). 
 
The Icelandic ITQ system has, it seems, shown to be successful in minimising the 
overcapacity (and increasing efficiency) of the fisheries industry - by many considered the 
biggest challenge of the fisheries sector worldwide. Moreover, when fishing capacity 
decreases and fishermen sell their vessels, the ITQ system may facilitate and smooth this 
transaction because earnings from the sale of quotas compensate fishermen leaving the 
industry. However, from the opposing perspective it has been argued that people in local 
communities who are not fishermen, but nevertheless depend on the fishing sectors (e.g. 
people in the processing or gear industry), are not compensated for their lost earnings, which 
creates unfair imbalances between those privileged with free quota shares and those not 
(Eythórsson 2000). 
 
4.1 Statistics 
 
All catches landed in Icelandic harbours are weighed by a licensed weight-master at 
accredited harbour scales upon landing (Regulation nr. 224/2006 replacing earlier regulations 
from 1996). All the 60 accredited harbour scales in Iceland are connected to a Directorate of 
Fisheries (DoF) database (called GAFL, DoF and Harbour Joint Database). The DoF 
publishes landings per boat per species and the resulting changes in quota status per species 
per boat every day (see DoF homepage where it is pos ible to access information on the quota 
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status of individual vessels by species and by yearhttp://www.fiskistofa.is/aflastodulisti.php). 
Special provisions are made for ice landed with iced fish and for gutted versus un-gutted fish. 
For catch processed at sea there are processing efficiency indexes (nýtingarstuðlar) 
accounting for the loss in the processing process. 
 
Catch statistics are collected on a continuous basis in the Icelandic fisheries. Every licensed 
vessel is mandated to report catches electronically trough an electronical logbook system 
(latest regulation nr. 557/2007) to the Directorate of Fisheries. When combined with a satellite 
vessel monitoring system (VMS) this provides very reliable information to the Directorate of 
Fisheries for enforcement purposes and reliable statistics to the MRI for stock assessment 
purposes. The information reported in the electronic log book are: 1) name of ship, 
registration number and call code, 2) fishing gear, kind and size, 3) latitude and longitude of 
start of fishing, 4) Catch by weight and species comp sition, 5) date and 6) landing harbour.  
 
The collection of fisheries related data in Iceland is accomplished through what is probably 
the most advanced data collection system currently i  operation for a whole sector. This 
system presents the opportunity to monitor in near r l-time the harvesting sub-sector both 
regarding individual species and particular vessels. The opportunity to manage the fisheries 
by for example adaptive, regional, species specific cr teria exists. Such measures would 
probably detract from the economic efficiency of the current system, but could address some 
of the emerging and pressing biological and social issues facing the current management 
system. 
 
4.2 Fleet composition and development 
 
After the implementation of the IVQ system in 1984, it was expected that there would be a 
reduction in the Icelandic fleet. However, the fleet increased in both numbers and 
displacement. This is especially marked in the displacement of the trawling fleet and in the 
numbers of the open boats (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). The number of boats reached a 
maximum in 1990, the year before the new Fisheries Act was implemented. That year there 
were 2,321 vessels registered, an increase of 666 vessels from the implementation of the 
initial quota system in 1984 (see Figure 5). Most of his increase can be attributed to a great 
increase in open boats, from 825 in 1984 to 1,325 in 1990, an increase of 61%. Decked 
vessels remained fairly even during this period of time, reaching a maximum of 883 in 1990 
and a minimum of 675 in 1997. The number of trawlers increased slowly from 107 in 1984 to 
a maximum of 121 in 1996. From the high in 1990 theov rall number of vessels has 
decreased dramatically, with the number of fishing vessels in the Icelandic fleet in 2006 being 
1692. Most considerable is the decrease in number of open boats, by 548 vessels, a 70% 
decrease and in trawlers by 58 vessels, a decrease of 92%.  
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Figure 5. The number of registered Icelandic fishing vessels by class, 1980 – 2006 (source: Fiskifélag Ísl nds 
and Statistics Iceland). 
 
These trends for trawlers and open boats have different explanations. It is inherent in ITQ 
systems that effort can be concentrated on larger more efficient vessels. This is precisely what 
happened in the Icelandic fisheries. Larger vessels w re brought into the fisheries, and quota 
was moved from less efficient vessels to more effici nt vessels within the same fishing 
company. This trend continues until 1997, after which we observe a decline by almost half in 
the number of vessels, but only by 41% in GRT (see Figure 6). That is a definite trend 
towards a fleet consisting of a fewer larger trawlers. Exactly, what one would expect. 
 
The trend for open boats is quite different. Initially open boats were excluded from the IVQ 
system. This loophole resulted in an explosive growth in the number of small vessels (the 
initial cut off was at 10 GRT). In 1980, there were 518 small vessels. In 1984, there were 825 
and in 1991 after the advent of the ITQ system, the number peaked at 1,325. The share of 
catch, especially in cod, caught by the small vessels increased commensurately, from less than 
5% in 1983 to more than 20% in the 1990s. The small vessels have now been incorporated 
into the ITQ system although with some special provisi ns, and the observed decline in the 
number of small vessels continues unabated. 
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Figure 6. The displacement of the Icelandic fishing fleet 1980 – 2005 (Fiskifélag Íslands and Statistics Iceland). 
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Figure 7 shows the number of commercial fishing permits issued 1992/93-2004/05. In this 
period of time the number of fishing permits has been reduced by over 1,000. As all fishing 
vessels are required to have an official fishing licence to engage in commercial fishing within 
the Icelandic exclusive economic zone (EEZ), this is a good indicator of fleet reduction (The 
Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries). 
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Figure 7. The number of commercial fishing permits issued 1992/93-2004/05. 
 
Figure 8 shows an overall distribution of vessels and their shares of the catches in both tonnes 
and Icelandic króna for the year 2005 (The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries, www.fisheries.is). 
This figure shows that a small part of the fleet, the 63 trawlers and multi purpose vessels (six 
percent of the fleet in terms of numbers) catch more than 40 percent of the harvest in value 
and more than 20 percent in weight. It also shows that about 40 percent of the Icelandic fleet 
(small vessels) catches less than 1 percent in terms of tonnes and less than 4 percent in terms 
of value.  
 
Figure 8. Overall distribution of vessels and their shares of the catches in both tonnes and Icelandic króna (The 
Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries, www.fisheries.is). 
 
Trends in the fishing fleet composition, both in numbers and displacement fit with the 
expectations of how an ITQ system works. Fewer, larger more efficient vessels catch a 
majority of the fish both in value and weight. This consolidation is clearly seen in the 
declining number of fishing permits51. At the same time, both newcomers and established 
fishermen are exploiting all possible loopholes in the system. This is well expressed in the 
                                                
51 There is also a consolidation in the processing sub-sector, as per section 5.3. 
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historical trends in the small vessel fleet. 
 
5 Social robustness 
 
The literature review has uncovered several debates relating to the performance and effects of 
the Icelandic fisheries management system. However, th  debates seem on an overall level to 
be related to two different discourses on the ITQ system on Iceland. On one side is a 
discourse, which focuses on the positive effects of the system. The literature belonging to that 
discourse looks mainly at increases in economic effi ncy and to some extent at the story in 
relation to conservation, which has, it seems, turned out being not nearly as negative as 
anticipated by some sceptics. One of the main authors fr m this perspective is Ragnar 
Arnason (Arnason 1996; Arnason et al. 2000; Arnason 2005; Arnason 2006). On the other 
side is a discourse, which is more sceptical towards the system – or at least focus on the 
negative aspects. The literature belonging to this di course focuses largely on the 
distributional affects of the ITQ-system from different angles. One of the main authors from 
this perspective is Gísli Pálsson (Pálsson and Helgason 1995; Pàlsson and Helgason 1996; 
Pálsson 1998; Copes and Pálsson 2000). 
 
The two discourses question only to a limited extent whether the other camp is right or wrong. 
They rather seem to focus on different issues and objectives of fisheries management. The 
reason for the discrepancy between the two sides can be illustrated by the use of the idea of 
conflicting fisheries world views. Charles (1992: 379) argues that “conflict can often best be 
understood as rising from natural tensions between three differing fishery paradigms (or 
‘world views’), each based on a different set of policy objectives”. Charles (1992) identified 
the three paradigms to be: conservation, which focuses on the policy objective of 
conservation in the sense of resource maintenance; rationalization, which focuses on 
economic performance in the sense of productivity; andsocial / community, which focuses on 
community welfare in the sense of equity, see  
Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. The Paradigm Triangle (Charles 1992). 
 
The two conflicting discourses in the Icelandic debat  can be understood as representations of 
respectively the rationalization and the social / community corner of Charles’ (1992) triangle. 
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In the following, we will briefly look at the two discourses and some of the issues they have 
focussed on. 
 
5.1 Quota Concentration 
 
The debate over quota concentration has mainly focussed on two interrelated aspects: the 
concentration of quotas in larger firms and the regional concentration of quotas.  
 
The negative consequences of the ITQ system for the emote fishing communities have, it 
seems, been significant. These problems have mostly been associated with perceptions of 
unfair distribution of opportunities, concentration f wealth and structural changes removing 
fisheries related activities away from small communities traditionally specialised in fisheries. 
As summed up by Copes (cited in Copes and Pálsson 2000) the “gratis quota allocation gives 
windfall gains to the privileged few. Capitalization f quota rights at high values encourages 
their accumulation in the hands of corporations and wealthy investors. This facilitates 
financial and geographical concentration of fishing operations, with substitution of capital 
for labour, causing irrational excessive job loss. High quota costs deprive crewmembers of 
the traditional opportunity to become independent owner-operators, as they can no longer 
afford to purchase vessel with quota privileges. Communities historically dependent on 
adjacent fish stocks, find their economic viability – and sometimes their very existence – 
threatened when their resources are alienated to outsiders. Members of the public are 
scandalised by the gifting of access rights to public resources, privileged an emerging class of 
‘armchair fishermen’ who become retires, living offthe avails of quota leasing.” 
 
As the following numbers illustrate, the ITQ system has resulted in a concentration of quotas 
(fisheries access rights). In 1999, the 20 biggest quota owners held 57 percent of the total 
quotas in comparison to 1991 where the 22 largest quo a owners held only 26 percent of the 
total quotas (Eythórsson 2000). Similarly, there has been a dramatic reduction in the number 
of quota holders from 535 in 1984 to 391 in 1994, a reduction of 144 quota-holders - or 27 
percent. Moreover, the quotas have been concentrated mong large-scale quota-holders, 
whereas the number of people owning small amounts of qu tas have diminished (Pálsson and 
Helgason 1995; Pálsson 1998). 
 
A result of the ITQ system has according to Eythórsson (2000) been marginalisation of some 
fishing communities. This has especially been the case for the smallest communities under 
500 inhabitants. These small communities have lost t  the larger communities in a 
competition for quotas. The ITQ system has supposedly not only led to a consolidation in 
terms of larger companies but also a relative concentration of activity in larger fishing 
communities leaving the smaller communities with fewer sources of income as the processing 
plants loose their source of raw material when fleets move elsewhere.  
 
For many of the smaller fishing communities of Iceland one of the fundamental difficulties 
has been that many of the people do not have the means to obtain fishing rights. And, when 
excluded from the fishery, they find that alternative livelihood activities are scarce 
(Eythórsson 2000; Orebech 2005). When these people see large quantities of fish quotas being 
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traded, they may wonder whether the ITQ system has created a fair balance between what 
fisheries contribute in respect to welfare maximisation as opposed to wealth maximisation.  
 
Where financial resources used to circulate in the local communities, they are increasingly 
transferred to non-local institutions in larger urban centres or worldwide (Orebech 2005). Not 
only do the local communities have few alternative employment opportunities outside the 
fisheries sector, the contract fishing, which earlir was an employment option for the people 
of the small communities, has also diminished and re-entry into the sector through the 
purchase of smaller boats is not economically feasible for most people of the communities. 
Moreover, the land based fish processing has also declined as processing increasingly occurs 
on the vessels (Eythórsson 2000). 
5.2 Salary of Employed Fishermen 
 
With the introduction of the ITQ system, the access to fisheries has become a tradable 
commodity. The system allows for quotas to be transferred between vessels and hence, the 
ITQs have increasingly been subjected to quota leasing. This typically occurs when a vessel is 
short of quotas and therefore enters into a contract with a quota owner. Under these 
agreements the fisher is frequently obliged to sell his/her fish for a fixed price from which the 
quota price is subtracted. This has led to the Icelandic cod fisheries experiencing that 
fishermen sell raw fish for approximately half the fr e marked price. The people suffering 
from such arrangements are often crew members as they usually receive their salary as a fixed 
share of the fish price on delivery. In 1998, after many protests from fishing crews, a ‘share-
price office’ was established to secure minimum prices for fish and hence minimum wages for 
the fisheries crew (Eythórsson 2000). 
 
5.3 Community quotas and coastal communities 
 
The community quotas (byggðakvótar) were introduced in the fishing year 2002/03 
(regulation nr. 909/2002) to address some of the criticism of the ITQ system, specifically the 
reputed effect of quota consolidation in larger communities resulting in movement of people 
away from smaller communities.  
 
The term ‘community quotas’ refers to a small part (currently around 4000 tonnes of cod-
equivalent) of the Icelandic quota allowance that is given to small communities (about 20 
communities get the quotas). Introducing the regional quotas was a highly political decision, 
which caused legal problems. The distribution of the regional quotas is based on a formula of 
employment, how much they are dependent on fisheries, if quotas have been transferred away 
from the areas and so on. This is not in any legislation; the Minister himself decides on the 
distribution of these quotas annually by a special regulation (nr. 909/2002, nr. 596/2003, nr. 
960/2004, nr. 722/2005 and nr. 439/2007). Some years the Minister has not distributed the 
entire community quota. But there seems to be consensus on the process and most people 
have accepted the system of distribution under the new regulation.  
 
Table 5. Community quota allocations in cod equivalents and the number of communities that have receivd the 
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quota 2002/03 to 2006/07 (source Ministry of Fisheries and Directorate of Fisheries). 
 
Cod 
equivalents 
(mt gutted 
fish) Communities 
2002/03 2000* -- 
2003/04 1500 36 
2004/05 3200 41 
2005/06 4010 43 
2006/07 4385 47 
*2002/03 allocations in un-gutted fish 
 
The regulation on community quotas was reviewed before the fishing year 2007/08. Until 
now the small villages have decided for themselves who in the community should get the 
quota. This has caused some problems within the local communities, where everybody knows 
everybody; and everybody wants the quotas. The changes to be made are to ensure that these 
processes are running smoother. In some cases, the yst m has worked okay, in others the 
system has failed. The local communities do not have the means to distribute the quotas in 
proper ways. The quotas are supposed to support communities, not the vessel owners.  
 
Aside from the regional quotas, another measure has been introduced to improve the situation 
of the coastal communities: “Línuívilnun” means that the quota for the longliners having their 
lines prepared on shore is reduced by 16 percent less than for other vessels. Hence, this 
measure enhances both the use of longliners, which are considered to be biologically 
sustainable, and preserves jobs on shore.  
 
It is still highly contentious if indeed trading quota shares away from (or towards) a 
community has any effect either way. Looking at the trends in proportinal employment in the 
fisheries sector in Iceland (see Table 6.) the overall trend is clearly moving towards a 
diminished importance of fisheries as a source of employment.  
 
Table 6. Employment in the fishing industry as a proportion of total employment (Source: Statistics Iceland) 
  1998 2002 2005 
Reykjavik area 2,7 2 1,7 
Sudurnes 23,8 18,1 15,3 
Vesturland 19,3 17 15,5 
Vestfirdir 37,7 32,2 28,6 
Nordurland 
west 16,8 13,7 11,2 
Nordurland east 17,8 14,7 13,4 
Austurland 28,3 26,2 17,5 
Sudurland 14,9 11,8 9,9 
All Iceland 10,1 7,9 6,6 
 
The most recent published study on the effect of quta trading on community development by 
Hall et al. (2002) does not find any patterns or trends. Agnarsson has recently presented a 
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further analysis on the subject at the IIFET conference in 2006 and at a recent conference in 
Reykjavik showing no significant relationship between landings (presenting local quota share 
ownership) and population change in Iceland. There is however, not surprisingly, a weak 
relationship between fish processed in the local community and population change (see Table 
7.). 
 
Table 7. Changes in population and bottom fish catch in Vestfirdir 1998-2006 (Source: Directorate of Fisheries, 
Statistic Iceland). 
 Population 
Landed 
catch 
(mt) 
Processed 
catch 
(mt) 
Bildudalur -125 -1,874 -2,125 
Bolungarvik -116 2,864 -408 
Drangsnes -39 1,001 379 
Flateyri 19 5,56 9,965 
Hnifsdalur -84 0 5,501 
Holmavik -45 573 -1 
Isafjordur -213 -5,747 -18,858 
Patreksfjordur  -125 -2,471 -428 
Sudureyri -18 -2,041 1,497 
Sudavik -19 624 85 
Talknafjordur -50 -1,361 1,164 
Thingeyri -59 -139 197 
 
People stay in the communities if there is work avail ble commensurate to their expectations 
of income and services (or new labor will replace th emigrants). The changes in suitable 
employment opportunities in the fishing communities around Iceland is therefore of great 
interest when examining migration patterns. As shown in Table 8. the number of facilities in 
Iceland that are processing bottomfish has diminished by somewhere between 20-50%. These 
numbers fit very well with the concentration in quota discussed earlier. 
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Table 8. Number of facilities processing cod and other demersal species 1992 to 2004 (Source: Directorate of 
Fisheries, Statistic Iceland). 
 Cod 
Other demersal 
species 
 Frozen Salted Frozen Salted 
1992 50 41 50 34 
1993 48 39 49 34 
1994 50 40 50 34 
1995 49 46 49 37 
1996 49 47 50 34 
1997 48 45 49 37 
1998 46 42 44 29 
1999 43 43 44 33 
2000 40 45 38 34 
2001 43 38 44 27 
2002 40 35 42 26 
2003 40 37 42 24 
2004 34 34 35 25 
 
5.4 Legality and Fairness 
 
The Icelandic ITQ system has led to much debate over definitions of ‘property and access 
rights’. Not least because the Icelandic government co tinues to argue that even under the 
current ITQ system the Icelandic fisheries resources an be characterised as a common 
property, albeit under the supervision of the state on behalf of the public. However, arguments 
such as the “transactions of uncaught fish violate the rule of capture and the common 
property nature of the fishing stock” (Pálsson 1998, p. 283) have been numerous in the 
debate. While quota-holders/fishermen under the ITQ system have private property rights in 
the sense that their share of the right to utilize the resource can be traded on a free market, 
their utilisations of their particular share of the resource is submitted to rules entirely defined 
by the state.  
 
When the IVQ system was introduced in 1984, fishing vessels were allocated unequal shares 
of quotas based on their catches the previous threeyears. This, as well as the semi-perpetual 
awarding of ITQ shares by the Fisheries Management Act, has since led to many disputes 
over the fairness and legality of the process by which a public property resource was handed 
over to individual fishermen. Eythórsson (2000) argues that a number of court cases indicate 
that the legislation relating to the ITQ system was not sufficiently well designed from the 
outset and that the Parliament would probably have been reluctant to award the ITQ shares for 
free without time-limits if the implications had been realised in 1990. However, the Fisheries 
Management Act represents de facto a ‘point of no return’. On the other hand Helgi Áss 
Gétarsson, specialist at the Law Institute of the University of Iceland, has pointed out that 
firstly almost all of the current quota shares have changed hands since the initial allocation, 
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i.e. have been traded and secondly that the allocation in 1990 was based on catch 
records/history going back at least to 1980. The argument of fairness or lack thereof, has to be 
viewed in light of this fact. 
 
According to Eythórsson (2000) one of the main legal problems has been the need to uphold a 
paradoxical status of quota shares, which means that they are by law public property, but for 
all practical purposes functions as private property. Because of this paradox, the sector 
experienced several court cases in the late 1990s. An important example is the 1998 case 
(Kvótadómur) regarding a fisher who was denied obtaining a fishing licence and a catch quota 
because he had not been an active fisherman in the 1980s when quotas were allocated. 
Eythórsson (2000:490) describes the outcome of the case in this way: “Considering the 
Icelandic constitution, which claims equal employment rights for every citizen, and the 
Fisheries Management Act of 1990, which defines the fish resources as public property, the 
majority of the Court found […]  that by introducing the ITQ system the government had given 
away exclusive rights to the publicly owned Icelandic fish resources. These had been given 
away as perpetual rights to a group of people who happened to be the owners of active 
fishing vessels at a certain point in time. Such an act could not be justified by the need to 
preserve the resources or by the best public interes ” .  
 
In short, the implementation of the IVQ/ITQ system was declared unconstitutional due to the 
de facto perpetual character of the allocation of ITQ shares. The High Court (Hæstiréttur) was 
not unanimous, a minority opinion pointed out that the statement made by the majority of the 
Court about giving away perpetual rights to an exclusive group of people in 1983 is simply 
not right since the allocation in 1990 had been based on much wider criteria. The research by 
Grétarsson and others, mentioned earlier, seems to support this minority opinion. However, 
the ruling resulted in an amendment to the Fisheries Act 38/1990 giving Icelandic citizens a 
general right to obtaining a fishing license on demand. This did, however, not change the fact 
that newcomers still had to either buy permanently or lease temporarily a costly quota to be 
able to fish. The need for a quota was later challenged in the courts. However, the fisher, who 
had fished without quota, lost the case in the High Court after having won in a lower court. In 
this case, the majority of the High Court found that the quotas were not formally defined as 
private property, and that they were justified on conservation grounds. It is notable that 
neither of the rulings were unanimous (Copes and Pálsson 2000; Eythórsson 2000). 
 
As opposition towards the ITQ system has increased, one major concern has been that it may 
be very difficult to reverse the ITQ system. Many citizens feel that they have lost, 
definitively, what used to belong to them. To compensate society, the discussion about 
‘resource rental’ has become increasingly central in the ITQ debate. While the public largely 
supported the idea, in the light of the large resources having been handed over to the quota 
owners, the industry saw resource rentals as yet ano her tax that would diminish their 
competitiveness. Another alternative which was put forward in the Icelandic fisheries debate 
was the idea that the fishermen annually instead of resource rentals return a small percentage 
of their quotas to the state which would then be auctioned at an open auction (on auctions in 
quota systems see e.g. Anderson and Holland 2006). Consequently, the public would, in the 
long run, regain their ownership over fish resources (Eythórsson 2000). The outcome of this 
debate was the resource tax, which is described earlier. 
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It has been pointed out, e.g. by Agnarsson et al. 2007 and Hall et al. 2002 that the ITQ system 
has become a synonym for everything negative that happened in the development of small 
coastal communities around Iceland. It is hard to see how any other management system 
would have done any better, considering the circumstances and changes in the economy and 
society in general. In the end, the decisions to sell or lease quotas out of the communities 
really come down to the individuals or enterprises that own the quota shares, not the 
“system”. 
 
Regarding the issue of fairness, Orebech (2005, p. 166) adds by arguing that “technically, the 
privatization policy of ITQs involves robbing the excluded fishermen of their assets (open 
access) without the payment of compensation”. The excluded fishermen refer to coming 
generations of fishermen or newcomers into the sector that are underprivileged because they 
must buy quotas that the first generation of quota holders got for free. Consequently, in the 
transition period between first and second generation of quota holders, the relative 
competitiveness of the second generation to the first generation is imbalanced (Orebech 
2005). It has therefore been increasingly difficult for newcomers to enter into the fishery, 
since the price of the right to fish is too high to make their activities profitable. On the other 
hand it can be argued that larger enterprises often have a larger group of shareholders, and 
therefore there are probably many more owners/participants in the Icelandic fisheries sector 
than at any point in time. 
 
The conclusions Orebech draws are possibly not specifically applicable to the Icelandic case. 
Both in the initial 1983 allocation and in the 1990 allocation, the quota shares went to boat 
owners (in most cases not fishermen as such) that had history in the fisheries. This implicates 
that the individuals/enterprises that were allocated the quota got it because they had made a 
considerable investment into the harvesting sector. This raises the question of the fairness of 
newcomers getting access and quota shares without similarly making an initial investment. 
This has been pointed out numerous times in the literature (e.g. Arnason 1996, 1999 and 
2005, Hall et al. 2002, etc.) 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The Icelandic fisheries were, along with the New Zealand fisheries, one of the first in the 
world to be subjected to a comprehensive quota system. Initially the quota was on a vessel 
basis, non transferable and an option along with effort management for a part of the fleet, 
albeit the most important part of the fleet. Over the last 23 years several changes have been 
made to the quota system and currently all commercial fisheries in Iceland are subject to ITQ 
management. It is important to realize that the ITQ system is only a part of the fisheries 
management system in Iceland. The ITQ system ensures that the Icelandic fishing fleet 
adheres very precisely to the annual TACs of the 25 commercial species contained in the 
system. The MRI recommends an annual TAC for all commercial species. This 
recommendation derives from catch statistics, independent survey data and other scientific 
information available. Based on the advice and discus ions with stakeholder representatives, 
the Minister of Fisheries decides on the TACs for the coming fishing year. The biological 
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performance of the fisheries management system is deduced from a scientific process that 
precedes the ITQ mechanism of distributing annual catch allowances. Biological performance 
is therefore more related to the vagaries of politics han anything else. It depends on how 
closely the Minister of Fisheries follows the advice of the fisheries scientists at the MRI.  
 
The ITQ part of the fisheries management system has ensured that the economic performance 
of the fisheries sector in Iceland has been good. Hwever, the resulting consolidation of quota 
shares and processing capacity has been hard for many small fishing communities in Iceland. 
A large part of the Icelandic public relates the ITQ system directly to the changes in 
population and employment patterns that have occurred over the last two decades. That is 
certainly oversimplification of causes and effects. 
 
The evolution of the Icelandic fisheries management regime over the last two decades 
contains a number of lessons both of success and mistakes. These lessons are important to 
have in mind when considering future development of fisheries management. 
 
7 Best practices  
7.1 Initial allocation of quota 
Initial allocation should be made in percentages of the quota 
 
The ITQ systems of Iceland and New Zealand have many similarities, but they handled the 
initial allocation of the quota differently. In New Zealand they made the initial allocation in 
fixed tonnages, which caused severe problems afterwards. Fixed amount quotas put managers 
in a difficult position when having to set down the TAC, as they will then have to buy back 
quota, which they cannot necessarily afford. New Zealand therefore changed the system into 
allocation in percentages of the quota. In Iceland, they made the initial allocation in 
percentages, and hence avoided the issues they had in this respect in New Zealand.  
 
ITQs should not be given out in perpetuity 
 
The ITQs on Iceland is not given out in perpetuity. But the Icelandic system gives the same 
benefits, as one would expect from a right-based system. Hence there is no need to hand out 
the quota shares in perpetuity, as in New Zealand, as the Icelandic system performs 
marketwise as well as the New Zealandic system. Hence, giving out quota in perpetuity would 
just take potential flexibility out of the ITQ system. 
 
7.2 Effects of the ITQ 
ITQ is a powerful tool to make the fleet adapt to the TAC: 
 
In Iceland’s ITQ system, operators can plan their activities in order to be most efficient. Since 
the implementation of the ITQ system the Icelandic fleet has not overshot the annual TAC.  
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7.3 Flexibility of the ITQ 
 
All quota systems face the challenge of fishermen not being able to control the catches. 
Hence, all quota systems have to deal with the differences between the allowed catches and 
the unintended catches. In Iceland, discard is banned. The Icelandic fisheries management 
system has developed a number of flexibilities in the quota system to minimise discard. These 
flexibilities are essential for the success in order for the quotas to match the fluctuations of 
nature and unpredictable fisheries: 
 
Flexibility of quota over both previous and next year is essential if introducing a discard ban. 
Flexibility in buying/leasing quota is essential if introducing a discard ban. 
Flexibility in buying/leasing quota between fishermn is essential for an ITQ system to work. 
 
7.4 Enforcement 
 
Strong enforcement framework accompanied by an accur te system of monitoring: 
 
The enforcement system in Iceland is supported by a real time, online catch reporting system, 
which is coordinated with the amounts of quota of the vessel. Everybody has access to the 
information of this system. 
 
The enforcement system has to be flexible and review d regularly. 
 
Giving the biologists authority to close down areas up to two weeks without political 
amendment: 
This ensures a fast response from the observation of u dersize fish in an area to the closure. 
 
7.5 Participation by fishermen 
 
When deciding upon technical measures: 
 
Fishermen’s expertise should be incorporated when establishing technical measures to reduce 
by-catch. In Iceland, fishermen formally play a small role in the management system, but in 
practise they have easy and direct access to the Minister, who has the final say in most 
matters.  
 
When setting TACs: 
 
In Iceland, a Harvest Control Rule on cod, HCR, has been introduced. It makes the setting of 
TACs robust to both economic and biological changes. The fishermen were part of the 
formulation process for HCR, but formally the fisherm n do not play a role in the setting of 
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the TACs: In Iceland, the Minister has the final say in setting the TAC, and the fishermen do 
not play any formal role in the management system, but in practise they have easy and direct 
access to the Minister.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The rise of the Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) during the 1970s encouraged states to 
devise mechanisms to occupy and exploit their recent enlarged maritime jurisdictions. Before 
this change, most countries in the world had maritime domains up to 12 nautical miles. 
Outside these boundaries, fishing was carried out by industrialised fishing nations able to 
operate distant water fishing fleets (DWFF). Albeit the extent of the exploitation carried out 
by DWFF in the high seas will never be known, DWFF discovered a large variety of fishing 
resources and opened seafood commercialisation channels.  
 
After extending their maritime jurisdictions to 200 nautical miles, many nations encouraged 
the development of their national fishing industries. New Zealand was not an exception and 
declared jurisdiction on the 200 nautical miles off country’s littoral. The emergence of a wide 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) encouraged government to promote growth of the local 
fishing industry, especially the deep-water sector. New Zealand’s government soon 
recognised that protective measures generated a rush for fish and subsequent overexploitation. 
Consequently, government turned its attention to a market-based solution.  
 
Although the seeds of the New Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) can be tracked 
back to ideas emerged in other places of the world, there is a meaningful component 
developed in New Zealand. These features of the QMS are shaped by the particular 
characteristics of the country and its fisheries, which have not had a long tradition before the 
QMS inception. New Zealand consists of two main islands and does not share any resource 
with neighbouring countries. Thus, the country can perform as a sort of laboratory in which 
experiments on fisheries management have taken place without much influence from outside.  
 
New Zealand has developed a management system that is unique. Since the introduction of 
the EFJ, New Zealand’s fisheries have substantially changed. It has been the result of a long 
process of learning and adjusting steered by a government belief that market has to guide the 
evolution of this industry. This is a sui generis case in which most of the intrinsic 
characteristics of the fishery were propitious to a system based on individual transferable 
quotas (e.g. limited number of harbours, a relatively small initial number of species to 
manage).  
 
Government’s aim of reducing responsibilities and management costs and a permanent seek 
for value adding for the industry has changed the sructure of New Zealand’s fisheries. The 
system is based on property rights and has many complementary mechanisms that are 
innovations to management on their own such as private research, cost recovery, and 
stakeholder participation. Moreover, several auxiliary instruments such as the paper trail 
instrument and the discount rate mechanism to reduce sea mammals discard deserve to be 
described.  
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2 Rationale and methodology 
 
The CEVIS project aims at evaluating innovative approaches for European fisheries 
management such as participatory governance, right-based management, decision rules and 
effort control. The CEVIS WP3 team planned visits to four places outside Europe that have 
implemented innovations to fisheries management. These places were Alaska, Maritime 
Canada, Iceland and New Zealand. The case of the New Zealand Quota Management System 
(QMS) was chosen due to its in-depth implementation of right-based management and the 
various complementary innovations such as participation, cost recovery, and private research. 
 
Our aim was to find the reasons for the inception of such a comprehensive right-based 
management and find out how particular conditions of the country and its fisheries have 
reshaped what originally was an application of a theoretical approach, from which many 
expectations emerged, into what is now a referred example of successful management. We 
also aimed at knowing what the unexpected outcomes w re and what adjustments were 
required to counteract these negative outcomes, in order to understand how the QMS has 
managed to survive and to reach relative success. 
 
Twenty years have passed since the QMS inception and both foreign and native researchers 
have drawn many lessons. We have gathered evidence from these lessons through a literature 
review carried out in the first stage of the WP. The literature review allowed us to get 
acquainted in touch with the case and to identify ke sources of information that led us to key 
people and institutions. The second stage was the study trip that allowed us to get in closer 
touch with the case and its actors, while seeking for the sources of success or failure during 
the QMS implementation. 
 
The interviews took place in three cities (Wellington, Auckland and Nelson) where main 
management and harvesting activities are based. Interviews took place between November 
13th and 28th, 2006. Prior arrangements were done to interview four key representatives from 
the Ministry of Fisheries, Seafood Council, conservationists and academic realm. These 
representatives directed us to a broader group of conservationists and private researchers and 
customary representatives belonging to a variety of academic disciplines. 
 
23 people (see Table 1) were interviewed and their main contributions to our study are 
presented in this report. Informants were addressed by introducing the aim of the CEVIS 
project and by assuring recordings and information provided will be kept anonymously. We 
asked two kinds of questions: 1) Open questions on how the system had evolved during the 
last 20 years from their perspective, and 2) specific questions focusing on those aspects in 
which the informant contributes the best according to his/her background and the new 
information he/she was providing. These questions were more focused. 
 
The New Zealanders we interviewed were all open in expressing their views and helpful in 
directing us to other people and providing printed information such as scientific papers and 
informative documents. The first informant told us that “Public is part of our culture, it’s the 
New Zealand way”. All other informants confirmed this. This could be one of the reasons for 
the openness of the people in the system.  
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Table 1. Professional affiliations and academic background of the interview participants 
 Government Industry Research Green Academic Customary  
Biologist 3 1 2 2 1 1 10 
Economist 5 1 1  1  8 
Anthropologist   1    1 
Fisheries 
representative 
 2     2 
Journalist 1   1   2 
 9 4 4 3 2 1 23 
 
3 The New Zealand Quota Management System (QMS) 
3.1 Background of the innovation 
 
When the government, in 1978, extended the maritime jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles, a 
range of fish stocks came under national control. Harte (2000) reports that foreign fleets 
previously exploited offshore fisheries with few controls on catching operations. In the early 
1980s, the country had a low yielding fishery since ov rexploitation led inshore fisheries into 
crisis, and licensed foreign fleets largely dominated he deep-sea fishery within the EEZ. 
Government issued financial aid and tax reductions to encourage the development of the 
offshore fleet. Stakeholders used economic support to develop larger and more efficient 
offshore capacity that finally was diverted to the already depleted inshore fisheries (Strakker 
et al, 2002). Consequently, DWFF predominated until the early 1980s, while inshore 
resources were seriously threatened. 
 
Thus in the Fisheries Act 1983 the government introduced a quota based mechanism to 
manage the seven deepwater fisheries, which is also known as the Deepwater Allocation 
System (DAS). This can be considered the precursor of the current ITQ system (called QMS 
for quota management system). Quotas for the deepwat r fisheries were allocated for ten 
years and were not transferable (Lock and Leslie, 2007).  Clark (1993) reports that one of the 
goals of the DAS introduction was to encourage and secure the development of the deep-sea 
fishery. In 1985, quotas allocated for deep-water species were granted in perpetuity. After a 
long appeal process for inshore fisheries that lasted for 12 months, both deep and inshore 
fisheries were brought into the QMS from October 1986, following the Fisheries Amendment 
Act 1986 (Lock and Leslie, 2007). 
 
In a more general economic context, the New Zealand government introduced many changes 
in the early 1980s since economic crisis called for immediate and drastic actions. Minister of 
Finance, Roger Douglas, propelled the introduction of liberal measures in many key economic 
activities aka “rogernomics” (Dewees, 2006). The general liberalisation plan included 
telecommunications, postal services, health services, education, etc. Hanneson (2004) points 
out that the general economic plan aimed at making the economy more competitive and open 
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by lowering tariff barriers and dismantling subsidies. One senior manager illustrated the 
radical decision of privatising a public asset with this statement: “the inception of the QMS 
was a brave decision back then, but seen in context th re were many brave decisions at that 
time in history”. 
 
According to Connor (2001a), the property right soluti n was preceded by a substantial 
consultation process before finalising the allocation process in legislation. This process 
included all interests but the Maori’s.  A key management officer informed us that this 
process consisted of a pole carried out among all bo t owners in all fisheries ending up in a 
majority supporting the property right alternative. Connor (2001a) reports that the 
consultation process aimed at rising support and commitment from the fishermen. To achieve 
this aim government produced documents outlining the proposal and held meetings around 
the country.  
 
3.2 The introduction of the QMS 
 
In October the 1st 1986, the QMS was extended to all inshore and offsh re fisheries. This 
system performed a fixed fish tonnage allocation to be held in perpetuity (Symes and Crean, 
1995). These rights were allocated for free to the existing participants, they were transferable, 
and imposed a 20% limit in ownership for inshore stocks and a 35% limit for deep-water 
stocks52.  
 
The QMS assured the right to use the resource, while t e fishing permit remained as the right 
of access. Initial fixed amounts of fish were allocated according to historical catch. Although 
rights were allocated for free, requirements for initial allocation were rather demanding. 
Rights were allocated to holders of fishing permits in May 1985. To receive permits under the 
new QMS, fishermen were required to demonstrate that they received 80% of their income or 
NZ$10,000 from fisheries in the fishing year 1982/1983. 2,260 permit holders (46%) could 
not meet this requirement and were considered part-timers. Thus they were excluded from the 
rights allocation (Strakker et al., 2002). 
 
Fishermen were left the sole decision of keeping their rights or transferring them. Rights were 
considered an asset from the very beginning. Social s entists criticized that the informative 
process was poor, and many boat owners sold their quota because they found the process of 
keeping control of their catches and other formalities extremely complex: “Some fishermen 
didn’t even bother getting quota. Others sold fairly quickly to companies, understanding they 
would be able to lease them back”. Fishermen therefore decided to sell their rights to big 
companies. Leasing back hardly happened and many were expelled from the system.  
 
In 1990, the original specification of QMS in fixed tons was changed into percentages of the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) (Connor, 2001b). Regarding characteristics of the property 
                                                
52 According to Deewes (2006), the original design of the QMS was sketched by Ministry of Fisheries’ economists, who were inspired by a 
paper by Maloney and Pearce, published in the Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada in 1979. 
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right, it seems that a combination of desirable qualities such as durability, transferability and 
security have most likely been the seeds of the steady growth of New Zealand’ fishing 
industry. Bess and Harte (2000) report that during the first ten years of QMS the positives 
outcomes were a rise in industry profitability, hig levels of investment and improved fish 
availability due to developments in assessment and recovery strategies. 
 
In the beginning, the setting of the TACs had to face a limited knowledge about stock 
abundance and distribution. Other difficulties were ncountered in finding the criteria on how 
to allocate rights among stakeholders. An inexperienced Monitoring Control and Surveillance 
system (MCS) had to face the challenge of controlling and keeping track of illegal activities 
as quota busting, black marketing, and high grading. Quota busting, for instance, demanded 
effective and strict control. New Zealand enjoys some advantages such as having a limited 
number of harbours where vessels can offload and, hence, a reasonable control can be carried 
out.  
 
The enforcement apparatus effectively backed up the implementation process. Enforcement 
and punishment actions were strong. For instance, penalties for quota busting were hard, 
including immediate confiscation of boat and gear. At the same time to stop ‘black marketing’ 
of fish, a computerised paper trail was set up to accompany all fish entered and sold in shops 
in New Zealand. By-catch and high grading problems also needed time to be resolved. New 
Zealand has responded to these challenges implementing i novations to enhance the MCS by 
installing the first satellite fishing tracking system in the world, the Vessels Monitoring 
System (VMS), in 1994.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Map showing the fisheries management areas (FMAs) in New Zealand. Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
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3.3 The core of the QMS 
3.3.1 Characteristics of property rights 
According to theory, property rights comprise six characteristics (Scott, 1988): transferability, 
duration, quality of the title, exclusivity and flexibility. The informants pointed out that all 
these characteristics are inherent to the QMS to a high extent. Economists mainly aiming at 
economic objectives such as development of offshore fisheries, reduction of government 
intervention and rise of exports designed the system. Most informants considered the system 
to be of success since it has added a meaningful source of income to New Zealand and has 
allowed for the development of a modern and competitiv  national fishing industry. 
 
The characteristics of the QMS have generated the restructure of the industry mostly in hands 
of vertically integrated companies. These factors citicised by social scientists and 
conservationists have meant the growth of fish exports (see Figure 3).  
 
The initial allocation was carried out in fixed tonnage. When government decided to cut Total 
Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) for orange roughy due to stock declines, high quality 
of the property titles encouraged stakeholders to oppose decisions and even to challenge 
government. Government reacted accordingly and expressed rights as percentages of the 
TACC53. This measure improved resource protection and shifted risk from government to 
stakeholders (Stakker et al, 2002). 
 
It is worth saying that decisions of TACC cuts always have been surrounded by controversy 
and hot debate. Stakeholders have in several opportunities opposed substantial reductions of 
TACCs and even taken government to court. At the tim  of writing this report, the decision of 
the Minister of Fisheries, Jim Anderton, to reduce th TACCs in the orange roughy fishery 
from 914 tonnes to 870 tonnes in waters from Bay of Plenty, north to Cape Reigna and 
through to east coast of the North Island (ORH 1) was challenged by Antons Fishery in the 
High Court (The Independent Financial Report)54. A similar announcement in late September 
2006 provoked a judicial process started by the same fishing company. On that occasion, the 
Minister did not defend the case in tribunals. Instead he introduced the Fisheries Amendment 
Bill that will give the Minister great powers in resource sustainability. This proposal has not 
been approved by the parliament yet. Antons Fisheries found that the decision “was 
unjustified on any scientific, rational and legislative decision”.  
 
In a very different case, decision to cut down quotas for hoky by 10% to 90,000 tonnes have 
                                                
53 The Fisheries Amendment Act 1990 modified quota entitlements from fixed tonnage of fish to a proportion of the TACC. Each fishery 
stock was divided in one hundred million shares. 
54 At the time of writing this report (09/2007) the Minister of Fisheries, Jim Anderton, has recently annou ced various measures for the sake 
of sustainability. Among these measures is the rise of deemed value for the West Coast North Island snapper and the closure of the orange 
roughy fishery off central West Coast of the South Island (ORH 7B). The Minister has also decided on the reductions of the TACCs for 
various stocks such as the stock of orange roughy of the South and East Chatham Rise (ORH 3B), the orange roughy stock in waters from 
Bay of Plenty, north to Cape Reigna and through to east coast of the North Island (ORH 1), and hoky in all New Zealand waters (Ministry of 
Fisheries Web Page). 
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been welcomed by the two giants of the New Zealand industry, Sealord and Sanford. These 
two companies requested the Minister to downsize the TACC to 80,000 tonnes. On the other 
hand, smaller operators have recently requested to the Minister to keep the TACC for hoky in 
100,000 tonnes since a substantial reduction of 20%will harm small operators. It seems that a 
process of negotiation has taken place in which government has managed to counterbalance 
both factions and sustainability goals. 
 
It is remarkable that the government has changed attitude towards its mind many times in 
order to let the market guide the process. In the beginning there was a belief that the 
government would buy quotas back and sell them later functioning as a bank. It has never 
happened. Stakeholders have ended up buying and selling quotas directly among them.  
 
The introduction of annual catch entitlements (ACE)55 as an instrument allowing companies 
to fish a certain amount of fish according to the annual TACC and to trade it without needing 
to sell their rights forever have smoothed the process of ownership change. However, nobody 
is obliged to trade ACE. ACE can be considered as an instrument to open a wide variety of 
possibilities for stakeholders.  
 
Some other rules launched by the government establih limitation on quota ownership. A 
government officer pointed out that “theoretically four or five companies could own the 
entire fishery”. Government position is consistent to this market based approach and that 
officer stated that if market determines that only the four fittest companies own the fishery, it 
would enhance a more accurate monitoring and, consequently, it would reduce costs. The 
market-based solution has also allowed reducing costs that are huge in other countries such as 
collection of economic data on fleets characteristics and operations. In addition, the 
threatening ghost of overcapacity is not considered as such. Therefore no subsides and 
decommission schemes are carried out. 
 
The philosophy of no government intervention has also established that cost for research and 
management must be recovered from users. Some costsfor recreational and customary 
activities are still borne by the government, but all other costs are covered by the industry (see 
4.2). The system of cost recovery has led some of our informants to make controversial 
statements on the research focus. 
 
The QMS is widely accepted by the stakeholders, a fact that is considered advantageous for 
its application. A comment by one industry representative illustrates this fact well “Many 
people are satisfied with the system because they got something for nothing. It means that 
now they are owners of a quota that they can trade. In the past they just had an allowance to 
fish” . 
 
3.3.2 The compliance system  
 
An effective Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system has to be backed up by an effective 
                                                
55 Although ACE was introduced in the Fisheries Amendment Act 1996, technical limitations delayed its implementation until 2001.  
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judicial system able to punish infractions on the established rules (Arnason, 1992). In New 
Zealand, such judicial apparatus together with an effici nt MCS system are the backbone of 
the QMS. 
 
The Ministry of Fisheries’ infrastructure includes patrols, a boat tracking system supported by 
satellite and an experienced staff, in cooperation with the military forces. Major offences 
include falsifying of records, misreporting, dumping, illegal fishing and declaration of catches 
from other areas than those where boats are not allowed to fish. In the latter case, the Ministry 
uses forensic science and DNA analysis to determine whether or not fish have been caught in 
a given area. Compliance staff compares catch compositions from vessels with observers on 
board with those from vessels without observers in order to identify misreporting and possible 
dumping. There may be an important amount of misreporting in offshore fisheries. A green 
pointed out that “fish caught on vessels with observers on board are smaller on average than 
on the boats with no observers”. In spite of this, it seems that compliance officers consider 
stakeholders essential in identifying non-compliant ctivities and active in denouncing them. 
A manager pointed out “We depend on quota holders to prevent dumping activities because it 
is their assets that are being eroded”. 
 
Informants considered punishment as draconian. The punishments include confiscation of 
fishing vessels and gear, withdrawal of licenses and quotas, and penalties and sometimes even 
imprisonment. Several of the informants pointed outthat discarding of species with low 
economic value is likely to take place in spite of the deemed value system, which is designed 
to counteract discarding. The MCS system controls the paper trial system and fulfilment of 
the technical measures such as mesh size, size limits, area restrictions and limits imposed on 
effort in the squid fishery. However, technical measures are not a major issue in the 
management of New Zealand fisheries, which according to a management officer is in line 
with the philosophy of market-based regime. Costs of compliance are recovered from the 
industry. The government pays compliance costs for recreational and customary fishermen. 
 
4 The complementary innovations of the QMS 
 
The QMS system in New Zealand is best known for the distribution of quotas through ITQs. 
But a number of innovations complement the ITQs in regulation of the fisheries. The QMS is 
not solely market based; some parts of the system ar  highly regulated by government. One of 
the most remarkable innovations of the QMS is that p rts of the system (e.g. research, 
administration, fisheries observers, etc.) are paid by the industry through the cost recovery 
programme. Another noticeable innovation is the system of deemed value, a fee that allows 
fishermen to over fish the TAC in order to prevent discard. The prices of both schemes are 
calculated and set annually with the TAC. These twoinnovations and the innovations of 
paper trail and discount rates are further discussed below. Active participation ad 
consultation are other features that accompany the system and that are in line with both the 
government’s philosophy of openness and the stakehold rs’ sense of ownership. 
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4.1 Participation 
 
One of the most apparent things about the management system in New Zealand is the active 
participation of actors in the process of management. The system is steered by the Ministry of 
Fisheries, but an active process of consultancy with stakeholders is taking place. Consultancy 
can be tracked back to the days prior the QMS inception when Ministry’s officers were sent to 
harbours to discuss with fishermen on the possibility of introducing an ITQ system in New 
Zealand (Connor, 2001 a). 
 
Early in the process decisions started to change the face of New Zealand fisheries, while 
participation started to shape up when companies gathered in commercial stakeholder 
organisations (CSOs) under the umbrella of New Zealand Seafood Council (SeaFIC). This is 
especially the case when management issues are in hearing. Industry representatives pointed 
out that organisation of the industry is complex and that there is poor collaboration between 
CSOs. Within a CSO differences in interests are complex and in many case conflictive. 
Industry participates actively in discussion papers such as the initial position review of the 
TACCs, conversion factors, and final advice paper. 
 
Stakeholders, including industry, conservationist and customary interests participate together 
with the Ministry, science providers and other government departments in the research 
planning process as part of the planning groups and coordinating committee. Stakeholders 
revisit and contest the outcome from the stock assessm nt working groups in the plenary held 
yearly in May. The main outcome of the plenary is the Plenary Report, which is the basis for 
management recommendations. Stakeholder participation is said to bring about stakeholder 
understanding of research needs and improve assessment with meaningful input. On the other 
hand, stakeholders’ participation in said to be complex and time consuming. 
 
It is interesting to see that the setting of some technical measures such as excluding devices 
for sea lions include the industry as an input-giving factor. Participation also involves 
conservationist groups. They have an increasing role, but the lack of funding was pointed out 
as one of the main reasons for the greens to lack active participation. A management officer 
suggested that may be the government “will help the green next - who knows. Otherwise their 
representation will drift away from the intention”. The bigger green organisations can be 
found in some stock assessment meetings, but they too are constrained in funding. 
 
Even though the Minister of Fisheries takes ultimate decisions, stakeholders’ participation is 
meaningful in some of the key aspects of management such as MCS. The government and the 
industry have borne together some responsibilities and costs of the MCS system.  
 
Stakeholders participate actively in the setting of management objectives. This aspect 
internalises responsibilities and produces legitimacy nd, consequently, enhances compliance. 
Stakeholders’ involvement in the process of management is such that they have proposed 
banning bottom trawling and dredging from 31% of the EEZ and 6% of the territorial sea. The 
Ministry of Fisheries needs a range of inputs from stakeholders to assist them in making good 
fisheries management decisions. Each year the Ministry and stakeholders undertake a research 
planning process that results in the Proposed Fisheries Research Plan. The Minister of 
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Fisheries as part of the Ministry’s work plan or Statement of Intent approves the revised 
document. A substantial portion of the costs of many of these research projects is recovered 
from the commercial fishing industry. 
 
4.2 The cost recovery regime (CRR) 
 
The cost recovery programme was introduced in 1994 substituting a system of resource rent. 
According to Stokes et al. (2006) the principles supporting Cost Recovery Regim  (CRR) 
request individuals to pay for exploitation of resources from which they are benefiting and 
taking into account that exploitation may cause harm nd risk to the aquatic environment as 
stated in the Fisheries Act 1996.  The CCR aims at recovering the costs of management, 
including compliance, and research for all commercially exploited stocks. Costs are allocated 
to individual fisheries whenever possibly. On the other hand, the government pays for the 
costs of public interest, which involves customary nd recreational fisheries. Costs for multi-
sector fisheries56 are shared between industry and government. 
 
Stokes et al. (2006) describes the various objectives aimed at by the actors involved in the 
CCR: For government objectives are efficiency, accountability and reduction of the 
dominance of the provider of services. For the industry objectives are reduction of costs, 
interest in services provided, purchase and delivery of services by the industry. For research 
providers objectives are independence in collaborating with either industry or government and 
competitiveness determined by the range of potential providers of services. 
 
According to Peacey (2007), CCR allows the Ministry to recover about 30% of annual budget 
(30 million NZ$).  One of the main advantages of the CCR is that it is said to provide strong 
focus on cost-effective research methods. On the otr hand, it is administratively complex, 
and scientific merits are clouded by cost considerations. Harte (2006) sees among the various 
advantages of the CCR the improvement of accountability and transparency in the delivery of 
management services, involvement of industry in the det rminations of management services 
and generation of efficiency in the delivery of services. 
 
The way the CRR works through consultation is a huge driver in the QMS since CCR is a 
comprehensive system of commercial fishermen paying the expenses of fisheries 
management, research, and enforcement. A scientist suggested that the CRR is restricting 
research. Usually scientific advice is followed, for example, in 1999 the TACC for orange 
roughy was cut down from 48,000 to 8,000 tonnes. Since in many cases scientific advice 
suggests reducing TACCs, it is a strong incentive to reduce research. Moreover, 
conservationists point out that industry’s paying of research somehow direct research to most 
profitable species. 
 
4.3 The deemed value instrument  
 
                                                
56 Based on resources being exploited by inshore, customary and recreational stakeholders such as snapper. 
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Discard is often one of the biggest problems of a quota system, but banning discard in a quota 
system without allowing some degree of flexibility nto the system may not work. In New 
Zealand, they created the system of deemed value to address the issues of discard twenty 
years ago. The original idea behind deemed value was to create an instrument that encourages 
fishermen not to target above the TACC instead of dumping catches in an ever-changing 
market. A manager put it simple: “The incentives needed to be such that they didn’t target 
outside the TACC”. 
 
The deemed value instrument is applied when fishermen exceed their quota (and cannot/will 
not buy or rent more quota). Thus they have to pay the deemed value to the government. The 
deemed value is set annually and balanced so that the fishermen should neither gain nor loose 
economically from exceeding the quotas; hence there are no economic incentives to discard 
and no incentives to keep fishing after the quota is caught. The system of deemed value is 
very flexible: If a fisherman go fishing without ACE or ITQ, or over-fish, he has to pay 
deemed value of the catches on the 15th of the following month. Until then he can buy ACE or 
ITQ to fit his catch and hence not pay the deemed value. If he pays deemed value, but buy 
ACE or ITQ within the end of the year, he can have the deemed value refunded.  
 
One of the key points is setting the deemed value. The equilibrium in the deemed value 
system is difficult to achieve. The setting is based on economic calculations of prices. To set 
the deemed value so that the system obtains the required effects is almost impossible as the 
deemed value is interactive with the prices of fishand of ITQ/ACE. When the deemed value 
is set too high, the deemed value undermines the quota/ACE-prices by encouraging people 
not to buy quota or to discard, which is illegal, but nevertheless it is happening around New 
Zealand according to many of our informants. When the deemed value is set too low, the 
fishermen have strong incentives to over-fish the TAC within the legal boundaries.  
 
This system was one of the most criticised features of the QMS. An economist stated that he 
did not consider deemed value to enhance sustainability because it allowed the TACC to be 
over-fished; he considered the deemed value to be yet another tax. A biologist who said that 
deemed value has resulted in an economic invitation to exceed TACC supports this. There 
were many polarised opinions on the deemed value as an effective instrument of management, 
and conservationists pointed out that due to crews paying deemed value they tend to discard 
when the deemed value is too high. On the other hand,  relevant faction of conservationists 
believes a rise in deemed values may support conservationist measures. At the time of writing 
this report a key representative of the Environment and Conservationist Organisation (ECO) 
has welcomed the decision of government to rise deemed value in one of the most important 
commercial fisheries: “The big increases (of deemed value) in fisheries lke the West Coast 
North Island snapper should help to bring catches back within quota limits”. 57 (Scoop 
Independent News). 
 
                                                
57 At the time of writing this report (09/2007) Ministry of Fisheries Jim Anderton has recently announced various measures for the sake of 
sustainability. Among these measures are deemed value for the West Coast North Island snapper and the closure of the orange roughy fishery 
off central West Coast of the South Island (ORH 7B)(Ministry of Fisheries Web Page). 
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However, strong compliance may discourage crews to discard. Although confiscation of the 
boat may be a threat only to the boat owner, crews can be prosecuted. On the other hand, a 
low deemed value allows crews to make good profits. A management officer let us know that 
this instrument has been changed many times, and is thus slowly being improved by both 
government and industry. A working group composed of industry and government 
representatives has sent out a discussion paper on this issue. The big question is, however, 
whether this tool is suitable for mixed fisheries. In a mixed fishery it is more likely that low 
value species will be dumped, and that fishermen will pay deemed value for the species 
obtaining higher prices, which will at least allow them to recover the deemed value paid. 
 
4.4 The paper trial system 
 
The paper trail system has been one of the pillars of the QMS since the beginning of the 
system. Management officers considered that the papr trial is antiquated now because of 
problems with compliance due to emerging ways of regulation circumvention. Early during 
the QMS inception, managers realised that strong compliance measures were required for the 
QMS to be effective. Penalties for quote busting, for instance, were hard, including immediate 
confiscation of boat and gear. At the same time, to stop ‘black marketing’ of fish, the 
computerised paper trail emerged to accompany all fish entered into and sold in shops in New 
Zealand. 
 
Currently, the paper trail system is being broadly criticised. Some fishermen criticized the 
paper trail system for not working well: “the paper work is too heavy and complicated and it 
is followed buy substantial fines if it is not done right” . A fishermen representative stated that 
the Ministry refused to give instructions in how to fill out the papers, as the Ministry did not 
want to risk getting sued if wrong advice was given. Hence, the Ministry tells the fishermen to 
seek legal advice if they have doubts to avoid the risk of giving wrong advice. This was 
confirmed in the department of compliance in the Ministry; this had to be seen as an 
unfortunate consequence of QMS. 
 
Other people pointed out that the paper trail system had caused damage to local communities: 
The paper trail system is based on inspection leaving only means to sustain the larger landing 
sites. As New Zealand geographically covers a large area most landing sites were closed 
down in order for enforcement of the system to be possible. Not only the landing sites are 
controlled – also the receivers of the fish are controlled. A large number of fish receivers (e.g. 
local fish markets, restaurants, etc.) were refused license, as the amounts of fish were too 
small. One of the results is that it is impossible to buy fresh caught fish in most local areas of 
New Zealand. 
 
4.5 The discount rate instrument for reducing sea mammal by-catch 
 
The discount rate can be seen as a system of incentves for the fishermen to adopt technical 
measures to avoid by-catch into the fisheries. The system of discount rate applies to squid 
trawlers in the southern waters of New Zealand. The problem in the squid fisheries is that sea 
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lions feed on squid. Hence, sea lions are often caught when fishermen target squid. Often the 
sea lions are by-catch of squid fisheries and are killed in the process, and the rate of survival 
for the sea lions that manage to escape from the fis ing gear is very low.  
 
In order to reduce the number of sea lions killed, the industry was proactive in developing 
new technology of excluding devices by employing peopl  from overseas to help developing 
technical measures. “Fishermen are active in developing gear for avoiding seabirds and sea 
mammals” said encomiastic a key management officer. Fishermen anaged to come up with 
an excluding panel which releases the sea lions by a slide leading up to the top of the trawl.   
 
The squid fisheries are managed by a dual system: the normal TACC system and a maximum 
allowance of killed sea lions per vessels. The system of maximum allowance of killed sea 
lions per vessel works through calculated averages: For example, the Minister can decide that 
the fishery related mortality limit (FRML) is 200 sea lions a year. This setting of the FRML 
can be based on both political and biological objectiv s. Often the greens in New Zealand 
have strong protective attitudes towards sea mammals and work intensively to reduce the 
FRML. From FRML the Minister can calculate backwards: He knows that the by catch rate 
for sea lions equals 6 sea lions per 100 tows. The squid fisheries have to end up either before 
3.333 tows are made or when the TACC is caught. The result is that the squid fisheries are 
stopped before the TACC for squid is caught. The system of discount rate fits into this 
system. If the fishermen voluntarily install the excluding panel in the trawl, they get 20% 
extra tows as about 20% of the sea lions survive an ncounter with the excluding panel.  
 
5 The outcomes of the QMS implementation 
5.1 Fishing industry development  
 
Since the introduction of the QMS, a substantial increase has happened in both quantity of 
harvest and its value for many species in the QMS system. During the first years, the system 
allowed the rise of employment mainly in the processing sector due to the fact that rights 
allow a long term planning horizon that stimulates investment in technological improvements, 
hence diversifying and adding value in a competitive processing sector (Annala, 1996 and 
Batstone and Sharp, 1999). However, trends in employment levels in the inshore sector are 
reverting due to the fact that bigger companies prefer to process abroad. 
 
Broadly speaking, security of tenure and other attrac ive characteristics of the New Zealand’s 
property rights model have encouraged operations planning and technological development, 
not only in infrastructure investment, but also in research and technological innovation. These 
positive spill-over effects have spread onto other s ctors outside the QMS such as 
aquaculture. The case of the GreenshellTM is a good example of the latter (Bess and Harte, 
2000). Furthermore, Bess (2005b) points out that investment in innovation has allowed for the 
development of some highly vertically integrated fishing companies that compete worldwide. 
The inception of the QMS has meant the transformation of a local supplier fishing industry 
into one of the most dynamic and developed export sectors in New Zealand. 
 
124 
Most of the fishing industry growth was experienced in the offshore sector between 1986 and 
1989. At that time, local fleet lacked offshore capability and charter vessels carried out 
fishing. Between 1990 and 1992 a sharp increase in exports is registered and local companies 
invested heavily in deep-water capabilities and sea farming (Bess, 2005a). Batstone and Sharp 
(1999) suggest that the introduction of the system has been fleet developmental, probably 
because it did not start facing a strong overcapacity problem. For example, Connor (2001) 
reports an increase in the overall fleet size of abut 43% during the period 1987-1998 and it is 
mainly due to the growth of the offshore fleet (>33m), which was built to replace charter 
vessels and to increase specialization. In the caseof the inshore fleet it has shown little 
variation in size although it has experienced significant restructuring including vessels 
replacement, ownership patterns, gear configuration, and changed targeting. The capacity of 
the core inshore fleet in the range 12-24m has beenk pt constant from the mid 1970s. 
 
The only sector of the fleet that has experienced a significant reduction has been the inshore 
segment of <12m. The drop in its capacity is estimated to around 70%. This fact seems to be 
an effect of a shift towards larger average size vessels. For instance the segment 24-33m has 
developed from a few boats in the middle seventies to a significant sector of the fleet. These 
boats are being devoted to harvest species other than the inshore species, which means an 
overall decrease in the capacity devoted to these species since the introduction of the quota. 
Since in general terms the changes in fleet structue have been more developmental than 
capacity reductive, it seems that the predominant change in industry has been quota 
concentration without meaningful capacity reduction. Connor (2001) argues that gains in 
efficiency were located outside the harvesting sector, for instance, returns to scale in the 
processing and export sector, synergies between the i s ore and offshore operations, new and 
larger companies, and rationalization among the existing medium firms, but without 
important impact on fleet capacity. 
 
One of the expected consequences of an ITQ inception is quota concentration. Stewart et al. 
(2005) have studied quota concentration in New Zealand. This team has elaborated a profile 
of exiters. They have found out that most exiters were boat owners without involvement in 
processing. These stakeholders had several years of involvement in the industry and made a 
rather quick decision of leaving. According to Stewart’s study, exiters left the industry 
voluntarily and for a variety of reasons other than loss of competitiveness. Exiters have not 
met many problems in finding alternative labour opprtunities outside the industry while 
many of them continue working in the fishing industry. One should be careful in drawing 
conclusions about the extent of the impact of the QMS introduction on fishermen. The issue 
of quota concentration has been addressed in the design of the QMS through mechanisms that 
impose quota limitations with the aim of avoiding exc ssive quota concentration in few hands 
(Strakker et al., 2002). 
 
Changes in fleet technical characteristics, structue and capacity reduction are expected 
outcomes of an ITQ inception. New Zealand has been partially an exception to what theory 
says. According to the interviews capacity has not been reduced, but has expanded in a way 
that has generated spill-over effects on internatiol waters or foreign EEZs. It is obvious that 
there has been a capacity reduction in the inshore sector, but capacity has been expanded in 
the offshore sector because of strong incentives for entrepreneurs to exploit deep water 
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resources that were fairly abundant during the first years of the QMS and in great demand in 
foreign markets (e.g. orange roughy). The management officers interviewed pointed out that 
in a comprehensive QMS like the one in New Zealand, overcapitalisation cannot be a concern 
for the management, but an issue for the firms having to take decisions in order to succeed 
which includes decisions on investing heavily in fishing capacity. 
 
Consequently, there are not subsidies for fuel, decommissioning schemes, vessel construction 
or renovations programmes. New Zealand as well as Australia has not taken any action in 
implementing the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity 
(IPOAMC). Australia and New Zealand are two of the countries in which property rights have 
been widely adopted. On the other hand, the IPOAMC has been widely adopted by most FAO 
member states (Pascoe, 2007). As pointed out, with the aim of improving processes and 
increasing efficiency the firms invested heavily in fleet capacity expansion and improvement 
in the offshore sector. 
 
As regards processing capacity firms invested accordingly. The resource economists 
interviewed pointed out that when the QMS was introduced the inshore fleet shrunk and 
consequently labour suffered a contraction. The economic system showed resilience and 
absorbed the impact by social security mechanisms and alternative labour opportunities. It 
seems as if the right of tenure brought security and llowed for long planning horizons. 
However, since resource availability has dropped in many cases, firms are seeking to reduce 
costs by processing fish in China and other countries in the Pacific Region, where labour costs 
are lower, or by chartering Ukrainian fishing boats that have lower operating costs. A 
respondent to the interviews pointed out that competitiv ness in New Zealand is understood 
as reducing costs and improving the quality of the products. 
 
Nowadays, with prestige conquered in the global fish market some firms such as Sealord 
process their products abroad and label them. Thus there is a tendency to get rid of capacity 
and the current overcapacity could disappear in the short run. Good natural conditions for 
aquaculture and prestige in the world market for New Zealand’s seafood are allowing for a 
rapid expansion of aquaculture. The interviewed people pointed out that there is an increasing 
synergy between the fishing and the aquaculture sector. However, increasing aquaculture is 
perceived by the industry as a threat to fisheries since they occupy large portions of the sea. 
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New Zealand fisheries: Evolution of fish exports (1 989-2006) 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of fishery exports in tonnes for the period 1989-2006. Notice the rise in exports from 1990. 
Exports have not dropped below 1,000 tonnes since then. Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
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Fig. 3. Value of fish exports in million New Zealand dollars for the period 1989-2006. Source: Ministry of 
Fisheries. 
 
 
5.2 Indigenous people  
 
Proper fisheries management and restructuring of the leet were the obvious challenges for the 
quota management system in New Zealand. QMS inception aimed at economic efficiency, 
and social objectives were not taken into account at the very start. The QMS was not designed 
for encountering the Maori people’s claim for their rights as stipulated in the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Yet the system has managed to encounter the Maori. How can it be that traditional 
Maori claims could be combined with modern capitalis ic management systems? Hersoug 
offers an explanation: ‘… the QMS provided the “currency”, making it possible to sort out 
the Maori commercial claims’. (Hersoug, 2002:69). He further argues that the QMS is an 
innovative attempt at establishing the better of two orlds, keeping Maori in touch with the 
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cultural roots of fishing while also participating in the modern commercial sector. 
 
Maoris issues have to be seen in the light of the satu  of indigenous peoples around the 
world. New Zealand has a different history than other colonized countries as it was not 
conquered and forced under the Crown: The Maoris signed a contract with a representative of 
the English Crown in 1840 (The Treaty of Waitangi58). This treaty states that the Maori have 
rights to their natural and cultural resources – including fisheries resources.  
 
In 1957, the ILO (International Labour Organization59) adopted a Convention (Convention 
No. 107 of 1957 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations) to be applied to indigenous 
and tribal populations in independent countries andimed at protecting these people. Since 
then, indigenous peoples have increased the political mpact of their countries claiming back 
rights and resources lost in and after the colonization. In 1989, the convention was revised 
(Convention No. 169 on Indigenous Peoples) in the light of changes in the position of 
indigenous and tribal populations and of greater understanding of their position by 
governments, employers and workers. Whether the adoption of these conventions on supra-
national level was a result of increased focus on indigenous peoples’ lost rights or the other 
way around is hard to say. In New Zealand, the Maori had made many claims in vain, but in 
the left wing orientation period in the early 1970’es things started moving. 
 
In 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal was established to make recommendations to the Government 
on how the Waitangi Treaty should be applied in current political matters. This, however, did 
not prevent the part-time fishermen - of which many were Maori - from being excluded from 
the initial allocation of quota in 1983. The initial llocation concerned 29 species, which 
corresponded to more than 80 % of commercial fisheres.  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal affirmed to the Maori that the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed the 
Maori the full rights to their traditional fisheries (Waitangi Tribunal, 1988). Numerous Maori 
organizations protested and applied for injunction in High Court, which was granted in 1987. 
In order to avoid long discussions and trials, the Government and the Maori compromised on 
the fishing rights – the government arranged for buy- ack schemes to be finalized by the end 
of 1992. The Parliament passed the temporary Maori Fisheries Act in 1989 (Hersoug, 2002). 
From a non-commercial customary Maori perspective, this settlement of a share of the ITQ 
was not satisfying. Hence, the Government established t e fisheries task force to advice on 
appropriate legislative change and reform. The taskforce saw a need for the Maori to be 
involved in management of the fisheries. The task force suggested two components for 
addressing the issues of traditional fisheries: a harvesting right and exclusive rights (Kerins 
and McClurg, 1996). Hence, the customary fisheries w re ensured to the Maoris by giving 
them exclusive rights to certain inshore areas.  
 
Other people see the development differently: Boast sees the development from a legal 
perspective: He argues that the system is rooted in political pragmatism rather than in the 
                                                
58 http://www.treatyofwaitangi.govt.nz/ 
59 The UN specialized agency which seeks the promotion f social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights 
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legal constitution, and further that its complexity, especially as to customary fisheries, has 
prevented a clarification of the Maori fishing rights (Boast, 2000). Dewees argues that the 
Maori people has a hard time adjusting their fisheries from the traditional fisheries as fisheries 
now require a new set of skills in order for fisherm n to manoeuvre in the bureaucratic system 
(Dewees, 1997). Representatives from the Ministry of Fisheries, Hooper and Lynch, argue 
that the process sketched above is an expression of the recognition of and provision for the 
rights of the Maori and the coastal communities. They argue that resources need to be 
protected if the resources are not to disappear more than they already have. Hence it is also of 
Maori interest that they are given some tools to ensure sustainable use of the marine resources 
(Hooper and Lynch, 2000). 
 
5.3 Fishing communities and recreational fisheries 
 
As regards fishing communities, social scientists pointed out that many communities have 
disappeared because QMS propelled a movement in which t e small boat owners got rid of 
their rights to avoid big bureaucratic processes with the hope of leasing rights back later. 
Leasing back has not happened to the extent expected. It is thought that information was not 
sufficient and that the small-scale operators were not advised to be cautious in the use of their 
rights in a scenario of fast changes. Even management officers recognise that the QMS has 
had a negative impact on communities. A key management officer pointed out that “ he QMS 
from a macro economic perspective is good; if you want to maintain communities it is bad”. 
Managers did not consider this a failure of the QMS since “social objectives including 
customary rights were not in the original agenda”.  
 
What is clear is that introducing such a comprehensiv  ITQ system definitely transformed the 
face of fisheries. The actors did not easily foresee QMS outcomes in the beginning. The most 
efficient companies that had better management capabilities to plan their operations absorbed 
many other small operators. Other informants pointed out that the complicated paper trial 
system required fewer points of offloading to make it asier to handle. As a consequence, 
many small offloading points were closed. Local fishermen were not allowed to sell fish 
locally as restaurants were not considered as fish receivers. Moreover, occasional fishermen 
were expelled from the system. It was necessary to demonstrate an annual income of more 
than 10,000 NZ$ to remain in the system and get quoa. The study carried out by Stewart et al 
(2005) suggests that former boat owners took the decision to exit fisheries on their own, and 
that they were absorbed by the fishery system where they found alternative labour 
opportunities. 
 
Both the government and the public in general consider recreational fisheries as an important 
source of satisfaction: fresh fish for home consumption and an important source of income for 
fishing communities with neighbouring fish spots as recreational fishing create jobs in 
retailing, entertainment and services. The economic value is estimated at $ 973 million for the 
major recreational species (Lock and Leslie, 2007).  
 
Management of recreational fisheries is a hot issue in New Zealand. Recreational fishing is 
considered a threat to resource sustainability by many groups such as commercial fishermen 
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and conservationists since it is not strongly regulated and its extent is not well understood and 
quantified. What is doubtless is that this activity is an old and strong tradition considered by 
New Zealanders as a birthright. Recreational fisheries are practised by New Zealanders from a 
wide range of ethnic and social backgrounds (Hawkey, 2004 quoted by Lock and Leslie, 
2007). This is well understood by Government, and the non-economic and economic value of 
recreational fishing is being considered when allocting the share of the TAC.  
 
It seems that a conflict for space and resources between increasing recreational fishing, 
marine farming, conservationists, commercial and customary fishing will rise in near future. 
Lock and Leslie (2007) see the creation of a management mechanism to facilitate interaction 
among these factions as a necessity.  
 
5.4 Resource status and assessments 
 
Many will disagree to the statement that the QMS is a success in terms of biological 
sustainability. However, from the increase in total fish exports it is clear that most stocks are 
in good health (see Figure 3). Low mobility species such as rock lobster, scallops and abalone 
populations have increased. Such increases may be due to the QMS and the participatory 
approach and co-management in these fisheries. Moreover, there is little illegal practising 
coming from outside. However according to fishermen, r creational fisheries accounts for a 
meaningful share of the rock lobster fishery: “There is too much recreational fisheries for the 
quota system to work; hence in the rock lobster fishery about 25%-50% of catches are not 
reported”. 
 
Assessment of inshore resources is quite accurate sinc their biology is well known and data 
used in the assessment is not undermined to the extent of offshore species as illegal activities 
are easily detected and denounced by inspectors, fishermen and people in general. In the 
interviews, recreational fisheries were acknowledged by all fractions as a factor that threatens 
stock’s health due to scarce regulation. A conservationist had this comment: “The quota 
system is being undermined by the other kinds of fisher es, which are not included in the 
QMS”. Recreational fishing, which cannot be measured, is considered an impediment to 
evaluating resource status in the inshore fisheries. The extent of recreational fishing is 
evaluated through voluntary surveys, but there is a belief that many fishermen do not know 
the imposed daily limits (Lock and Leslie, 2007). In addition, customary fishing can also be 
considered an impediment to accurate assessment of the status of inshore resources and their 
management. According to Bess and Rallapudi (2006), customary activities are not subject to 
size restrictions, bag limits and other management easures. 
 
Other problems arise when assessing what has actually happened with slow growing deep 
water populations such as the orange roughly stocks. The case of the orange roughy fishery in 
the Challenger area is a good example for reflection on the role of the knowledge basis in the 
setting of TACC. During the first years, TACC was based on catches for earlier years, which 
may work in well-established fisheries, but this was not the case here. There were many new 
fisheries in middle- and deep-water. An accurate setting of TACC demands a thorough 
knowledge, but this is especially difficult as regards exploitation of deep-water resources 
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where assessment is expensive and difficult (e.g. orange roughy poorly reflects sound in 
acoustic surveys due to lack of swimming bladder).  
 
Moreover, initial TACC for orange roughy was based on educated guesstimates based on a 
revision of the - at that time rather scarce - grey lit rature on the dynamics of orange roughy 
stocks in the world. Growth rate was overestimated. Fish behaviour was misunderstood. 
According to the interviewed biologists, this species gathers in compact aggregations to feed, 
and this behaviour makes the species highly vulnerabl . Furthermore, scientists suggest that 
this species may have not steady recruitment. The setting of an initial fixed TACC for orange 
roughy brought judicial demands when the government d cided to cut TACC down because 
of overexploitation (see figure 4).  
 
The rise and fall of the orange roughy fishery in t he Challenger area
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Fig. 4. The rise and fall of the orange roughy fishery. The fishery collapsed in 2001 and was finally c osed. 
Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
 
The Minister of Fisheries, Jim Anderton, has announced this 25th of September the closure of 
the orange roughy fishery in waters off central West Coast of the South Islands (ORH 7B) due 
to “In this particular case, the best information shows the stock is well below the sustainable 
target, indeed around 17% of original biomass, and there is nothing to suggest that it is 
improving”. Moreover, the Minister has also decided on reductions of the TACCs for various 
stocks such as the stock of orange roughy of the South and East Chatham Rise (ORH 3B), the 
orange roughy stock in waters from Bay of Plenty, north to Cape Reigna and through to east 
coast of the North Island (ORH 1), and hoky in all New Zealand waters (Ministry of Fisheries 
Web Page). It is clear that sustainability is high on the agenda of the Ministry of Fisheries and 
even in the case of such a comprehensive property right system government continues to be 
the main player. 
 
Out of the 592 stocks, 220 stocks are managed throug  a TACC based on catch history, 75 on 
CPUE analysis, and 75 (about 8 species) on full stock assessment including acoustic and trawl 
survey. Species included in the latter are among the most profitable species such has snapper, 
hoki, orange roughy, rock lobster and oyster. Stock assessment is carried out by 13 stock 
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assessment working groups (e.g. orange roughy stock assessment). The Ministry of Fisheries 
runs the process in which National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research Limited 
(NIWA) participates as a provider of some of the best local scientists. The industry also 
participates in hiring leading international researchers. Managers are supposed to participate 
in assessment, but they usually find it hard to follow the technical aspects of the process. 
Assessment services for resources commercially exploited are purchased by the Ministry and 
then recovered from stakeholders. 
 
The plenary is carried out the 31st of May to have everything ready for the fishing season 
starting in October. This is usually a long process because of the various consultations to be 
carried out among the groups concerned. According to a management officer, there is a need 
to increase the budget for research. Industry constantly discusses specific research 
programmes, for instance orange roughy. A report assessment could be consulted four times. 
New Zealand has water area eleven times its land area. Hence, much research is needed to do 
proper stock assessment. The stock assessment process gives room to research directly 
purchased by industry, for example, tagging for rock lobster, fine scale harvest data for 
abalone (paua), acoustic surveys of orange roughy, catch sampling, habitat mapping and 
development of excluding devices for sea lions (Peacey, 2007). 
 
A representative of the official sector argued that: “one of the main outcomes of the QMS has 
been conservation ethics”. An example of this is the industry suggestion to ban bottom 
trawling and dredging operations in 31% of the EEZ. It is said to be the largest marine 
protective action even proposed within a nation’s EEZ (Bess and Rallapudi, 2006). Even 
though it sounds like a good example of growing enviro mental ethics, it is worth pointing 
out that the areas the industry are proposing to include in the ban are deep-water areas in 
which - so far - fishing is unfeasible. However, since fishing technology is progressing so 
quickly the interviewed representative pointed out that industry is going to lose opportunities 
in a near future. This issue has also generated polarised opinions between conservationists, 
some of them considering industry’s proposal as good since industry offers banning trawling 
in areas in which trawling has never been undertaken. Other factions of the greens considered 
that this is just a first step in a negotiation process in which industry will request aperture of 
seamounts and other closed areas. 
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the hake fishery during the last 30 years. Notice that after QMS inception the fishery has 
experienced a substantial growth.  Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
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6 Summary: Evaluation of the New Zealand QMS 
 
The purpose of CEVIS is to evaluate innovations with regard to four criteria: Cost of 
management, economic efficiency, biological robustne s and social robustness. The literature 
review and the study trip helped formulating a number of hypotheses for the evaluation of the 
innovations described in this chapter. These hypotheses were used as the basis of developing 
the CEVIS research work in Europe. Various processes ar  identified within each innovation, 
but not all processes can be evaluated with regard to all four criteria. The findings are 
summarised in the table below (-) means ‘decrease’ while (+) means ‘increase’: 
 
Innovation Economic 
Efficiency 
Biological  
robustness 
Social 
robustness 
Costs of 
management 
Property rights 
Characteristics of high 
quality 
+ + -  
Processes involved     
• Fleet capacity 
adjustment 
+ +/- - + 
• Pressure for effective 
monitoring 
 + - 
 
+ 
• Seek for value adding + +/- -  
• Seek for participation  + + + 
• Introduction of 
deemed value 
measure 
 +/- + + 
• Introduction of ACE 
measure 
- + + + 
• Paper trial and other 
enforcement 
measures 
 + - + 
Participation  
Industry involvement in 
research 
 + +  
Consultation  + + + 
Technical solutions to by 
catch and other technical 
measures 
 + +  
Devolution of responsibilities 
Cost-recovery + +/- + - 
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As it has been described in previous chapters the most i portant innovations in New Zealand 
is the introduction of a high quality title, which was pointed by informants as the main driver 
in the evolution of the QMS system. High quality has caused a rise in economic efficiency 
allowing only the most efficient to remain in the fishery and to increase competitiveness 
through value adding of products.  
 
Biological robustness has also increased due to these characteristics, but not in the case of 
deep-water species where the lack of a solid knowledge basis was the reason for the decline of 
the orange roughy fishery. Changes in fleet structue have been more developmental than 
reductive. In the inshore sector property rights inception has determined a reduction of 
capacity, but in the offshore sector the result hasbeen excess capacity, which is not 
considered deleterious for New Zealand, but for the boat owners. Sense of ownership has 
determined an intense seek for improving of monitoring and seek for participation which is 
also determined by the cost-recovery system.  
 
The deemed value system is highly criticised for being an invitation to overfish, but it has 
been also a good measure to avoid discarding. ACE has smoothed the process of ownership 
change. In this way, many operators can lease their right without getting rid of them for good. 
In terms of economic efficiency, this could be considered negative, as the introduction of ACE 
has ensured that a broad range of fishermen can partici te in the fisheries. On the other hand, 
it has also caused a positive impact in terms of social robustness.  
 
The paper trial system is considered positive in terms of biological robustne s since actors are 
discouraged to cheat. However, social scientists pointed out that many points of offloading 
were closed, as they were considered too small. This affected small-scale commercialisation 
of fresh fish and the small communities. Paper trial is considered expensive and complicated. 
In general terms enforcement is strong in New Zealand, even if complicated and a source of 
litigation between managers and users.  
 
Participation is the second main innovation in New Zealand. Many positive outcomes are 
found related to this innovation. Industry involvement in research t rough participation in 
working groups, hiring of international experts and support in data collection are considered 
to increase biological robustness. Consultation of management issues increase social 
robustness since actors including conservationists and customary groups feel part of the 
process, which determines that they feel comfortable with the system and increases 
compliance. But consultation also makes the process complicated and costly. Technical 
alternatives to problems of by-catch for example involve the fishermen in determining 
meaningful input and strengthen the links with managers.  
 
Finally, the cost recovery system is the innovation that has allowed substantial costs of 
management reduction, even if some aspects of management are still covered by the 
government. Cost recovery has meant wider involvement of the industry in all processes of 
management albeit it is criticised due to its focus on the species with higher economic value. 
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7 Best practices from New Zealand 
 
Initial allocation should be done in percentages ofthe TACC 
 
Initially, the quota allocation in New Zealand was done in fixed amounts in tonnes. The idea 
was that the TACC should work like a national bank; buying up quota when stock was low 
and sell quota when stock was high. This became a problem when stock declines forced 
government to buy back large amounts of fish. Since fixed shares were property rights, some 
stakeholders took government to court. The solution was to split TACC in percentages, which 
is recommended by scientist every year. Thus any variation in TACC will mean an immediate 
adjustment of the shares since they are percentages of this overall quota. In this way, 
government shifted the risk to quota holders.  
 
Keep a share for the TAC for other uses 
 
Managers should remember that when allocating in perpetuity, it is not possible to return to 
the original status of the fishery. Hence, it is a good idea for the managers to hold a 
percentage of the TAC for uses other than what is allocated for ITQ (Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch). Other uses of the TAC comprise sci ntific, recreational fishermen and 
even a share for precaution.  
 
Annual catch entitlements 
 
An annual catch entitlement enables fishermen to transfer the right to catch a given tonnage of 
fish to other fishermen without needing to sell theperpetual right. This is meant to soften the 
impact on ITQ inception so that changes in industry uctures would not be too drastic and 
swift. 
 
Keep an eye on changes in the fishery system 
 
Introducing ITQs in a given fishery is a brave decision. Changes may arise all the time and 
many of them will be irreversible. Managers shall remember that an open mind to changes 
may indeed help the process of management. Arising claims from groups with a right to 
exploitation of the resources such as indigenous people, recreational fishermen and groups 
with interest in resource protection such as conservationists should be taken into account.  
 
Include fishermen’s technical expertise 
 
The setting up of technical measures related to the harvesting operations should include the 
industry as an input-giving factor. Working groups dealing with technical measures are a 
good instrument for allowing fishermen to participate and share their expertise in finding 
solutions to by-catch problems. In New Zealand, for example, fishermen, scientists and 
foreign experts have managed to come up with technical solutions such as the mammal 
excluding panel, which is accompanied by incentives to introduce it. 
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Develop participation structures 
 
The inclusion of all stakeholders’ factions into the management process enhances legitimacy 
and commitment. It is a long, costly and complex process but outcomes would be positive. It 
is advisable for managers to enable all to expresses their thoughts and to help those without 
the economic means to participate (e.g. conservationis s). 
 
Request stakeholders to bear part of all costs of management 
 
Cost recovery encourages industry participation, transparency and interest for cost 
effectiveness of research. But be careful that industry would tend to focus on most profitable 
species which may not be in line with an ecosystem approach to management. Rules shall be 
established and agreed between government and players on the latter. Industry shall be let free 
to invest on their own in issues related to research on species of major economic interest. This 
fact expands the knowledge basis and contributes to resource sustainability. 
 
Review enforcement rules regularly 
 
Reviewing enforcement rules regularly protect the system against fishers’ inventive ways of 
circumventing enforcement. This is as important as setting up strong rules. Even though 
draconian measures are expected to discourage non-compliance economic incentives to cheat 
are always strong. New Zealand lessons are to builda strong enforcement apparatus in which 
an effective judicial apparatus, experienced MCS staff, infrastructure, collaboration between 
Ministry, policy and army and informative material nviting people to denounce a poacher 
builds a network to deter illegal practices. 
 
Managers should always have the last decision on resource sustainability 
 
The authority of managers to take hard decisions on resource sustainability must not be 
questioned. Even in such a comprehensive market basd system such as the New Zealand’s, 
the fisheries minister takes decision that may harm the interest of the fishing industry. The 
New Zealand’s experience teaches us that quick decisions shall be taken for the sake of 
sustainability and based on the best available scientific knowledge. Therefore, none economic 
interest shall interfere when deciding to close fisheries when stocks are in risk. 
 
8 Conclusions  
 
Although it is difficult to draw conclusions about what the main forces have been in shaping a 
rather successful QMS, it is noticeable that qualities intrinsic to the right such as high 
transferability, security and durability have been determinant factors. These characteristics 
have enhanced the quality of the titles that has developed a sense of ownership, which has 
generated stakeholder’s involvement in management and enhancing of competitiveness. This 
participatory aspect has been among the driving forces in developing the New Zealand fishing 
industry. It has allowed for a growing concern about how to improve the management 
systems through cost-recovery, participation in research and growing concern about the 
impact of fishing activities on the ecosystem.  
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From the side of the government, withdrawal of subsides have enhanced industry 
inventiveness, which has been expressed in the developm nt of products through research and 
development, improvement of sea and land capabilities, and the expansion of export markets. 
Although many point at the impact on equity as one f the negative outcomes of a system that 
gives efficient actors the opportunity to prosper at the expense of the inefficient actors, it 
seems that the New Zealand system has offered the exiters alternative economic opportunities.  
 
The issue of indigenous people and their degree of inv lvement in the system also means that 
New Zealand has taken decisions to respect customary rights. Therefore integration of the 
Maoris and white New Zealanders into the system is also acknowledged to be successful.  
 
New Zealand’s experience tells us that managers shall consider carefully the introduction of 
property right systems by defining clearly what theobjectives are from the very beginning. 
Trade offs are to be carefully taken into account. If a country or region aims at economic 
efficiency as the overall objective the New Zealand experience tells us that introduction of 
high quality property rights is the path to be followed. However, if social concerns are the 
objective, property right cannot be applied comprehensively and the quality of the titles will 
diminish.  
 
Experiences show us that this innovation work fairly well when applied in a relatively new 
fishery, but there is a big doubt whether they will ork in traditional fisheries where many 
actors will be expelled from the system. How to balance economic efficiency and social 
objectives?  
 
New Zealand government still keeps control of many spects of the system. It has a share of 
the TAC booked to recreational fisheries, which they consider a strong tradition in the country 
and an important aspect of citizens’ well being, while another share of the TACC belongs to 
customary groups. These are measures that soften social impacts of the QMS. Within the 
scope of the commercial TAC, the lack of interventio  of government in the trade of quotas 
among commercial stakeholders is one of the main reasons for the increase in exports and 
value of the fishery.  
 
Lessons from New Zealand are to shift risk from government to commercial stakeholders, to 
consider industry the sole responsible to invest in capital, to consult the industry on 
management decisions, to recover costs, to contract research from research suppliers, to take 
input from the fishermen when introducing technical measures and to pay attention to further 
uses of sea in order to avoid or smooth a conflict among factional groups such as fishermen, 
sea farmers, recreational fishermen, customary interests and conservationists. 
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Acronyms list 
 
ACE  Annual Catch Entitlement 
 
CCR  Cost Recovery Regime 
 
DWFF  Distant Waters Fishing Fleets 
 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
 
FMA  Fisheries Management Areas 
 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
 
IPOAMC International Plan of Action for the Managemnt of Fishing Capacity  
 
ITQ  Individual Transferable Quota 
 
MCS  Monitoring Control and Surveillance 
 
NIWA  National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research Limited 
 
QMS  Quota Management System 
 
TAC  Total Allowable Catch 
 
TACC  Total Allowable Commercial Catch 
 
VMS  Vessel Monitoring System 
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Appendix 
Facts and figures on the New Zealand fisheries 
 
TACC    589,000 tonnes 
 
Total effective catch  517,000 tonnes 
 
Exports   90% of total production 
 
Value (2006)   0.7 billion Euros 
 
Wild capture   NZ$ 1.1 billions 
 
Aquaculture   NZ$ 240 millions 
 
Total quota value  NZ$ 3.8 billion 
 
Fleet    1,372  
 
Quota owners   1,678 
 
Direct employment  7,155 
 
Direct subsides  None 
 
 
Source: Peacey (2007) 
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Objectives of management  
Objectives of management of fishing resources fall into four broad categories: economic 
efficiency, biological robustness, social robustness and cost effectiveness of management. 
These four general objectives are common to most fisher es management systems in the 
world. Connor Bailey and Sven Jentof (1992) stress that undertaking any objective of 
fisheries management usually produces effects or trade offs on other intended objectives.  
Although it may be not hard to define objectives, it is indeed hard to carry out actions to 
achieve them since trade off among objectives may arise nd be hard to counterbalance. Hard 
decisions in fisheries management means that in some situations the sacrifice of some 
objectives, for the sake of goals that are more relvant to a given fishery in a given situation, 
is unavoidable (e.g. stock collapses).  This may generate conflict and hurt individual and 
group interests. Innovations to management applied in other regions of the world such as the 
ones studied in this report, show that smart mechanisms can be introduced to diminish 
negative effects of managing fisheries management when aiming at one or all of the 
aforementioned objectives.  
 
Most cases of innovative management in the world consist of a combination of innovations. 
All the innovations studied in this report consist of a mixture of innovations in which a 
backbone innovation is accompanied with several comple entary ones. These structures 
support their management systems. Many of the comple entary tools have been developed 
during the innovations’ life span, arising when dealing with problems, and in many cases 
through a participatory process which is a good platform to launch modifications to the 
original model when necessary. In this context, it is remarkable that the EU now is investing 
considerable time and funds to develop the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs). We believe 
the development of such a platform will enable the EU to improve fisheries management 
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while building flexible structures to face problems through a continuous process of learning 
and adjusting to the ever changing management context. The following section will synthesise 
general best practices from the previous chapters on how to pursue the four general objectives 
of management 
 
Economic efficiency 
In broad terms, economic efficiency is understood as the maximisation of resource rents. 
Economic efficiency is related to indicators such as reduction of government intervention in 
terms of subsides and aids; the construction of industrial competitiveness; and the reduction 
of redundant fishing and processing capacity. The comprehensive property right system 
applied in New Zealand (see Chapter 4) is probably the best known example of a system that 
has achieved most of the intended economic goals. Economic efficiency has been reached by 
letting the market guide a process in which the most efficient operators have survived and 
built a modern and competitive industry. Iceland is another good example of capacity 
reduction and increase in the value of the fishery which has increased from 20 million US$ to 
450 million US$ in 18 years (see Chapter 3). Despit the focus on economic efficiency, New 
Zealand and Iceland have devised mechanisms to diminish the impact of economic measures 
on other aspects of the fishery. The New Zealand an Iceland experiences with 
comprehensive ITQ systems are good examples to draw useful conclusions from when aiming 
at economic efficiency.   
 
In a different context, the Pollock cooperatives in Alaska (see Chapter 1) are other good 
examples of right based management that have shown effectiveness in meeting economic 
efficiency. In fact the coops manage a proper ITQ system by letting the dynamics of right 
base management operate within each coop by allowing leasing and selling of fishing 
privileges among members. In this way, the fittest operators predominate, while marginal 
capacity is eliminated. Another modality of ITQs is found in Nova Scotia in Canada where 
the allocation has been carried out on a fishing gear basis bringing about a substantial 
rationalization of the fleet (see Chapter 2). From the cases mentioned above it is clear that 
property rights have introduced a powerful driver to economic efficiency with especial 
regards to reduction of marginal capacity. These experiences are a good source of ideas to 
achieve the intended goals while counteracting the negative outcomes of introducing 
measures aiming at economic efficiency. Lessons from the cases revised comprise: 
 
Introduce exclusive, durable, transferable and secure rights if you aim at economic 
efficiency 
 
If managers aim at reaching economic efficiency, the implementation of ITQs may help them 
to reach their objectives. Property rights may introduce a powerful driver to economic 
efficiency. Rights that hold the most attractive characteristics of property rights such as 
exclusivity, security, high transferability and duration may enable the most efficient 
stakeholders to remain in the activity and to grow competitive while eliminating unnecessary 
harvesting and processing capacity. Regarding duration, this characteristic has been addressed 
differently by New Zealand and Iceland. It seems that Iceland have managed to obtain 
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efficiency in the system without allocating permanent rights as New Zealand did.  In addition, 
managers should keep in mind that social distress may arise. They shall counterbalance the 
trade offs and establish measures to diminish social distress. These measures may diminish 
economic efficiency but may help to meet social objectives. Allocation of rights to fishing 
communities, skippers, crews and buy out programmes shall smooth changes in ownership 
and fleet restructuring.  
 
If the decision is to introduce a long term property right, establish a mechanism to transfer 
the annual share of the right 
 
When managing permanent or long termed ITQs, the introduction of an annual catch 
entitlement similar to the ACE used in New Zealand llow stakeholders to buy and lease the 
share for the current year -which varies according to stock status- in such a way that quota 
owners do not need to transfer their property right forever, but they are able to transfer or 
lease the share that corresponds to the current year. The introduction of an Annual Catch 
Entitlement is meant to soften the impact on an ITQ implementation so that changes in 
industry structures would not be too quick and drastic.  
 
Initial allocations should be done in percentages of the TAC 
 
The inception of comprehensive property rights builds ownership and quota owners will be 
ready to challenge any decision that threatens their assets. Managers should carry out the 
original allocation of rights in percentages of theTAC. In this way, further stock declines will 
not need to be economically compensated as was the cas  in New Zealand. Allocation in 
percentages of the TAC shift risk to quota owners. In this way, further reductions of the TAC 
due to changes in resource status will not be easily contested and challenged in court.  
 
Biological robustness 
Biological robustness has been, for a long time, th main focus of management. Concerns for 
achieving sustainable levels of exploitation and recov ry of stocks after collapse, have 
determined that biological objectives have been top priority in agendas and that biology has 
been the main support to decision making. Governments have devoted large amounts of 
economic resources and technical expertise to achieve biological aims. Despite efforts 
devoted by governments and international organisations biological robustness is likely to be 
the hardest issue to deal with since managing marine resources faces high uncertainty. In the 
cases reviewed in this report many mechanisms have been introduced to approach biological 
robustness. Mechanisms comprise participatory approaches to gather the empiric knowledge 
of stakeholders, industry hired research, enhancement of MCS systems and introduction of 
tools in line with the Precautionary Approach to fisheries management such as the HCRs. 
Challenges may keep arising and the ecosystem approch t  management stands as one of the 
major challenge to reinforce resource and environmental wellbeing. This fact may determine 
that innovations shall keep evolving and adapting to new situations. The lessons that can be 
drawn from the cases revised are: 
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Review enforcement rules regularly and establish a strong and flexible MCS system 
 
Reviewing enforcement rules regularly protects the system against fishers’ inventive ways of 
circumventing enforcement. This is as important as setting up strong rules. Even though 
draconian measures are expected to discourage non-compliance economic incentives to cheat 
are always strong. Strong enforcement system in which an effective judicial apparatus, 
experienced MCS staff, infrastructure, collaboration between Ministry, policy and army and 
informative material inviting people to denounce a poacher builds a network to deter illegal 
practices. Strong enforcement will provide fairness to fair players and the marine resources 
will be better managed.  
 
Establish good observer coverage on board and let communities participate in MCS 
 
Efficient observer coverage on board helps managing bycatch problems and other potential 
ecosystem considerations (damage of bottom habitat, undersized fish, etc). This will make 
sustainability labelling easier and the fish may reach a higher value in the market. In addition, 
a real time, online catch reporting system similar to the one held by Iceland and open to 
everybody is expensive but backs up monitoring effectiv ly. Monitoring carried out by 
fishing communities may increase its acceptance in the community. The arms-length user pay 
monitoring system developed in Nova Scotia in Canad, for example, works well (see 
Chapter 2). This modality of monitoring system might link up very well to both an ITQ 
system, for example, and to community based management. In both cases local fishers and 
officers should be very interested in keeping a close, real-time eye on landings.  
 
Enable collaborative research and encourage industry initiatives on research 
 
Although collaborative research and co-management is ot error-free, it is clear that increased 
communication and industry involvement helps strengthening the credibility of science. It has 
also helped to learn to accept uncertainty as inherent to fisheries science and management, to 
live with it and to take it into account for decisions. The case of ground fish fisheries in Nova 
Scotia in Canada are a good example of the latter. Such initiatives should be encouraged to 
improve communication and trust between scientists and fishermen. In New Zealand, 
scientists working for the industry as consultants i crease the quality of research which is 
benefited by a process of continuous peer reviewing. Industry shall also be free to invest on 
their own in issues related to research on species of major economic interest. This fact 
expands the knowledge basis and contributes to resou ce sustainability. Research hired by 
industry speeds up knowledge production and helps to facilitate management. This is 
especially feasible when self management is in place. This is the case of Pollock coops in 
Alaska which hire scientific services to undertake th  by catch reduction programme.  
 
When setting TAC establish an HCR 
 
It makes the setting of TACs robust to both economic and biological changes. The fishermen 
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should be part of the formulation process for HCR as it has been the case in Iceland, for 
example. Although in most cases fishermen do not play any formal role in the management 
system, in practice they should have easy and direct ac ess to the decision makers.  The 
management objectives concerning the biological resources and the basic ideas of an HCR 
should be decided by law in order to avoid negotiati n on the TAC thus ensuring sustainable 
fisheries. There will always be room for negotiations (ecosystem concerns, data, models etc.), 
but some kind of border should be drawn for what can be negotiated. It is also advisable to 
decide on HCR for non-harvested species and criteria fo  developing a new fishery. It allows 
for precaution when developing a new fishery. 
 
Include fishermen’s technical expertise 
 
The setting up of technical measures related to harvesting operations should include the 
industry as an input-giving factor. Working groups dealing with technical measures are a 
good instrument to allow fishermen to participate and share their expertise in finding 
solutions to by-catch problems, for example.  
 
Keep a share for the TAC for other uses 
 
If managers decide for a perpetual rights allocation hey should remember changes will be 
irreversible. Hence, it is a good idea for the managers to hold a percentage of the TAC for 
uses other than the share to be allocated for the commercial activity (Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch). Other uses of the TAC comprise scientific, recreational fisheries, 
customary and even a share for precaution. New Zealand provides an example of 
segmentation of the TAC into the main sectors of the fishing activity: commercial, customary 
and recreational. 
 
Managers should always have the last decision on resource sustainability 
 
The authority of managers to take hard decisions on resource sustainability must not be 
questioned. Even in a comprehensive market based system, the fisheries minister has to take 
decision that may harm the interest of the fishing industry. The case of a recent closure of one 
fishery for orange roughy in New Zealand provides a good example of quick and brave 
ministerial decisions when resource wellbeing is at risk (see page 130). Quick decisions shall 
be taken for the sake of sustainability and based on the best available scientific knowledge. 
Therefore, no economic interest shall interfere when d ciding to close fisheries when stocks 
are being threatened. 
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Social robustness 
Social robustness has an increasing weight in the agendas of fisheries managers. Modern 
management steps a side of aiming merely at economic efficiency and biological robustness -
the traditional main objectives of management- and turns its attention to social aims. Social 
goals involve stakeholder’s acceptability, institutional sustainability of the regime and legal 
conformity of the innovation to the legal context. Experiences in the world (e.g. New 
Zealand) show that even when agendas do not include social aspects among its aims social 
distress will demand modification of the original model. In this context, institutional 
adaptation to new demands is a key factor of success. In New Zealand, the involvement of 
Maoris into the QMS -although contentious at a first stage- demanded modification of the 
original property rights model. It seems that adaptability of New Zealand institutions to this 
change has been successful and in conformity with law, specially the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Other systems in the world have been developed by taking social aspects into account from 
the very beginning. The case of New Scotia in Canad shows that mechanisms can be found 
to allocate rights in such a way that conflict, if not eliminated, is at least smoothened. 
Participatory management and transparency of the process contributes to social robustness, 
building legitimacy which facilitates stakeholder’s acceptability. It is possible that in Canada 
the social objectives were high in the original agenda since the particular characteristics of its 
fisheries based on traditional fishing communities facilitated the development of structures in 
which stakeholders have tangible participation in decision making. The lesson that can be 
drawn from the case revised are: 
 
Identification of sectors 
 
Prior to undertaking a rationalization process, managers should collect comprehensive 
information on characteristics of the fisheries to be dealt with. Different fisheries require 
different solutions. The information collected should comprise historical catches, 
characteristics of fishing fleets, fishermen, economic and social dependency on the resources 
being exploited, alternative labour opportunities and identification of organisation structures 
and rules within the fishery that can support a reorganisation of the fishery activity. 
 
Limit transferability of fishing rights to fishing communities 
 
The experiences reviewed in this report show that property rights holding unlimited 
transferability and high duration introduce high efficiency but undermine social robustness. 
Fishing rights allocation limited to the fishing community such as the model applied in Nova 
Scotia presents a very strong alternative to rights wi h unlimited transferability. The Nova 
Scotia experience of community based ITQs shows a strong balance between social and 
economic objectives.  It is not just conflict resolution, there is still plenty of conflict, but it 
also shows that the system can maintain rural employment, viable fishing communities, broad 
participation in decision making and smooth the entry of new fishers into the fishery, while at 
the same time achieving most of the benefits of increased economic efficiency including 
smoothing the exit of fishers who want to retire or who represent surplus fishing capacity.  
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Subjects to allocation 
 
Giving rights not only to vessel owners, but also to the captains and the crew shall increase 
legitimacy and acceptance of the process of rights allocation. Moreover, it would impede 
power to be concentrated on a few hands. This practice requires comprehensive data. In 
Alaska, for example, there was a problem with colleting data on how much the crew (other 
than the captains) had worked on a fishing vessel.  
 
Develop participation structures 
 
The inclusion of all stakeholders’ factions into the management process enhances legitimacy 
and commitment. It is a long, costly and complex process but outcomes would be positive. It 
is advisable for managers to enable all to expresses their thoughts and to help those without 
the economic means to participate (e.g. conservationis s). Fisheries management should 
involve stakeholders in addressing management issues and in evaluating management 
decisions. Although this may be time consuming, involvement can improve the 
communication between the different parties, which again can improve acceptance of the 
different views. Involvement may improve the quality of the management decisions as more 
aspects are brought to the table. Involvement will trigger negotiations, which can result in 
innovative solutions.  
 
Cost effectiveness of management 
Large funds and expertise are devoted to managing fishing resources with regards of research, 
administration or MCS. Concerns on increasing budgetary requirements may determine the 
generation of mechanisms that allow effective reduction of management expenses. 
Mechanisms to recover the cost of management from the s akeholders are in use in many 
places in the world. They recover, all or part of the management costs. It is a highly debated 
aspect of modern management and many managers and scientists disagree since the cost 
recovery tool may become a powerful tool of combat for the industry to contest management 
decisions. Costs of management shall rise since tendencies of modern management are to 
consider ecosystem issues into account. This requirs development of research and technical 
capabilities. Increasing use of the seas, not only by fisheries but also to aquaculture and other 
activities, will require strengthening the enforcement apparatus which will increase 
management expenses. The main lessons that can be drawn from the cases revised are: 
 
Request stakeholders to bear part of all costs of management 
 
Cost recovery encourages industrial participation, transparency and interest for cost 
effectiveness of research. But care must be taken because industry will tend to focus on the 
most profitable species, which may not be in line with an ecosystem approach to 
management. Rules shall be established and agreed between government and players on the 
latter. Industry shall be let free to invest on their own in issues related to research on species 
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of major economic interest. This fact expands the knowledge basis and contributes to resource 
sustainability. 
 
Allow the industry to independently hire research services  
 
Industry may have particular interest in some species with a higher economic value. Managers 
should consider giving facilities to the industry to hire research on their own. This contributes 
to the biological knowledge base for management. It allows the development of private 
providers of research services and gives agility to the assessment process. Research produced 
in this way enables stakeholders to contrast their findings to officially hired research. This in 
turn improves the research process. Industry hired research is not an expense to the 
government but a benefit of the whole system. 
 
Allow communities to undertake MCS activities 
 
In a context of self fisheries management, allowing groups to undertake MCS activities may 
reduce the cost of management to a great extent. MCS activities carried out by the community 
or cooperatives may also produce legitimacy and enhance compliance since participants are 
permanently controlled by their colleagues. The case of Pollock cooperatives in Alaska is a 
good example of the effectiveness of a system of MCS carried out by the members 
themselves.  
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Appendix 
Guide questionnaire 
 
 
A brief revision of the history of the fishery 
• What was the situation of the fishery two decades ago?  
• What were the main problems at that time?  
• When were the ground breaking measures that allowed the improvement of the fishery 
management system introduced?  
• Did those measures yield immediate positive results? 
• Was that innovative model a creation of the involved managers and scientists of that 
time?  
• Was that model ‘imported’ from somewhere? 
• Did you encounter legal problems when the measures were introduced? 
• Did you have to adjust the measures due to legal problems (law suits etc.)? 
• Was the legitimacy of the measures questioned when they were introduced? 
 
The current situation of the industry 
• How do you perceive the current situation of the industry?  
• What are the causes of success / failure of the industry?  
• Who are the key persons behind this situation?  
• What have been the key factors that generated the curr nt situation?  
• What are the challenges the fishery faces?  
• What are the constraints?  
• What are the comparative and competitive advantages?   
• What are the threats? 
 
The policy 
• Are the goals and objectives of the policy accurately s t? 
• What are the strengths of the policy in use?  
• What are the weaknesses?  
• Does the policy include any goal on innovation or at le st shows flexibility to accept 
new approaches? 
• Did the policy developed involve the participation f users and wider stakeholders? 
Was participation balanced (e.g. were ‘minorities’ involved)? How were transparency 
and accountability of the process ensured? 
• Is the inclusion of stakeholders in the management process stated in the policy?  
• Does the policy encourage investment and added value?  
• Does the policy control fishing capacity and effort?  
• Does the policy protect the resources and the enviro ment?  
• Does the policy seek an improvement in labour and protein supply?  
• Does it seek economic efficiency? 
• (How) Does it seek to improve social conditions, e.g. create sustainable communities?  
• Have there been major modifications of the policy/management innovation over time?  
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o If yes, were these induced by learning processes or rather by external 
circumstances?  
• Is the policy designed in a way that it accounts for uncertainty/ long-term dynamics 
and promotes learning (e.g. through adaptive management structures: monitoring, 
feedback processes, responsive decision structures, experimenting)? 
• Does the central government devote attention to the fis ry as a meaningful sector of 
the national economy?  
• Does the central government devote economic and human resources accordingly?  
• Are there any known conflicts of the measure with national law (e.g. constitutional 
law or state aids)? 
• Are there any known conflicts of the measures with in ernational law (e.g. trade law, 
competition law etc.)? 
 
The management 
• Is this a top-down management system? If not 
o Can the current system be described as an innovative management system? 
• Does the current system include active stakeholder participation?  
• Do you consider stakeholder participation positive in all cases?  
• Does stakeholder participation speed up the process or does it delay decision making?  
• What are the more radical positions of stakeholders?  
• Is there a conflict between certain stakeholder groups?  
• Are the final decisions normally based on what was debated and decided with the 
stakeholders?  
• Do the various stakeholders (fishermen/industry, processing sector, civil society e.g. 
conservationist, etc.) accept management innovation?  
o Were there conservationist’s protests, legal challenges or the like when the 
management innovation was introduced?  
o Are there high levels of infringement by fishers?  
o Do the stakeholders (industry and broader society) participate in the 
institutional arrangements (formal and informal channels of participation), or 
do they oppose them? 
• Is there a good communication between the scientists, government officials and 
stakeholders?  
• How do you deal with the gap regarding communication between the scientists and the 
industry?  
• How do you assure compliance with regulations?  
• Do you have an efficient MCS system?  
• Does the industry participate in MCS? Does the industry finance part of the costs of 
MCS? 
 
The production of knowledge 
• Does the current management system encourage multidisciplinary participation in 
assessment, advice and decision making? 
• Is the traditional knowledge included in the knowledg  basis? If so,  
• Is there evidence of an improvement of fisher compliance?  
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• What are the sources of error in data collection that undermine assessment?  
• Does the industry support part of the research costs?  
• Does the industry participate in assessment?  
• Is training of scientists and technicians an important part of the production of 
knowledge?  
• Does the current system include any kind of stakeholders training in the understanding 
of assessment tools (seminars, workshops)? 
 
The future 
• How do you see the fishery in one decade?  
• Do you expect the system to improve?  
• Do you suggest any means to improve the system?  
• Is there any dangerous trend that can threaten the sustainability of the exploitation in 
the near future?  
• In the event of collapse of the current exploited stocks: What would the impact on the 
social and economic side be? 
• Are there escape valves for a situation of social and economic distress? 
• Are there any potential resources for the development of new fisheries? 
 
